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Preface 
Flying as a means of travel is no more than 
another s forward in man's impulsive drive to 
discover and explore, to colonize and trade. The 
ship, the railway and the automobile have already 
made their contributions toward these ends, that of 
the aeroplane is currently being madeo However, in 
the field of r transport, progress has been so rapid 
and comprehensive that the aeroplane may possibly 
represent the last step; for, short of the development 
of travel by ballistic methods, long-distance journeys 
are becoming more and more the prerogative of the 
international airlineso On shorter s too, air 
journeys of less than 200 miles appear to be accepted 
as both practicable and reasonable, even in areas 
where surface transport is highly developedo Airlines 
and rcraft are today as much a part of our worid as 
the metropolitan bus and the suburban train. Fifty 
years ago rline life was just beginning; today 
suspension of its activity would inconvenience millions. 
Consequently the time has long passed when 
aviation ~as a subject exclusively for the enthusiasts 
and pioneers; today it is a subj which is of 
iv 
interest to everyone for it concerns everyone. 
New Zealand's concern with commercial aviation is 
probably greater than that of most nations since her 
geographical remoteness and exceptionally large 
volume of overseas trade combine to make the country 
dependent on r and sea transport. It is, 
therefore, hard to understand why successive 
governments in a country which has been so much to 
the fore in conceiving and developing its extensive 
social services and export pastoral industries failed 
to realize the importance of controlling New Zealand's 
export shipping. 
Fortunately, the grim circumstances of war 
revealed to New Zealand's policy-makers that this 
mistake could not be lowed to repeat itself in the 
field of commercial aviation, and so today New Zealand 
owns and operates its own external ai ine - Air 
New Zealand. Like everyone of the hundreds of 
companies which now form the airline world, Air New 
Zealand possesses a personality of its own and has had 
to solve a pattern of problems peculiar to its own 
environment. 
The aim of this thesis is twofold. Firstly, 
it attempts to trace and record the development of 
TEAL, the predecessor of Air New Zealand, trying 
v 
throughout to explain the causes and effects of 
various lines of development. Secondly, it 
endeavours to show why New Zealand ownership of an 
international airline was deemed essential and 
advantageous. I would like to stress that this is a 
study of the origins of New Zealand's international 
airline, not a study of New Zealand in international 
aviation, for the latter must, of necessity, include 
a treatment of all the airlines operating into New 
Zealand, and in addition an examination of New Zealand's 
attitude to international aviation as expressed at 
various conferences and in membership of various 
organisations. 
In the course of my research into TEAL's history, 
I came across few insurmountable difficulties in 
obtaining material, although I was surprised at the 
apparent lack of concern with the past on the part of 
the airline, a situation that seems to have ended with 
New Zealand's acquisition of total ownership. 
Nevertheless the company placed a great deal of 
information at my disposal and its staff revealed a 
pleasing willingness to recall events of the past 
with which they had been associated o 
vi 
Reference should be made to three extremely 
useful items in the company's possession - an 
untitled outline history, a chronological outline of 
the company's operations and a monthly news-sheet. 
The first of these is a typewritten manuscript which 
outlines the growth of the airline and also discusses 
specialised agencies such as maintenance and catering. 
This work which has no title, is divided into a number 
of sections and is footnoted as TEAL, luntitled 
outline history], with chapter and page numbers~ The 
second work provides a chronological outline of the 
airline's history between the years 1940 and 1961. 
As its pages are not numbered, it is footnoted as 
TEAL, Operational History, followed by the date of 
entry. The third work is a monthly news-sheet which 
was issued from 1940 until 1954 when it was superseded 
by a monthly bulletin, Tealagram, the name of which 
was changed to The Air New Zealander in 1965. This 
item has been footnoted as TEAL, Report for the Month. 
The other major primary source for this thesis 
has been the metropolitan newspapers, principally 
The New Zealand Herald and The Press. They were of 
particular value for their editorials and articles by 
aviation correspondents which, if not always impartial, 
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were valuable guides in assessing the attitudes of 
the timeo Mention should also be made of the 
information contained in the files of Whites Aviation, 
Auckland. This company has, through the interest of 
its founder, seemingly assumed the role of archivist 
for New Zealand aviation and has in its possession a 
great deal of valuable information, concerning not 
only TEAL but all aspects of civil and military 
avi on in this countryo 
Secondary materi'al is not abundant; most of the 
references so classified in the bibliography deal with 
a much wider picture into which TEAL and Air New 
Zealand fit as one small part. However RoEoGo Davies' 
work A History of the World's Airlines (1964) is 
extremely valuable for, not only is it a source of 
reference, but it also provides a world-wide picture 
into which New Zealand developments can be placed and 
with which New Zealand can be compared. 
In compiling this the s, two major difficulties 
were experiencedo Firstly, I considered it necessary, 
in order to present a full picture of the rline's 
change to an international operator, to continue the 
period under consideration up to the end of L967. 
This is the point where history becomes the present 
and the present becomes history, and it means the 
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inclusion of a period in which I had a personal 
interest in the development of aviation in New 
Ze and. This, I hope, has not been allowed to 
interfere with the assessments and judgements which 
I have passed. 
Secondly, in the treatment of a topic which spans 
more than a quarter of a century, many subjects must 
of necessity be summarily dealt with and others 
excluded altogether. Many of these concern 
sp alised agencies, maintenance, catering, cabin 
services, and are undoubtedly important in themselves; 
however, this importance usually diminished when the 
item was included in the whole and reluctantly these 
factors were excluded. To have given them the 
attention they deserve would greatly increase the 
length of this study and would so demand an intimate 
knowledge of these agencies which is to be gained only 
through a more considerable association with the 
airline than I, regrettably, was able to experience. 
* * * * * 
During my research I have incurred many debts of 
gratitudeo Undoubtedly my greatest debt is to the 
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staff of Air New Zealand, in particular Messrs 
V. Mitchell, P. Davidson and D. Findlay; 
Mrs N. La Hood; and Misses J. Oliver and Go Laloli 
of the Information Services department, who not only 
accommodated me in their office for almost two months 
but answered every question and met my every request 
with patience and enthusiasm. 
I wish to thank the many librarians who have 
tended my numerous demands, in the Auckland Public 
Library, the General 'Assembly Library, the University 
of Canterbury ary, and I would e cially like to 
extend my thanks to Mr R.C. Lamb and the staff of the 
New Zealand Room, Canterbury Public Library, 
Christchurch. I am also grateful for the help of 
Mr DoP. Woodhall of the Aviation Historical Society 
who provided a number of the illustrations and valuable 
information on the various aircraft used by the 
company. Thanks are also due to a great number of 
people who have contributed, directly or indirectly, 
to the compilation of the information presented in 
this thesis. They are too many to name individually 
but my thanks are no less because of this. 
I owe a special debt of gratitude to my 
supervisor, Professor WoD. McIntyre, for his 
suggestion of what has proven to be an extremely 
x 
interesting topic, and also for his supervision and 
guidance throughout my preparation of this study. 
Finally, to my sister, Miss Pam Thomson, I 
must express my grateful thanks, not only for her 
patience and forbearance in accurately transforming 
my written script into a more legible typescript, but 
also for her help in the checking and correction of 
the manuscript. 
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CHAPTER 1 FROM VISION TO REALITY 
On 30 April 1940 the first scheduled 
commercial flight of Tasman Empire Airways Limited 
commenced when the flying-boat "Aotearoa" lifted 
off Auckland Harbour and set course for Sydney, 
1,300 miles away across the Tasman Sea. Airlines, 
however, are not evolved overnight and this 
fledgling had been no exception. In the preceding 
ars a series of official discussions examined the 
feasibility of linking Australia and New Zealand 
with a commercial r service, whilst pioneer 
rmen demonstrated that such a link was possible. 
Consequently, the flight of the IIAotearoa ll was 
the cUlmination of some twelve years of endeavour 
aimed at establishing an air link between New Zealand 
and the outside world, in particular, with her near 
neighbour Australia. 
Such a link had been envisaged at the end of 
the First World War by no lesser person than 
Major-General Sir Frederick Sykes, Controller-Gene 
of Civil Aviation in Great Britain. In the course 
of an address delivered to the Royal Geographical 
Society in 1920, Sykes revealed that in June 1918 
2. 
he had prepared and read to the Imperial War 
Cabinet a paper in which the policy of uniting the 
various parts of the Empire by air was discussed. 1 
Sykes' paper 1920, in most part a descriptive 
outline of such a network, contained a proposal 
to link Austr ia and New Zealand by air. The 
Australian terminus was to be at Sydney, New 
Zealand's at ther New Plymouth or Wellington. 2 
New Plymouth never became a base for such a service 
and thirty years elapsed before Wellington was 
incorporated into the external air network of 
New Zealand. 3 The scheme is worthy of note, 
however, in th the linking of Australia and New 
Zealand in 1940 was the final extension of another 
Empire air scheme originating in Great Britain. 
The implementation of a scheme such as that 
envisaged by Sykes was not beyond the realms of 
possibility. The probability of such an event 
in the early 1920's was slight however as was 
revealed by an examination of the scheme within 
1. He Sykes, "Imperial Air Routes", 
Geographical Journal, 1920, lv(4), p.242. 
2. Ibid., pp.241-62. 
3. The first external commercial service from 
Wellington was flown 3 Oct 1950 .. 
3. 
the context of civil aviation of the day_ Only 
seventeen years had elapsed since the Wright 
Brothers' successful flight in a heavier-than-air 
machine, and Bleriot's crossing of the English 
Channel had taken place as recently as 1909. The 
First World War, in employing aeroplanes as weapons 
of attack and defence, provided an impetus to 
aircraft development, and the abundance of aircraft 
and airmen after the cessation of hostilities 
provided a suitable b~se from which civil aviation 
could, and did, develop. Within most major 
European countries, and also in the United states, 
airlines were formed and regular services commenced. 
In 1924 the struggling competitive services within 
Great Britain were combined into one company, 
Imperial Airways. It was intended that this 
organisation compete with the airlines of nearby 
continental countries, at the same time planning 
for more distant flights, with mail and passengers, 
along routes that would link the countries of the 
Empire. Thirteen years later, in 1937, an 
Imperial Airways' flying-boat carried out an 
experimental flight across the Tasman, gathering 
data for the proposed Tasman service o 
4. 
Australia, although far from the major 
aircraft suppliers, followed overseas trends and 
in the four years 1921-24 three airline companies 
commenced operations. The most important of this 
trio was the company Queensland and Northern 
Territory Aerial Services Limited for it was this 
firm which in 1934 joined with Imperial Airways to 
form Qantas Empire Airways Limited and this latter 
organisation was responsible for establishing the 
Empire Air Mail Scheme between the United Kingdom 
and Australia. Commercial operations across the 
Tasman were envisaged as a further extension of 
this scheme and consequently suffered by the delays 
which occurred before the England-Australia service 
was opened. 
In 1928, six years before the formation of 
Qantas Empire Airways, the second attempt to fly 
the Tasman Sea had succeeded. Preceding years 
had shown that the aeroplane could cover long 
distances by means of a succession of short flights. 
In June 1919 Ross and Keith Smith won a prize of 
£10,000 offered by the Australian Government for 
the successful completion of a flight of less than 
thirty days between England and Australia. In the 
5 .. 
same year Alcock and Brown conquered the Atlantic. 
The Pacific's turn came in 1928 when Kingsford Smith 
crossed from California to Brisbane by way of 
Honolulu and Fiji.. Sooner, or later, as this 
shrinking of the globe continued, attention was 
certain to focus on the Tasman, as yet uncrossed, 
and in 1928 the first of the twenty crossings 
undertaken over the next eight years commenced. 
Ironically, the first attempt was destined to be the 
one flight in twenty which failed. In a small 
monoplane named "Aotearoa", the same name as that 
given twelve years later to one of the regular 
Tasman service flying-boats, Lieutenant J.R. Moncrieff 
and Captain G. Hood made their bid to be conquerors 
of the Tasman. Leaving Richmond, some forty miles 
from Sydney, on 10 January 1928, they headed 
eastward hoping to land at Trentham. Shortly after 
twelve hours flying-time" had elapsed radio contact 
with the airmen was lost. They were neither 
sighted nor heard from again and the wreckage of 
their aircraftre~ains undiscovered. 
Despite the tragic ending of this initial 
attempt others were ready to try and in September 
1928, just eight months after Hood and Moncrieff's 
6. 
attempt, the "Southern Cross", with a crew of 
four - C.E. Kingsford Smith, C.T.P. Ulm, 
H.A. Litchfield and T.H. McWilliam - completed 
the first aerial crossing of the Tasman Sea, in a 
time of 14 hours 25 minutes. Another link in the 
airways of the world was forged and, in Australia 
and New Zealand, the time could be visualized when 
mail and passengers would travel the distance 
between the countries above, rather than on, the 
Tasman Sea. 
Time was obviously needed for the complete 
development of a service but the arrival of 
"Southern Cross" at Wigram Aerodrome was a practical 
demonstration that the limitations suffered by 
New Zealand as a result of the country's isolation 
were on the way to being overcome. The significance 
of the event was not lost upon the politicians of 
the day. New Zealand's Prime Minister, J.G. Coates, 
announced a grant of £2,000 to the party as an 
encouragement to such efforts - "not with the view 
of anything spectacular, but of the possible growth 
of trade and passenger services by air.,,1 
1. PO, ccxix, 120. 
7 .. 
H .. E. Holland, Leader of the Opposition, saw the 
flight as "the forerunner of important air services 
between New Ze and, Australia, and other countries,,1, 
and in similar mood the Australian Prime Minister, 
S.M. Bruce, expressed the hope that the flight might 
"inaugurate a new era in the means of communication 
between our two Dominionso,,2 A Christchurch 
newspaper was even bolder.. In a leading article 
it acknowledged the fact that a regular Tasman 
service was s 11 a long way off, but went on to 
say, "in less than a decade the growth of public 
interest and confidence in the new method of travel 
will have made material 3 advance .. " 
One month and three days later, 14 October 
1928, Kingsford Smith and his crew flew 
"Southern Cross" back to Australia .. This return 
flight lasted nearly twenty-three hours but this 
double crossing clearly foreshadowed the establishment 
of a regular service across the Tasman. How 
long that would take and the type of aircraft best 
suited for such -a service were questions which 
demanded answers .. The flights of "Southern Crossf! 
1. PD, ccxix, 120. 
2.. Bruce to Coates, telegram, 11 Sep 1928, 
quoted in NZH, 12 Sep 1928. 
3. Lyttelton Times, 12 Sep 1928. 
had shown that men were available: adequate 
finance was now required in order that the most 
suitable type of aircraft might be obtained. 
Ulm summed the matter up; 
At present we know of no type 
of aircraft in production which is 
ideally suited to such a service but 
we are thoroughly convinced that such 
a type can, and will in the comparatively 
near future be developed GOO 0 However, 
in my opinion before such a service is 
put into operation at least a year, or 
probably two years, of work is ahead in 
research and preliminary organisationo 1 
others were to follow in the path of the 
"Southern Cross", Go Menzies (1931), 
Fo Chichester (1931), W.Mo O'Hara (1935), 
Jean Batten (1936) and L.E. Clark (1936) to name 
2 but a few .. Each flight contributed in some way 
to the growing fund of knowledge necessary before 
regular commercial operations could be attempted. 
Furthermore, they demonstrated that the ill-fate 
which terminated the attempt of Moncrieff and 
Hood was an exception to, rather than the ru of, 
flying conditions across the Tasman. Some of 
these flights were more spectacular than others. 
10 , 15 Oct 1928" 
2. For further det Is on these pioneering flights 
see L .. Jillett, Wings Across the Tasman" 
1928-1953. chaps II-XV .. 
9. 
Menzies finished upside down in a swamp near 
Hari Hari on the West Coast. Chichester made 
his journey from New Zealand to Australia even 
more hazardous than necessary by halting at 
Lord Howe and Norfolk Islands. Jean Batten's 
Tasman flight was only the last stage of a 
marathon England-New Zealand journey, completed 
in ten days. The activities of these aviators 
must not be allowed to overshadow a number of other 
Tasman flights taking place over the same period. 
Between January 1933 and July 1934 Kingsford Smith 
made four Tasman crossings and over the same 
period, his companion during the 1928 trip, DIm, 
performed six trans-Tasman flights. The 
significance of these flights is examined in 
greater detail later in this chaptero 1 At this 
point it may be noted that both men had made public 
statements concerning the establishment of a 
regular Tasman service and on some of these trips 
mails were carried. 
At the same time as this activity in the 
Tasman area, further development in the field of 
10 See below, pp.11-13. 
10. 
civil aviation was taking place overs.eas .. Indeed 
it was the combination of overseas development 
with local activity which finally led to the 
establishment of a Tasman service in 19400 
Providing the impetus for this development were 
two principal factors. The size of aircraft was 
increasing and this allowed for either greater 
range or payload and, in some cases, a combination 
of both. The second factor was that by the end 
of the 1920's the aeroplane was so well developed 
as a method of transportation that the Postal 
Union found it necessary to regulate its use for 
carrying mail and an Air Mail Convention was adopted 
by the Postal Union Congress which assembled in 
London in 1929 0 Under its provisions airmail fees 
were to be payable by ordinary postage-stamps and 
registration of correspondence sent by air was to 
be available if desired.' The Congress also decided 
upon a system by which air and sea mails could be 
di stingui shed 0 In future mail for despatch by air 
was to carry, on the upper left-hand corner of the 
front of the envelope, a blue label with the words 
"By ai r m ai 1 .. " 1 
10 AJHR, 1930, F 1, p.23. 
11. 
New Zealand airmails intended for England 
crossed the Tasman by ship and were then carried 
on by air, where such a service was established. 
In the latter part of 1930 Imperial Airways and 
the Dutch airline K.LoM. were engaged in a 
competitive drive to establish a route into 
South-east Asia, and in April 1931 Imperial Airways 
undertook the carriage of experimental mails to 
Australia. With the help of two Australian airline 
companies, Qantas and the original Australian 
National Airways, this venture proved highly 
successful. In the same year KeL.M. opened a 
regular passenger service between Amsterdam and 
Batavia. 1 The air link between Great Britain and 
New Zealand and Australia was gradually corning 
closer. It appeared, however, that some form of 
regular service on the section between England and 
Australia was required before the establishment of 
a Tasman service could be justified. 
The ten flights made by Smith and Ulm in the 
nineteen months between January 1933 and July 1934 
demonstrated that operation of a Tasman service was 
1. Batavia is now named Jakarta. 
12. 
a practi proposition. However, both agreed 
that a more suitable type of aircraft was an 
essential requirement of any such service. In 
1934 Smith, in predicting a regular service as 
being some five years distant, confessed that it 
was very difficult to talk of a regular service 
when there were few machines capable of performing 
such a task satisfactorily.l In the course of 
these flights airmail crossed the Tasman for the 
first time. On 17 February 1934, DIm carried 
the first rmail from New Zealand to Australia. 
In March Smith carried mail from Kaitaia to Sydney 
and during the following month DIm transported 
mail in both directions. At the time the desire 
for a regular airmail service between New Zealand 
and Australia provided the driving force behind the 
advocation of a Tasman service. It was too early 
to expect consistent passenger support for any 
service. Both countries were in the process of 
emerging from the Depression and a suitable type of 
passenger aircrqft'had still to be found. Airmail 
therefore appeared to offer the best prospect of 
support for any regular service that might be 
i. NZH, 15 Jan 1934. 
established .. In the course of four flights 
these two airmen transported some 123,000 letters 
weighing more than 1,600 lbs across the Tasman .. 1 
It seems astonishing that their activities did not 
lead more speedily to the inauguration of a 
regular Tasman service. A possible reason may 
lie in the fact that within fifteen months both 
had lost their lives in flying accidents in other 
parts of the world. 
In 1935 the commemoration of twenty-five years 
of the reign of King George V provided a fitting 
occasion on which to attempt an air-link between 
Great Britain and New Zealand. Kingsford Smith 
was to fly the Australia-New Zealand section and 
return, and, upon the arrival of the New Zealand 
mail, special flights were to be despatched from 
Brisbane to connect with Imperial Airways at 
Singapore. At last it seemed as if New Zealanders 
could despatch airmail to England in the knowledge 
that not just part but the entire route would be 
traversed by air .. Ill-fortune, however, ended 
this visionary enterprise. Four hundred and fifty 
1. AJHR, 1934-35, F 1, p.14o 
14" 
miles from Sydney one of the three motors on 
"Southern Cross" failed and as the stricken craft, 
another engine ailing, limped back to Sydney the 
Jubilee Mail was reluctantly jettisonedo 
New Zealand's Prime Minister, G.W. Forbes, at the 
time in London attending King George V's jubilee 
celebrations, expressed relief at Smith's escape 
from a "desperate situation" and ventured the 
opinion that the episode had reve ed that the 
right type of machine to make regular mail and 
passenger crossings a practical proposition had 
still to be found. 1 The leader writer of a 
Christchurch daily newspaper thought otherwise. 
The Prime Minister's attempt to draw a moral from 
an unsuccessful flight was deemed "regrettable" 
whilst the opinion he had ventured could "scarcely 
be regarded as authoritative or useful.,,2 By 
1935 a number of aircraft had been produced, in 
comparison with which the "Southern Cross" appeared 
both painfully slow and relatively small but 
apparently none ,of these aircraft fulfilled the 
Prime Minister's requirements. 
1. Press, 17 May 1935. 
2.. Ibid .. 
15. 
Kingsford Smith was undaunted by the failure 
of the Jubilee Mail attempt and within a month of 
that venture had formed and registered a 
developmental company the Trans-Tasman Development 
Company Limited .. He explained that the company 
was formed "for the purpose of co-ordinating the 
knowledge that has been gained by our previous 
crossings of the Tasman, dating back to 1928, 
together with investigations into the operating of 
a regular service",,1 It was, of course, impossible 
to inaugurate such a service almost immediately. 
After the Jubilee flight Smith had forecast 1937 
as the earl st possible date, warning that it was 
important to determine whether there was yet a 
demand for such a service. What was needed, he 
added, was a company which could offer the public 
a perfectly organised and entirely efficient service, 
and was also able to pay for itself" Necessities 
for successful operation he deemed to be punctuality, 
regularity, safe operation and a readiness to link 
up with Imperial Airwayso2 
1. Press, 6 Jun 1935. 
2. Ibid., 28 May 1935. 
16. 
Smith himself lost little time in moulding 
his company along such lines. Less than one 
month after its formation he submitted a comprehensive 
scheme for a Tasman service to the Federal Government 
of Australia. The scheme provided for the experimental 
operation of a Tasman service over a period of three 
to six months, using either flying-boats or land 
rcraft. It was suggested that the Governments of 
Australia and New Zealand purchase the machines and 
then, when the servic~ was firmly established, sell 
them to a permanent contractor who would continue to 
operate the service. New Zealand was to contribute 
sixty per cent., and Australia forty per cent., of 
the necessary funds, Smith reasoning that New Zealand 
had most to gain by the scheme. 1 
It was fortunate for Smith that the man before 
whom his proposals were ~lace~ was the Australian 
Minister for Defence, RaAG Parkhill, for he personally 
wished to see the Tasman air-service established as 
an Australian and New Zealand enterpriseo 2 Parkhill 
gave the proposals a warm reception, as was to be 
expected, but asked for further information and an 
estimated cost of such a scheme. 
1. 20 Jun 1935. 
2. Ibid., 13 Jul 1935. 
In less than a 
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fortnight the required information was presented: 
a company with a capital of £260,000 and operating 
Sikorsky flying-boats with a speed of 150 m.p"h. 
would make two trips in each direction weekly. 
The company would provide the machines but a subsidy 
would be required, and it was suggested that 
New Zealand contribute sixty per cent. of the 
required amount. 1 Smith's proposals were never 
put into practice but when Tasman Empire Airways 
Limited was formed, New Zealand did in fact become 
the major shareholder. This position New Zealand 
enjoyed until 1953, then, for eight years ownership 
was shared on a joint basis with Australia, until 
finally in 1961 the company became entirely 
New Zealand owned. 
When Cabinet endorsement was received for 
Parkhill's approval of t~e scheme, Kingsford Smith 
focussed his attention upon the politicians of 
New Zealand. For New Zealand the advantages of a 
Tasman air service were great - an end to isolation, 
tourists could stay longer and spend more and 
long-range aircraft and skilled personnel would be 
available for defence purposes. Furthermore, a 
1. Press, 17 Jul 1935. 
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service of this type would be needed if New Zealand 
was to share in the advantages which would follow 
the proposed speeding up of the England-Australia 
service .. 
On 24 July 1935 Smith met New Zealand's 
Cabinet Ninisters at Parliament House. If he could 
obtain their approval of his scheme the way was 
clear for him to comple necessary details of 
equipment and operation. Full details of the 
Conference were not disclosed but it was understood 
that Smith outlined two proposals to the Cabinet .. 
He offered a flying-boat service making two trips a 
week and requiring a subsidy of £80,000, New Zealand 
to contribute half or, alternatively, a service with 
Douglas landplanes, these carrying m only and 
requiring a smaller subsidy of £60,000, New Zealand 
again to contribute half the .amounto Either 
service, established, would also require protection 
for a period of six years.l Unfortunately for 
Smith, the New Zealand Government was less enthusiastic 
.. , 
than its Australian counterpart and gave only an 
undertaking to consider the proposals and notice of 
its intention to communicate with the Australian and 
1. CS, 25 Jul 1935 .. 
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Imperial authorities in regard to their contributing 
some of the cost. 
It is worthy of note that a change had taken 
place in the financial side of the scheme during 
the journey across the Tasman. New Zealand was no 
longer required to contribute sixty per cent. of 
the subsidy, fty per cent. was the new figure she 
would have to pay. Two months later a Sydney 
report indicated that an application had been lodged 
by Smith's associates with the Federal Director of 
Postal Services seeking permission to carry airmail 
between Australia and New Zealand. The service was 
to use Sikorsky flying-boats on a twice-weekly 
schedule and the commencement date, provided approval 
was granted, was given as July 1937. 1 The 
application contained no mention of a subsidy. 
Smith had apparently decided .the service did not 
need to rely upon a Government subsidy in order that 
it might be run as a commercial proposition. 
The prospects' of the Trans-Tasman Air Service 
Development Company, as the organisation was now 
1. CS, 7 Sep 1935. 
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known, operating a Tasman service suffered a serious 
setback in November 1935 when Smith lost his Ii 
in the course of an England-Australia flight. 1 
Lady Kingsford Smith decided that the company should 
continue its work and promised the backing of her 
own resources. She herself occupied the seat on the 
board of the company previously held by her late 
husband. The plans were to be continued but the 
driving force behind them had gone. This fact, 
combined with the reluctance of both the Australian 
and New and Governments to commit themselves 
definitely to the proposals, virtually ended the 
first attempt to establish a commerci r service 
across the Tasman" In 1936 the company tried again, 
placing proposals before both Governments. The 
proposals were unchanged - Sikorsky flying-boats, a 
three month trial period, two return flights a week, 
one Sydney to Auckland, the other Sydney to \'lellingtono 2 
1. The change in the name of the company by 
addition of the words 'Air Service' to the 
original title seems to have occurred about 
the time of Smith's death in Nov 19350 
The company was given its original title in 
a report in The Christchurch Star Sun, 
18 Dec 1935 but the new title appeared in 
reports in the same paper 17 Jan 1936, and 
also in The Press, 7 May 1936 and 
5 Feb 1936 .. 
2. ,5 Feb 1936, p,,12. 
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The attitude of the New Zealand Government so 
remained unaltered. Desiring joint control by the 
Australian and New Zealand Governments of the 
proposed service and committed to the extension of 
the Empire Air Mail Scheme to New Zealand, the 
New Zealand Government declined to make a decision. 
Upon the failure of these negotiations with the two 
Governments, the company concerned abandoned the 
project. Four more years were to pass before a 
commercial air service crossed the Tasman Sea. 
Much of the New Zealand Government's opposition 
to the Trans-Tasman Air Service Development Company 
Limited's scheme arose from the Government's interest 
in the proposed extension of the Empire Air Mail 
Scheme across the Tasman. As a result of this 
outlook the establishment of a Tasman service was 
clearly going to be h d up every time a delay 
occurred in the inauguration of the England-Australia 
section of the route. Delays on this section not 
only occurred, they were numerous and lengthy and 
this, in addition to the fact that the scheme was 
not intended to reach Australia until 1938, gave 
little hope for the early establishment of an aerial 
link between New Zealand and Australia. 
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The Empire Air Mail Scheme, devised by the 
Board of Imperial Airways, envisaged the carriage 
of all first-class mail by air, and, as well as 
providing an excellent way of expanding the field 
of the company's activities, was a workable way 
of linking various Commonwealth countries with 
Great Britain. The Bill establishing it passed 
the House of Commons on 20·December 1934 and 
proposed linking London and India in two days, 
London and South Africa in four days, with a similar 
time for a journey from London to Singapore by way 
of India. When extended to Australia the time for 
the journey was to be seven days and one further 
day would be needed to extend the service to New 
Zealand. The carriage of all first-class mail 
by r on these routes was provided for, the British 
Post Office proposing a letter r of l~d a half 
ounce although Governments of participating 
countries were free to fix their own charges. 
Clearly though the scheme would benefit greatly if 
charges were uniform throughout the whole system. 
The British Post Office also reported that it did 
1 
not expect to introduce the new rate before 1937. 
i. Details of the Empire Air Mail Scheme are 
given in H, 5th ser., ccxcvi, 1328-310 
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Not only did the scheme promise to b~ of great 
value in the transportation field, it was also 
vastly important for British prestige and in 
securing Empire cohesion through active leadership 
by the Mother Country. 
It was the intention of Imperial Airways to 
operate the scheme with flying-boats since this 
type of machine would not require elaborate aerodromes 
to be constructed and maintained along the routeso 
Accordingly, a fleet of twenty-eight Empire 
flying-boats was ordered from Short Broso The 
boldness in this action of placing a large order 
for an aircraft not yet designed or flown is revealed 
by the protracted evaluation programmes which precede 
the re-equipment of an airline today_ It was, 
however, an action in keeping with the character of 
a scheme subsequently described as "one of the most 
bold and successful measures ever taken in the 
history of air transport .. "l 
In the same month the airmail scheme was made 
public, a regular mail service was opened between 
Australia and England, enabling mail to travel from 
1. WaH. Fysh, Qantas at War, p.45. 
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England to New Zealand in seventeen or eighteen 
days, depending, of course, upon a good connection 
being made with a trans-Tasman steamer at Sydney. 
Realising the importance of this extension of the 
England-India air route to Australia, the New and 
Government agreed to contribute £5,000 per annum 
toward the cost, on the understanding that suitable 
connections with trans-Tasman ships would be 
maintained at the Australian end. The £5,000 was 
to be divided in the proportion of three-fifths to 
the Government of Great Britain and two-fifths to 
the Government of Australia, the basis of division 
coinciding with the distance of the sections 
by those countries on the extended service .. 1 
Association with this scheme facilitated the speedier 
delivery of mail between London and New Zealand but 
it was clear that little reduction of the time 
could be obtained by the continued use of ship and 
aeroplane, even though the performance of both was 
constantly being improved. What was n 
an extension of~th~ London-Australia 
across the Tasman to New Zealand. 
was 
r service 
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Prospects for such a service appeared promising 
ter representatives of Britain, Australia and 
New Zealand met at Sydney in February 1935. The 
conference was convened in order that the 
representatives of AUstralia and New Zealand might 
be given a detail briefing on the Empire Air Mail 
Scheme, and an exhaustive examination of this scheme 
took place. More significant, from New Zealand's 
point of view, an air link across the Tasman was 
discussed, and was reported to be "within the realms 
of practicability .. ,,1 Such a service, operating 
twice-weekly, would allow mail to travel from 
New Zealand to Great Britain in a transit time of 
eight days, a reduction of fifty per cent. on the 
ship and aircraft method. Tentative agreement 
regarding the financial structure of the service 
provided for Great Britain contributing fifty per cent., 
Austral twenty-five pe~ cent., and New Zealand 
twenty-five per cent. of the total cost. Both the 
Australian Controller of Civil Aviation and members 
of the British delegation were to investigate and 
report on suitable type of aircraft for the operation 
10 Details of the Sydney Conference were given in 
a statement by the Postmaster-General, t 
ccxli, 287-88. 
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of the routeo At this stage however, it was not 
proposed to discuss the establishment of a passenger 
service across the Tasmano It was with some 
justi on that the Postmaster-General wrote in 
his annual report; 
Progress recently in the development 
of aviation as a means of long-di 
transport over land or sea has been such 
that there is every prospect that by 1937 
all from Great Britain to 
New Zealand will be conveyed by air 
twice weekly in the remarkably short 
time of eight d ayso 1 
The New Zealand Government was obviously 
committed to the idea of extending the Empire 
Air Mail Scheme across the Tasman and consequently 
withheld approval of the plans put before it later 
in the year by Smith's company. No doubt the 
British Government contributing fifty cent. of 
the cost of extending the Empire scheme appeared 
a much more attractive propos~tion than that proposed 
by the company under which Australia and New Zealand 
would each contribute fifty per cent. of the subsidy 
required to operate an independent ceo 
New and support for the scheme was not 
without criticso Captain P.G. Taylor, pioneer 
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aviator and associate of Kingsford Smith complained 
about the possibility of an English company 
directing the service .. New Zealand and Australian 
airmen had performed the pioneering work across the 
Tasman and they should, upon procurement of the 
right type of aircraft, be allowed to commence a 
service .. 1 controversy on such a point reveals that 
the future inauguration of a service was at last 
regarded as an established fact; henceforth the 
point of issue would be one of operation. Who, 
in fact, was going to operate the service when it 
was established? 
There are interesting points in an attempted 
answer. Almost certainly both the Trans-Tasman 
Air Service Development Company and Imperial Airways 
would have required some form of subsidy in order 
to operate the service, at least over the early yearso 
If such a subsidy was granted by the Governments of 
Australia and New Zealand then it was almost just as 
certain that, in order to protect their investment, 
-
they would take some form of control. On the other 
hand there existed no really valid reason why an 
10 NZH, 17 May 1935. 
-- . 
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efficient service could not be operated by 
Australians and New Zealanders. There would have 
been no need to wo+ry about close co-operation 
between such a service and the England-Australia 
service for the best interest of the company, as 
well as public demand, would have seen to that 
point. An important factor in £avour of a 
New Zealand-Australian enterprise was that financial 
benefits of operations would come to New Zealand 
and AUstralia, whereas dividends earned by 
Imperial Airways if they operated the service, would 
pass to the company's shareholders in Great Britain. 
The rejection of Smith's plans later in the year 
revealed that the Government favoured an extension 
of the Imperial Airways network rather than a local 
service, even though it could not be established 
before the end of 1937 at the earliest. 
However, so frequent were the delays in the 
development of the Empire scheme to Australia that 
it began to appear as if the date of late 1937-
early 1938 might have been rather too optimistico 
It was not until 1937 that the Australian and 
English authorities reached agreement on the basic 
outline of the service with details still to be 
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determined. From the start Austr ian 
officialdom appears to have been against the 
scheme. The use of flying-boats operating round 
the long Australian coastline did not fit in with 
current defence plans, the cost - not only that 
incurred in operating the service but in establishing 
and maintaining flying-boat bases caused alarm, 
and Australian control of the Singapore-Australia 
section was desiredo Consequently, on 31 January 
1936 the Australian cabinet rejected the Empire 
1 
scheme. The remainder of 1936 passed in argument 
and attempts to resolve the di erences between 
the United Kingdom and the Australian authorities. 
Much valuable time was lost and 1 the while the 
establishment of a Tasman service seemed to fade 
further into the background. 
The announcement in January 1937 that agreement 
had at last been reached on the Empire Air Mail 
Scheme did not end the opposition. Further delay 
was occasioned by the attitude of one section of 
Sydney's populatlon to the choice of their suburb 
as base for operationso Taking into account 
1. CS, 1 Feb 1936. 
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Sydney's population, industri importance and 
geographical position in relation to Australian 
settlement as a whole, its choice as terminus 
appears a logi one, even more so when Sydney's 
position as a point of entry for the proposed 
trans-Tasman and trans-Pacific services is considered. 
The residents of Rose Bay, the local inlet chosen 
for the base by H.G. Brackley, Air Superintendent of 
Imperial Airways, thought otherwise and, in the words 
of Hudson Fysh of Qantas Empire Airways, !fa most 
extraordinary outcry arose"l, the residents protesting 
strongly against the establishment of a flying-boat 
base in their suburb. Their protests were harshly 
criticised by a local newspaper: 
The sto~m in a teacup over Rose 
Bay as an airmail base would be as 
ridiculous as it is trivial if it were 
not that it is holding up preparations 
for the commencement of the new Empire 
r service next year 00... Already 
we have had enough dilly-dallying with 
the Empire air service, and there 
should be no more avoidable ays. 
The Commonwealth Government should make 
up its mind and get on with the job ...... 
It is a matter of parish-pump politics 
against the broad vision of national 
and Imperial progresso Which is to 
come first, Rose or the Empire?2 
1. W.H. Fysh, Qantas at War, p .. 57. 
2. SMH, 25 Jun 1937. 
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A second expert commissioned by the Australian 
Government confirmed Brackley's selection of site. 
In fact there was only one alternative, Botany Bay, 
but the swell from the open sea experienced there 
would have necessitated a long and expensive breakwater. 
Despite the opposition of the state Government, the 
local Council, and the residents, the Federal 
Government went ahead and declared Rose Bay the 
Sydney base. Minor details remained to be attended 
to and a year passed before the Empire Air Mail Scheme 
commenced operation between England and Australia in 
July 1938. 
The desire to establish a trans-Tasman air 
service had not been forgotten during the struggle 
to open the Empire Air Mail Scheme as far as Sydney. 
"We are not simply waiting for something to turn up -
we are trying to make something turn up", the 
New Zealand Prime Minister, M.J. Savage, stated. 1 
Having rejected the plans of Smith's company the 
New Zealand Government devoted its attention toward 
an effort to establish the Tasman service on the 
same day as the Empire flying-boat service opened. 
10 CS, 19 Feb 19360 
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This action was almost certainly spurred on by the 
activities of Pan American Airways in the Pacific 
area, for this company had, in 1935, sent a 
representative, H. Gatty, to New Zealand to negotiate 
for the establishment of a San Francisco-Honolulu-
Pacific Islands-New Zealand service. Such a 
service would, if established, go a long way toward 
ending doubts as to the necessity and success of a 
Tasman service .. The Australian-England dispute 
was bound to have repercussions on the establishment 
of a Tasman service and the proposals reported as 
"quickly taking shape"l in October 1935 had by May 
1936 "broken down",2 whilst in the opinion of the 
Australian Minister for Defence, ReA. Parkhill, it 
was "premature" to deal with the proposals until the 
matter of the Britain-Australia airmail had been 
dealt with.3 
In an attempt to overcome the deadlock which 
had developed, representatives of the three countries 
concerned met at Wellington in September 1936. 
10 CS, 19 Oct 1935. 
2,. Press, 4 May 1936. 
3.. Ibid .. 
33. 
No official announcement was made on the outcome 
of the conference but Th 
-...;;;...---:;;;;...;..~ reported that it 
understood finality had been reached on a number 
of points which were to be submitted to the 
Governments concerned for ratification, an 
observation subsequently verified in the Report 
of the Postmaster-Generalo 1 A fUrther six months 
went by with no appreciable advance being made 
toward establishment of a serviceo As the 
apparently never ending negotiations continued it 
was reported that the original proposal of the 
service being operated on a direct subsidy basis 
with Britain contributing half and both Australia 
and New Zealand a quarter of the total cost, had 
been abandonedo It was now expected that an 
operating company, modelled on Qantas Empire Airways 
and that organisation's operation of the Sydney-
Singapore route, would be formed, the. new company 
containing interests of Imperial Airways, Qantas 
Empire Airways and Union Airways, a domestic operator 
of New Zealando 2 It was not until July 1937 that 
agreement on operation of the service was announcedo 
10 Press, 3 Oct 1936; AJHR, 1937-38, F 1, p .. 7u 
2. SMH, 13 Mar 19370 
The service would be operated by a newly-formed 
company in which each Government would be represented 
by three directors. Subject to revision every 
three years New Zealand was to bear thirty-nine 
per cent8 of the payments to the company, the United 
Kingdom thirty-eight per cento, and Australia 
twenty-three per cent. The company was to be 
granted mail contracts and receipts from the company's 
earnings were to be divided in similar proportionso 1 
At last the question of operating the service 
had been settled but the means of settlement were 
open to question. The original intention of 
extending the England-Australia route to New Zealand 
with Imperial Airways controlling and operating 
the service would have simplified the administrative 
side of the venture and reduced the capital cost. 
The new company, under the control of three authorities 
rather than one would almost certainly suffer some 
loss of iciency. Moreover, the arrangement 
adopted seemed to make further progress dependent 
-
on agreement among the three governments concerned, 
agreement which had in the last two years been 
singularly difficult to secure. Indeed, the numerous 
1. p 31 Jul 1937. 
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delays of the past years seemed to dampen the news 
of agreement .. The Press warned against excessive 
enthusiasm and optimism in a leading article which 
said, "The pettifogging obstinacy of the Australian 
and New Zealand Governments over minor issues has 
so long delayed the inauguration of an air service 
across the Tasman that no one will be rash enough 
to assume that the agreement •• 0 finally removes all 
1 
obstacles." Such a warning appeared justified when 
New Zealand's Prime Minister confessed that he did 
not know when the air service across the Tasman 
would be inaugurated, adding that decisions on many 
matters, including the type of machine to be used, 
2 had yet to be made .. 
Prosp s brightened when the Empire flying-
boat "Centaurus" conducted an experimental Tasman 
flight 1 in 1937. Under the command of 
Captain J.W. Burgess the craft completed the crossing 
in just over nine hours, arriving at Auckland shortly 
after 3 p.m. on 27 December 1937. This, the first 
cros ng the Tasman by an aircraft capable of 
operating a commercial service, was an historic event. 
1.. , 2 Aug 1937. 
20 , 14 Sep 1937. 
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"Since it is the first practical step toward 
establishment of a regular flying service across 
the Tasman, it marks an epoch in the relations 
between the two countries" wrote the Australian 
Prime Ninister, J .. Ao 1 Lyonso "Another step 
towards the establishment of a regular air service 
between our two Dominions" was the opinion of 
H.V. Thorby, the Commonwealth Ninister for D ence. 
Historic though the occasion was, it could not 
be overlooked that when "Centaurus" arrived at 
Auckland the Pan American Airways' flying-bo 
"Samoan Clipper" was already riding at anchor on 
Auckland Harbour .. The Press quoted a report from 
the "News-Chronicle ll which read, "what is 
is that a full service cannot possibly be operated 
11 the next summer, yet a bi-weekly service 
between America and New Zealand is being opened 
to-morrow. How is this for 'cementing the bonds 
of Emp '7,,3 Unfortunately the "Samoan 
and her crew were lost on a southward voyage in 
January 1938. Services were suspended and did not 
i. Lyons to Savage, letter, quoted in 
29 Dec 1937 .. 
2 .. Thorby to Jones, letter, quoted in CS, 
27 Dec 1937 .. 
3. Press, 7 Jan 1938 .. 
2 
resume until September 1940, operating successfully 
from then until the Japanese thrust into the Pacific 
necessitated their cessation until the end of 
hostilities. 
The delay in the establishment of a Tasman service 
was even less tolerable in view of the fact that the 
agreement of July 1937 provided a framework upon 
which a service could be built. All that was 
required was the formation of the operating company, 
construction of bases and the acquisition of suitable 
aircrafto Curiously the determination to move ahead 
appears to have been the missing yet vital factor. 
Consequently a statement by the Australian Prime 
Minister that the service would probably begin 
simultaneously with the new flying-boat service from 
Sydney to Britain appears both premature and 
t · . t' 1 op 1m1S 1C. In order to establish a service by 
that date the New Zealand Government would have 
needed to abandon its demands for New Zealand 
retaining direct control of the operation of the 
company and its equipment, and accepting instead 
the British and Australian idea of a joint Government 
i. SMH, 29 Dec 1937. 
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organisation exercising general control of policy 
whilst an operating company conducted the serviceo 
With Qantas Empire Airways already possessing the 
equipment necessary for the service, the latter 
course provided the only means of establishing a 
service quickly since for a newly formed company, 
with three governments as partners, to procure such 
equipment would possibly have taken at least a year. 
Further time would be needed for the installation 
of radio and navigation equipment and the establishment 
of meteorological facilities, all essential 
requirements of the serviceo 
By the end of 1938 the proposed service seemed 
to be little closer to establishment. Negotiations 
had continued throughout the year and tentative 
dates for the inauguration of the service, ranging 
from Christmas 1938 to Easter.1939 had been given. 1 
Progress during the year was not made any easier by 
the constant bickering between New Zealand and 
Australia, each party blaming the other for the 
recurrent delays. Headlines such as "New and 
Causes Delay" and "New Zealand Is Not Responsible,,2 
1. , 22 Jun, 11 Nov 1938. 
2. CS, 30 May, 31 May 19380 
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were commonly found in newspapers when the 
proposed service came under discussion. More 
revealing was a statement by the Australian Minister 
for Defence; "There is no question of delay, 
because no time has been fixed as to when the 
service should, or could commence .. "l 
It would however, be unfair to suggest that no 
progress at all was made during 1938. In May 
Qantas Empire Airways was appointed to represent 
Australian interests in the joint operating company" 
The United Kingdom having already nominated Imperial 
Airways, it only remained for the New Zealand 
Government to nominate their representative to 
complete the tri-party structure of the new company. 
At the end of May New Zealand announced that it 
proposed to put forward Union Airways as its nominee. 
Not until August, however, did the Prime Minister 
announce the signing of an agreement between the 
New Zealand Government and Union Airways, providing 
for the latter to act on behalf of the Dominion in 
the formation of a company to operate the Tasman 
service, that company probably to be known as 
1. CAPD, clvi, 1909. 
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Tasman Empire Airways Limited and having its 
initia1 New Zealand terminal at Auckland. 1 
Union Airways, a subsidiary of the Union steam 
Ship Company was one of New Zealand's internal 
airline operators prior to the nationalisation of 
internal airlines during the 1940's. Early in the 
history of the company its chairman, NoS .. Falla, 
had indicated that the company would be prepared to 
. 2 
attempt a Tasman service , and in 1935 Falla had 
actually approached Imperial Airways in an effort 
to get them interested in extending the Empire air 
3 
route across the Tasman. It was particularly 
fitting therefore, that this company received the 
Government nomination to participate in the Tasman 
scheme. 
The ultimate determinant of the inaugural date 
of the service was, of course, the availability of 
a suitable aircraft. The range of the ordinary 
Empire-class flying-boat of which "Centaurus" was 
an example, was insufficient for this type of 
machine to operate the Tasman service economically. 
1. P s, 25 Aug 1938. 
2. Ibid .. , 26 Jul 1935. 
3. S.D .. Waters, Union Line: A Short History of 
the Union Steam Ship Company of New Zealand Ltd, 
1875-1951, p .. 94 .. 
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Consequently a long-range version of this craft 
was required and, although this was past the 
design stage early in 1938, there was little hope 
of it being available before 1939. At the same 
time the Australian Minister for Defence made it 
quite clear that there would be no service before 
these particular aircraft were available and 
Australia would, under no circumstances, co-operate 
with New Zealand in establishing a temporary 
landplane service. 1 
The inauguration of the Tasman service would, 
it appeared, henceforth be governed by the supply of 
the necessary aircraft, but in the meantime work 
could proceed on the base facilities required by the 
service .. Within New Zealand there were no objections 
to the choice of a base such as had occurred at 
Rose Bay, Sydney. On the other hand, New Zealand 
centres had competed with one another in an effort 
to secure the terminal. Nelson, New Plymouth, 
Wellington, Auckland and Invercargill all put forward 
~ 
claims to have the base located in their area, whilst 
in Christchurch the possibility of using the Estuary 
as a flying-boat base was given consideration. 
1. Press, 25 Feb 1938. 
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From the start, however, Auckland appe the 
logical choice: Pan American Airways had already 
established a base there and the possibility of 
linking the trans-Pacific and the trans-Tasman 
services at that point al~ost certainly tipped the 
scales in Auckland's favour. With the official 
announcement of Auckland as New Zealand terminal 
work could proceed, but it was not until December, 
four months later, that a contract was 1 for the 
provision of the necessary buildings Mechanic's 
Bay, the si chosen within Auckland. In addition, 
orders were placed for two launches, an essential 
feature of a flying-boat base .. One was to be 
thirty-seven in length, the other thirty-three 
feet and both were to be capable of twenty-five knotso 1 
It was expected that the buildings at Mechanic's Bay 
would be completed by the end of May 1939, the 
installation of a Brady pontoon, for use during 
embarkation, and other berthing and mooring equipment 
completed early in June, and the launches delivered 
about the same qateo Although this d was in 
fact met, the provision of these facilities meant 
that the service would remain inoperative until 
mid-1939, provided the installation of radio and 
meteorological facilities was completed by then. 
1. ~ __ , 1939, H 37, p.ll. 
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In December 1938 a conference was held at 
Melbourne to discuss this aspect of the service. 
It was decided that meteorologists should travel 
on trans-Tasman merchant vessels and that, besides 
base radio stations in Australia and New Zealand, 
radio equipment would be placed on Lord Howe and 
Norfolk Islandso The need to install this equipment 
before the service began meant a further delay and 
the new inaugural date became September 1939 as it 
was unlikely the ground organisation, including 
radio and meteorological services, could be installed 
and tested before that time. 1 The delay in the 
provision of these services was accentuated when, 
in February 1939, the first of the flying-boats for 
the Tasman service entered the last stages of 
construction at Short Bros.' factoryo It was 
expected to be launched near the end of February, 
followed within six weeks by its two sister-ships. 
However, it was not until after the last flying-boat 
had actually been launched that a tender was let to 
Amalgamated Wireless (Australasia) for the supply 
of equipmento Manufacture and transport of the 
equipment was expected to take about five months. 
10 Press, 7 Jan 1939. 
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A new date was fixed for the commencement of a 
regular twice-weekly service, 1 October, although 
in making the announcement the Australian 
Director General of Civil Aviation confessed that 
the Australian Government still had to consider 
minor points in the agreement. 1 "It is to be 
hoped", commented The Sydney Morning Herald, "th 
this expectation [ice. the date of 1 October] will 
prove to be better founded than many similar hopes 
held out during the past eighteen months .. 000 The 
long continued delays suggest that some or all of 
the Governments concerned have been repeating that 
petty haggling which was responsible for the constant 
postponements of the Empire flying-boat service 
between England and Australia. Such behaviour 
argues a strange blindness to rapid modern technical 
advance in aviation transport. No more time should 
be lost in signing the ag"reement and pushing forward 
with the ground organisation .. 0.0 any further 
postponement will arouse doubts whether the official 
heart is in this,venture .. ,,2 
In August 1939 "Aotearoa", first of the flying-
boats for the service, arrived at Auckland, and 
1. SMH, 31 May 19390 
2.. Ibid .. 
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October gave way to November as the possible starting 
date, by which time the other two flying-boats, 
"Awarua" and "Australia", should have arrived. 
Throughout the intervening period "Aotearoa"· carried 
out survey and training operations, preparatory to 
commencing the regular service. The aircraft made 
flights to Fiji, Tonga and other Pacific Islands as 
well as many unoffici flights across the Tasman. 
In the course of such journeys the Deputy-Prime 
Minister, Po Fraser, was flown to Sydney on his way 
to important war talks in London in December 1939, 
whilst early in 1940 Lord Willingdon, His Majesty's 
representative at New Zealand's Centennial celebrations, 
was flown from Australia to New Zealand and return. 
The way was still not clear however and a further 
delay was occasioned by events currently occurring 
on the opposite side of the globe. In September 1939 
the Second World War began and at once it became 
doubtful whether the two remaining flying-boats 
would be delivered and so enable the service to 
commence. A mishap to "Australia" while in use by 
Imperial Airways added a further complication. 
Fortunately, Peter Fraser was aware that the service 
was as important to New Zealand in time of war as it 
would be in times of peace, especially when the 
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impressment of merchant ships into service as armed 
merchantmen, troop transports, and hospital ships, 
threatened to disrupt the shipping links binding 
New Zealand to the outside world. Consequently, 
when he attended a war conference in London in 
December 1939, Fraser pressed for, and obtained, 
the release of "Awarua" to assist in establishing 
the Tasman air service. On his return to New Zealand 
Fraser revealed that both Britain and Australia had 
favoured postponing establishment of the service 
until the end of the war, but had agreed, after 
discussion of New Zealand's point-of-view, to 
co-operate in establishing the service on a modified 
1 
scale .. 
, Despite this, the almost inevitable delays 
continued to occur and cartoonists had fun at the 
expense of the service so long predicted .. One, 
published in the Sydney Daily Telegraph depicted a 
featherless parrot looking toward New Zealand from 
its perch in Australia and squawking "I'll fly! 
I'll fly!1I 2 The operating company, Tasman Empire 
i. Press, 26 Dec 1939. 
2. Whites Aviation, Dec 1947, p.3. A reproduction 
of the cartoon appears in the same periodical, 
May 1960, p .. 3 .. 
Airways Limited, had still to be formed, although 
once the Governments reached agreement on their 
financial responsibilities the registration of the 
company and appointment of directors was little more 
than a formality. Finally, in March 1940, New 
Zealand's Prime Minister announced that the three 
parties had agreed to commence a service of one trip 
to and from Australia weekly some time in April. 1 
Slowly events were moving to a conclusion. Early 
in April "Awarua", the second flying-boat for the 
service, completed its delivery flight and on 
17 April the directors of the company were announced; 
A.E. Rudder and N.S. Falla were to represent the 
United Kingdom, F. McMaster and W.H. Fysh Australia, 
and T.A. Barrow and CoG" 'vmite were to look after 
New Zealand's interests. 2 Disagreement Over matters 
of finance continued to hold up final settlement. 
Imperial Airways wanted estimates based on a ten· 
per cent. profit which would enable a reasonable 
dividend to be declared. The New Zealand Government, 
on the other hand,·did not favour any dividend and 
it was not until 25 April 1940 that a nancial 
formula was agreed upon. This provided for a dividend 
1. Press, 8 Mar 1940. 
20 , 17 Apr 1940 .. 
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no greater than six per cent. and this was to be 
restricted to three per cent. in the early years of 
th t to 1 e company s opera lone 
The following day Tasman Empire Airways Limited 
was registered as a company with its head office in 
Wellington and a capital of £500,000, consisting of 
500,000 £1 shares. The original issued capital 
was £250,004, contributed as follows: 
Qantas Empire Airways 
British Overseas Airways 
Corporation 
(which had taken over 
Imperial Airways) 
Union Airways of New 
Zealand 
. 
. 57,500 or 23% 
95,000 or 38% 
97,500 or 39%0 
A.E. Rudder, WoH. Fysh, C.G. White and C.G. Rose 
each held one share. 2 The New Zealand Government 
had decided in 1938 that private enterprise, in the 
form of Union Airways, would not hold the majority 
of New Zealand shares in the company, and proposed 
that the Government hold twenty of the thirty-nine 
3 per cent. This division was subsequently adhered 
1. W.H. Fysh, Report to Qantas Empire Airways 
Board, 16 May 1940, quoted in W.H. Fysh, 
Qantas at War, p.l05. 
2. Mercantile Gazette of New Zealand, 8 May 1940, 
p.422. 
3. ~, ccli, 602. 
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to when the original allotment of shares was made 
in 1940. Union Airways was appointed as the 
managing agent for the company and their general 
manager, Maurice Clarke, became manager of TEAL, 
as the company was popularly known, that concern 
having no general manager of its own in the early 
years. On the last day of April the flight of 
"Aotearoa" brought to a conclusion negotiations 
begun by Smith and Taylor in 1935 and resumed in 
1936 when representatives of the British, Australian 
and New Zealand Governments decided to conduct a 
Tasman r service under their own supervision. 
A vision had become reality. 
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CHAPTER 2 THE FLYING-BOAT ERA ' 
"We have all looked forward to this very moment 
for a long time" said New Zealand's Minister of, 
Aviation, F. Jones, at a ceremony prior to the 
departure of "Aotearoa" on 30 April 1940. 1 
Appreciation of this, TEAL's first scheduled Tasman 
crossing was no doubt made the keener by the fact 
that it had been preceded by so many years of 
negotiation that the difficulties had at times 
appeared insuperable. "Rarely has a service been 
started with such difficulty, but which is also 
fraught with such possibilities, as the one today 
inaugurated" wrote TEAL director We Fysh, a passenger 
aboard "Aotearoa" as it sped toward Australia .. 2 
TEAL was flying but the shadow of war hung over the 
company's operations and initial development was 
somewhat stifled by the prevailing international 
si tuation .. 
England had been in the grips of the 'phoney' 
war for six months whilst German armies were on 
the march in the neighbouring European continent. 
1. NZH, 1 May 1940. 
2. W.H. Fysh, Qantas at War, p.l08. 
Plate I: S.30 flying-boat "Aotearoa" moored in t he 
Brady pon toon, Auck l and . 
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Consequently it is not surprising to find news of 
the inaugural flight of the Tasman service taking 
second place to headlines such as "Fierce Resistance 
in Norway" and "Mediterranean Now Closed to British 
Ships" in the daily newspapers .. 1 Events on the 
international scene were not able to dampen local 
enthusiasm, however, and a cartoon of the day 
depicted a jubilant New Zealander who, having 
substituted a sign "Australia 7 hours" for an 
earlier one reading "Australia 1165 miles", was 
waving his hat at the flying-boat passing overhead. 2 
As commercial aircraft, the "Aotearoa" and her 
sister-ship "Awarua" were incredibly small by 
today's standards, with a seating capacity of only 
nineteen. Moreover, passenger capacity was affected 
by a number of factors, such as the weight of mail 
and freight and the strength of the expected 
headwind, so that the number of passengers actually 
carried was often less than nineteen. The two 
aircraft were Short S.30 flying-boats, a long-range 
version of the 5.23 type which had been designed for 
use by Imperi Airways on the. Empire Air Mail Schemeo 
1.. Press, 1 May; CS, 1 May 19400 
2. ~,1 May 1940, p .. 3. 
Late in 1937 Imperial Airways lodged an order for a 
further eleven of these rcraft, some to be long-
range versions .. The last three of this batch were 
originally intended for Qantas Empire Airways but 
were redirected to TEAL and named "Aotearoal!, 
"Australia" and "Awarua ll • 1 
As negotiations for a Tasman service were still 
proceeding when the aircraft were completed, Imperial 
Airways retained them for use on the Southampton-
Karachi service, the intention being to work the 
aircraft through to Sydney by September 1939 in 
order that the Tasman service might commence on 
. 1 October 1939 Q "Aotearoa" was duly delivered to 
New Zealand but the "Australia" met with an accident 
and after repairs rejoined the fleet of BoOoAoCo 2 
It being impracticable to operate the Tasman route 
with only one machine, the inauguration of the service 
10 The three aircraft (serial numbers S884-886) 
were originally registered G-AFCY, G-AFCZ, and 
G-AFDA and bore the Qantas names "Captain Cook", 
"Canterbury_" and "Australia" 0 When passed to 
TEAL the aircraft were re-registered and 
renamed and became ZK-AMA "Aotearoa lt , 
ZK-ANB "Australia" and ZK-ANC flAwarua". 
20 On 24 November 1939 an Act providing for the 
merger of Imperial Airways and British Airways 
into one State-owned Corporation, the British 
Overseas Airways Corporation (BoOoAoC.), came 
into force. The new Corporation took over 
the assets of the two companies involved on 
1 April 19400 
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was of neces ty postponed until "Awarua tt joined 
"Aotearoa" at Auckland in April 1940, after which 
these two machines, comprising as they did the TEAL 
fleet, operated the Tasman service for more than 
six years before being replaced .. 
It took "Aotearoa", under the command of 
Captain J.W. Burgess, slightly less than nine hours 
to complete the journey, about three times as long 
as today's jet airliners .. Aboard the aircraft were 
some 41,000 letters, a crew of six and nine 
passengers Messrs Fysh, White and Rudder (TEAL 
directors); Mr E. Johnston, Assistant Director-General 
of Civil Avi on in Australia; Misses J .. Hewitt 
and P. Dromgool; and Messrs H. Browne, T. Webster 
and H. Turner, the latter having booked his seat 
three years earlier. Later, Miss Dromgool, who was 
making her rst flight of any kind, recalled the 
event, noting the 'comfort and compactness of the 
flying-bo 's interior, the use foot and hand 
muffs for warmth during the journey, the pleasant 
breakfast ter which the passengers played quoits 
and the "delightful" pantry in which specially 
constructed racks held crockery in safety through any 
weather and large thermos flasks contained the food 
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and beverages prepared in Auckland prior to the 
aircraft's departure. 1 
Today the meals served aboard the company's 
aircraft continue a reputation for quality 
established in April 1940 when to serve meals aboard 
an aircraft was no easy matter. The S .. 30 flying-
boats contained no galley as do modern aircraft, 
and from the small galley which was installed, 
breakfast, lunch and early- and mid-morning tea 
were served .. There were no facilities for keeping 
food hot, hence the reliance on large one-and-a-half 
gallon thermos flasks. Such conditions were no 
barrier to quality meals, as the menus from the 
inaugural flight reveal. For breakfast the passenger 
enjoyed a choice of grapefruit, cornflakes and hot 
milk, scrambled eggs, sausages and bacon, grilled 
tomatoes, cold harn, and bread with jam, marmalade 
or honey. Tea, coffee, or hot chocolate, was also 
served. Equally impressive was the luncheon menu; 
tomato soup, asparagus mayonnaise, roast chicken, 
potato salad, ham, luncheon sausage, veal-and-ham pie, 
10 P.. Dromgool, "Flying to Sydney", NZOb, 
8 May 1940, p .. 14. 
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fruit salad, cheeses, biscuits and coffeeo 1 All 
meals were served by a steward for it was not until 
1946 that flight hostesses took their place in 
company aircraft. 
Two days after the successful inaugural flight 
the "Aotearoa" completed a somewhat unusual flight 
back to Auckland, thus concluding the first round trip 
of TEAL's trans-Tasman operations. Ten minutes out 
from Sydney the aircraft encountered hail and snow 
and patterns of ice began to appear on cabin windows, 
then, halfway across the Tasman, the "Aotearoa" was 
shaken by two violent bumps, one-of which shot the 
aircraft upwards at an extremely fast rate. Soon 
afterwards the aircraft flew into scattered cloud 
and bright sunshine, conditions which prevailed for 
the remainder of the journey. The first return 
Tasman service was completed and many more were flown 
during the war years o The company found however 
that it could not escape from the environment in which 
it had been created and its aircraft were required 
to undertake missions in aid of the war effort as 
well as continuing a commercial service. 
10 A set of menus used on the inaugural flight is 
on file at Whites Aviation Ltd, Auckland. 
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A chronology of the company's operational 
history notes, IIDuring the year ended March 31st, 
1942, TEAL undertook several special charter and 
reconnaissance flights to Noumea, Fiji, Tonga, 
Samoa, and as far afield as Honolulu, to assist 
the war effort""l Details concerning these 
operations are limited by the circumstances in 
which they were performed, but subsequently 
information on a number of incidents has been 
2 
released .. 
The involvement of the company's aircraft in 
wartime missions was no doubt due to the fact that 
in 1940 the Royal New Zealand Air Force had no 
long-range military aircraft in its possession, the 
Government having handed an order of Vickers 
Wellington aircraft back to the Royal Air Force .. 
Consequently arrangements were made with TEAL for the 
two flying-boats to be used on long-range sea 
reconnaissance and during these operations 500 lb 
bombs were carried and personnel of the Royal New 
1 .. TEAL, Operational tory, entry for 1942. 
2. Information on the wartime activities of TEAL 
is derived in large part from two works of the 
War History Branch of the Internal Affairs Dept; 
S.D .. Waters, The Royal New Zealand Navy, 
chaps IX-X. 
J.MoS .. Ross, Royal New Zealand Air Force, 
ch .. VI .. 
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Zealand Air Force supplemented the company's 
flying-crews. The need to utilise the TEAL 
aircraft in this way appears to have ended late 
in 1941 or early in 1942 by which time re-equipment 
had allowed the Royal New Zealand Air Force to 
form its own reconnaissance squadrons. 
Little time elapsed before the aircraft assumed 
their new role r in June 1940 "Awarua" carried 
out a search of the area about the Kermadec Islands 
after the vessel "Ni ara" was mined and sunk off 
the New Zealand coasto Later in the same year the 
activities of German raiders in the seas about 
New Zealand provided a further opportunity to use 
the aircraft in their wartime capacity and on 21 and 
22 August the "Awarua" took part in an unsuccessful 
search for the raider "Orion" which had sunk the 
"Turakina" in the Tasman Sea .. In November 1940 
both the "Aotearoal! and "Awarua ll were engaged in 
searching for the raider "Komet ll , that vessel having 
intercepted and sunk the 546 ton "Holmwood" and the 
16,712 ton tlRang-i tane" .. On 27 November "Aotearoa" 
left Auckland at 11.11 a.m., arrived at the search 
area shortly after 2 p.m. and searched, unsuccessfully, 
until 6 p .. m., when it returned to Auckland; "Awarua" 
on arrival at Auckland on a commercial flight from 
sydney, was refuelled and sent off to join the 
search .. Arriving at the search area about 4.30 p .. m .. 
the aircraft searched until dusk but saw nothing .. 
It was probably "Awarua" which was sighted by the 
German raider in the course of the search. The 
"Orion's" war log noted that, "as no radio activity 
followed DO .. it was presumed that the aircraft, in 
spite of good visibility "OD, had not seen the ships 
against the dark surface of the sea.,,,1 The following 
day the ftAwarua", which had been ordered out a second 
time, sighted an oil-slick and flotsam - 1 that 
remained of the "Rangitane"" Two flights were also 
made between New Zealand and the Chatham Islands in 
an effort to locate the missing ftHolmwood" but 
nothing was sighted .. 
As well as carrying out reconnaissance duties, 
the two aircraft also made a number of special flights 
carrying statesmen and heads of services to important 
overseas conferences, a task no less exciting or 
dangerous .. This point is borne out by a trip made 
1. Quoted in S.D. Waters, The Royal New Zealand 
Navy, p .. 139. 
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by "Awarua" under the command of Captain J. Burgess 
in January 1942 when the Hon. Walter Nash was taken 
to Honolulu as the first leg of a journey to 
Washington.. Not only was "Awarua" the first 
Commonwealth flying-boat to land at Pearl Harbour 
after the Japanese attack of December 1941, but on 
the return voyage was mistaken for a Japanese 
flying-boat reported to be in the area and fired 
upon by an American pilot. Fortunately the pilot's 
aim was bad and one hole in the "Awarua' s" wing was 
all the damage received before identification was 
established .. 
Necessary as such war missions undoubtedly were, 
TEAL's more important contribution to New Zealand's 
war effort was in the maintenance of a regular 
service across the Tasman throughout the war period, 
for as fewer and fewer ships remained on the Tasman 
route the great value of the airlinkwas emphasised. 
The new airline, in fact, found itself providing 
New Zealand's only regular and reliable link with the 
outside world and, despite the fact that the civilian 
passenger list was restricted by wartime regulations 
which gave travel priority to service and diplomatic 
personnel, the demand for seats continued to grow. 
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By August 1942 bookings were being accepted as far 
ahead as November with almost 400 reservations on 
the books, whilst early in 1945 it was reported that 
because passages across the Tasman were limited 
almost entirely to members of the services and 
civilians on Government business it was practically 
impossible for a civilian to obtain a seat. 1 In 
addition to carrying passengers the flying-boat 
service was invaluable in other ways; great 
quantities of mail were carried, much of it destined 
for New Zealand troops overseas, and the regular 
communication between Australia and New Zealand was 
instrumental in keeping commerce moving. So great 
was the value of the flying-boat operations to the 
war effort that security representatives and the 
police kept unceasing vigil at Mechanics Bay during 
the war years. 
In the course of these wartime commercial 
operations, several noteworthy achievements in the 
company's operational history were attained. On 
17 May 1940 "Aotearoa" completed the first scheduled 
night crossing, after a technical defect had delayed 
1. Wings, 5 Aug 1942; Press, 26 Jan 1945. 
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the aircraft's departure from Sydney until almost 
midnight, and in October of the same year "Awarua" 
carried a stretcher patient across the Tasman. 
Later in the war, in May 1944, the two aircraft 
arrived at Auckland within twenty minutes of each 
other although neither had sighted the other during 
the trip; for this to occur a further two months 
had to elapse until during July the two aircraft 
flew within sight of each other for several hours. 
The most significant achievement of these years was 
almost certainly the completion of 1,000 Tasman 
crossings by the company's aircraft and appropriately 
the 1,000th crossing was flown by "Aotearoa", the 
craft which had inaugurated the service in April 19400 
No longer was the journey one of glamour and adventure, 
now it was only an accepted comfortable and fast 
way of crossing the 1,300 odd miles between Australia 
and New Zealand. 
The value of this fast and regular service is 
revealed by operational figures for the war years. 
The frequency of the service varied throughout the 
period, the original one return flight a week being 
increased to three per fortnight in order to link 
with Pan-American Airways' Pacific service at Auckland, 
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the new frequency being maintained until the American 
company suspended its service in December 1941. 
By 1944 three return flights a week were being 
operated and in October and November of that year 
nine trips were flown each fortnight. A brief 
period of four return flights a week was operated 
in mid-1945 but the general operational frequency 
was three flights weekly. All of these operations 
were flown by the two original flying-boats, a fact 
made the more impressive by statistics of the period 
which indicate that in just under five years these 
two machines airlifted 14,449 passengers, 
584,113 lbs of mail and 210,438 lbs of freight across 
the Tasmano 1 Equally impressive was the regularity 
of a service which pessimists had predicted would 
be adversely affected by Tasman weather conditions: 
of 957 scheduled flights, 946 were completedo 2 
The return of peace in 1945 offered little 
respite to the company's two flying-bo s. Shipping 
took a long while to return to a peace-time basis 
and the demand for travel, repressed during the war 
years, reasserted itself. TEAL, its aircraft aging 
i. See Appendix A, p.221o 
2. P ,30 Apr 1945. 
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and in need of replacement, continued to be the 
main link with the outside world. The pressure 
upon the company in the period immediately after 
the war is shown by the fact that 6,100 passengers 
were carried in the year ended 31 March 1946 as 
against 1,959 carried in the first full year of 
operations (1941-42), whilst the weight of freight 
and mail carried over the same periods tripled and 
increased by half respectively.1 In spi of this 
increasing demand the need to reorientate the 
aviation industry into meeting civilian demands 
meant that not until late 1946 was a change of 
aircraft possible. 
Changes other than aircraft occurred within 
the company in the immediate post-war years. An 
important step was taken in June 1946 when 
G.No Roberts was appointed General Manager of the 
company. Until that time TEAL had operated without 
a chief executive, functional management having been 
in the hands of Union Airways, based some 500 miles 
'-
away in Wellington. Now with its own manager 
located in Auckland, the heart of company operations, 
1. See Appendix A, p.221. 
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things augured well for the future. Roberts was 
the first of the two general managers who served 
the company and during his term of office the 
transition from flying-boats to landplanes was 
accomplished. He retired in 1958 and his position 
was taken by Fo Reeves, during whose term of office 
TEAL became a New Zealand owned, jet equipped airline 
operating over a vastly increased network of routes 
under the new name, Air New Zealando 
Another significant post-war change was the 
alteration of the financial structure of the company_ 
At the Wellington Civil Aviation Conference, 
February-March 1946, it was decided to make a 
modification of the proportionate contributions each 
of the three Governments made to the company. In 
future New Zealand would contribute fifty per cent., 
Australia thirty per cent. and the United Kingdom 
twenty per cent., this arrangement coming into 
operation on 1 March 19490 1 New Zealand's Minister 
of Finance, Walter Nash, subsequently stated that the 
reorganisation came about because it was thought too 
much was being taken out of the company's profit by 
income tax, it being intended that the company 
1. , 1946, H 37, po21; YB, 1965, po347. 
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would be more fairly operated from a financial 
point of view than it had been in the pasto 1 
strange as it seems to nd a Government concerned 
about receiving too much income tax, Nash's statement 
is borne out by company figures which show that of 
the £739,000 income tax paid to the New Zealand 
Government by the rline in twenty-seven years of 
operation, over £91,000, or slightly more than 
twelve per cent., was p d in the first six yearso2 
In 1948, in order that new aircraft could be 
purchased, unallotted capital was called up and the 
total capital of the company increased to 750,000 
£ 1 shares .. New Zealand made the following 
purchases of shares: 
118,997 shares of unallotted capital 
14,001 shares of United Kingdom holding 
125,000 shares of newly created capital. 
In addition to these acquisitions the New 
Zealand Government had acquired, as a result of the 
nationalisation of the internal airlines, the entire 
1. PD, cclxxviii, 507. 
2. These figures were obtained in an interview the 
author had wi th Air New Zealand's Secretary, 
A.A .. Watson, in Auckland, 8 May 1968. 
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1 New Zealand shareholding in the company. 
totalled 117,002 shares, an increase having 
This 
apparently been made in the allotted capital prior 
to this occasion, and this amount combined with the 
newly acquired stock, detailed above, to give 
New Zealand a total holding of 375,000 £1 shares .. 2 
A more difficult task was the replacement of 
the two S030 flying-boats but as larger craft were 
clearly needed to cater for the demand for 
trans-Tasman passagei, a choice had to be made .. 
It was not an easy time at which to have to make a 
decision for the British civil aviation industry 
was at a difficult stage in the immediate post-war 
years and an interim period was needed before new 
British aircraft which the company was committed 
to use, became available. However, after the 
Wellington conference it was reported that the company 
proposed continuing the service with three S.25 
Sunderland aircraft, capable of carrying thirty 
passengers at a greater speed than the original S030ls03 
1.. The New Zealand National Airways Act was passed 
in 1945 and NoA.Co commenced operations under 
its own licences on 1 April 1947 0 
2. AJHR, 1949, B 1 [PtoII], p032. 
3. Press, 7 Mar 19460 
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These aircraft, powered by Pratt-and-Whitney 
motors, were expected to cross the Tasman in about 
seven-and-a-half hours and the establishment of a 
daily service (Sundays excepted) between New Zealand 
and Australia was proposed. 
So it was that in July 1946 TEAL obtained, on 
hire from the British Ministry of Supply, three 
MK IV Sandringham flying-boats, a four-engined 
aircraft, the basic airframe of which differed little 
from the wartime Sunderland of which it was a civil 
conversion. Modifications were confined to secondary 
structural details and rearrangement of the interior 
to provide for passenger accommodation. The bow 
and tail, sites of gun turrets on the Sunderland, 
were, of necessity, redesigned in a fashion similar 
to the S.30 craft which the Sandringhams succeeded .. 
These machines, which operated for TEAL under the 
class name 'Tasman', arrived in New Zealand during 
July, August and September 1946. A fourth 
Sandringham was acquired in October 1947 and the 
Sandringham fleet remained in service with TEAL 
until December 1949. 1 Operations, of course, could 
i. These aircraft bore New Zealand registrations 
and were given individual names: 
ZK-AMB "Tasman", ZK-AMD "Australia", 
ZK-AME "New Zealand" and ZK-AMH "Auckland" .. 
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not begin immediately delivery was taken, a 
shakedown period being required for crew 
familiarisation .. 
With the acquisition of new aircraft TEAL's 
original fleet was retired .. "Awarua" was withdrawn 
from service in June 1947 and in the following 
November "Aotearoa" suffered a similar fate when, 
after flying the last 5 .. 30 operation and completing 
its 442nd Tasman crossing, it too was withdrawn .. 
These two aircraft, which in seven years had 
transported more than 30,000 passengers, were 
subsequently broken up, although ltAotearoa" did 
spend a number of years as a tearoom at fJlission Bay .. 
It is a matter of regret th neither of these 
splendid machines was preserved as a memorial to the 
early years of the Tasman service. 
Although only regarded as a temporary fleet 
until post-war civil aircraft became available, the 
Tasman-class aircraft provided a much needed increase 
in the passenge;r:- carrying capacity of the TEAL 
fleet, for in acquiring these machines TEAL had 
replaced two aircraft with a capacity of thirty-eight 
by four with a capacity of 1200 Despite the 
increased passenger capacity of the aircraft and the 
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operation of a more frequent service, public 
demand continued and in November 1946 some 800 
people were reported to be awaiting transport from 
Sydney to New Zealando 1 The density of traffic 
thrust upon the airline was intensified when in 
January 1947 the trans-Tasman steamer "Wanganella" 
went aground in Wellington Harbour and was put out 
of commission. At the time there was little indication. 
that any other of the pre-war vessels would return to 
the service until late 1947 and, as the only vessel 
plying the Tasman was the former New Zealand 
inter-island ferry IIWahine", the airline was forced 
to carry the large proportion of the trans-Tasman 
traffic, a task for which it was not designed. 
Consequently the new aircraft made little impression 
on the waiting list even when the scheduled frequency 
was raised to seven return trips a week. One source 
complained that it was impossible to secure 
non-priority bookings at less than two months' 
t . 2 no lce ; indeed so great was the demand that a 
number of charter 'flights were made by Skymaster 
aircraft of Trans-Australia Airlines in an attempt 
to clear the backlogo 
1. , 4 Nov 1946. 
2. ~,1947, H 2, p o3o 
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The di culty encountered by the company in 
endeavouring to operate a service to meet the 
expanded demand was accentuated by technical troubles 
experienced with the Sandringham fleeto In October 
1946 the noise factor on these aircraft assumed 
serious proportions and investigations to rectify 
the trouble were carried out .. About the same time, 
comprehensive airtesting of the flying-boat "Australia" 
to determine the performance which could be expected 
from Tasman-class aircraft, revealed that apart from 
the advantage of a greater payload the new aircraft 
were no better in performance than the original S .. 30 
h . 1 mac lnes. 
An incident of more serious proportions occurred 
on 3 December 1947 when the flying-boat "New Zealand" 
was forced to return to Sydney on three engines, two 
hours ter departing from that point on a flight to 
Auckland .. Because of squally weather, the rcraft, 
with twenty-nine passengers and a crew of six on 
board, had been flying at a low altitude when one of 
its four engines fled. The decision was made to 
return to Sydney but the air speed began to decrease 
and the machine continued to lose height until it 
was only fifty feet above the sea .. In an effort to 
1.. TEAL, Report for the Month of October, 19460 
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maintain height luggage and freight were jettisoned: 
1,500 Ibs of baggage, 600 Ibs of freight including 
drugs, radio and electrical equipment and stationery, 
and thirty pounds of company stores splashed into 
the Tasman in order that the "New Zealand" could 
limp back to Sydney.l The engine fault was corrected 
in a few hours and the "New Zealand" completed her 
journey the next day but in view of this rather 
alarming incident a restriction on the all-up weight 
was imposed pending exhaustive tests and not until 
22 December did the aircraft return to normal loading 
d · t· 2 con l lons .. 
Such a decision would suggest that the testing 
procedures had revealed no major fault in the aircraft 
or its motors, a conclusion reinforced by the fact 
that for a further two months a regular service was 
operated at the original all-up weight limit. 
Consequently, it was rather surprising when, in 
February 1948, the Minister of Civil Aviation, 
F. Jones, announced the decision to suspend the 
service indefinitely, a decision described by TEAL's 
1. Press, 4 Dec, 5 Dec ~947. 
2. Ibid., 15 Dec, 22 Dec 1947 0 
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manager as one made by the company "in accordance 
with its [TEAL's] established and proven policy of 
subordinating all other factors to safety.,,1 
It was an unfortunate time at which to suspend 
operations for the demand for passages across the 
Tasman was still heavy and the one ship on the 
service, "v-lahine!!, was fully booked up till 14 May, 
her last scheduled tripo Obviously the air service 
could not be suspended indefinitely and so 
arrangements were made for the Government-owned 
Trans-Australia Airlines to provide an interim 
serviceo 
The decision to suspend the Tasman class 
flying-bo service was both courageous and strangeo 
It was a courageous decision to make affecting as 
it did a service which had been operated for eight 
years without injury, but no doubt this decision, 
reflecting as it did caution and strict adherence 
to the maxim of 'safety first', reflects the 
attitude which resulted in TEAL being awarded the 
Cumberpatch Trophy in 1952 as a recognition of 
~p~~, 23 Feb 19480 
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I t f t' 1 e even years sa e opera lone Almost certainly 
public confidence had been shocked by the forced 
return of "New Zealand" to Sydney and the 
circumstances surrounding that event, and in this 
respect the suspension appears a prudent measure. 
On the other hand if the suspension was a sequel 
to that unhappy incident it seems surprising that 
it should have been delayed so long. 
As a result of the decision to use charter 
services to maintain an interim service Skymasters 
of Trans-Australia Airlines and Australian National 
Airways operated the Tasman route between February 
and June 1948 .. It was not possible, however, to 
keep to the frequency of the flying-boat service 
as the Australian operators had other commitments 
to meet with their aircraft. This was especially 
so with the internal demand for air travel over the 
Easter vacation period and the Tasman service came 
to a halt, no charter aircraft being available .. 
1. The trophy, awarded by the Guild of Air Pilots 
and Air Navigators, is presented to organisations 
whose record over a period has made a notable 
contribution to safe flying, in TEAL's case the 
period covered being the first 11 years of 
operations. Only three other companies -
Wrightways Ltd, No.3 Line BoO.A.C., and 
Aer Lingus - had won the trophy prior to its 
award to TEAL" 
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During April, Australian National Airways became 
the main operator across the Tasman but at first 
was only able to offer two flights a week and the 
Sunderland "Matahua" of New Zealand's internal 
airline, N.AoC., was chartered for one crossing 
during this period. 
At the end of April the publication of the 
report of a Commission appointed to inquire into 
the incident foreshadowed the end of the flying-
boat as a commercial aircraft across the Tasman. 
The report exonerated the captain and crew, 
criticised certain administrative lapses, and 
included a recommendation that pressurised aircraft 
be used upon the route as soon as possible .. 1 In 
view of the difficulties inherent in pressurising 
the hull of a flying-boat, this recommendation gave 
added emphasis to the proposal to utilise landplanes 
on the Tasman service. A number of factors combined, 
however, to stall the landplane for a number of 
years.2 
On 17 June 1948 the Sandringham fleet resumed 
regular Tasman services, 
10 Press, 30 Apr 1948 .. 
2. See below, ch. 3. 
though the imposition of 
75. 
operational limitations necessitated a reduction 
in the aircraft's passenger carrying capacity. 
All was not right with the aircraft, however, and 
when, on 14 September 1948, one of the Sandringhams 
was forced to return to Sydney it was the fifth 
occasion on which this had occurred since the 
resumption of the service in June. The comp any t s 
pilots, aware that the crossing was an unusually 
long one devoid of any refuge, rightly preferred 
to err on the side of caution but the high incidence 
of these failings almost certainly had an adverse 
effect on the public's peace of mind. Such 
misgivings were in no way alleviated by the Royal 
Commission's questioning of whether the Tasman 
class aircraft possessed a sufficient margin of 
safety on three engines to be used safely on the 
trip. "Exclusive use of the far faster and more 
modern landplanes now providin:g part of the Tasm.an 
service would seem to be the right remedy for the 
present unsatisfactory situation", wrote one 
1 
newspaper. Tbe~e was, however, no guarantee that 
unpressurised landplanes, such as the Skymasters, 
would be any safer in similar circumstances. 
1. SMH, 15 Sep 1948. 
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Consequently, when a new aircraft was ordered to 
replace the troublesome Sandringhams, the choice 
fell upun the Short Solent and the flying-boat era 
continued .. 
In 1947 it had been reported that TEAL was 
considering expending £900,000 in order to purchase 
four Short Solent flying-boatso 1 The decision to 
procure further flying-boats appears a logical one 
when it is considered that flying-boats had until 
then served the company faithfully, the Sandringham 
trouble having not yet occurred. Furthermore, the 
airline possessed all the equipment needed to operate 
flying-boats, the TEAL staff were trained in the 
operation and handling of this type of machine, and 
the close proximity of the company's bases to the 
heart df the terminal cities was a further advant 
in the flying-boats' favour .. Consequently it was 
no surprise when the order for Solents was confirmed 
and a contract for their purchase completedo 2 
It seems however that the choice of a flying-boat 
as the replacement aircraft was not a unanimous one, 
1. NZH, 1 Jul 1947. 
20 NZH, 15 Aug 1947; Press, 6 Sep 19470 
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and at a meeting of the South Pacific Air Transport 
Council in Wellington in May 1948 the advisability 
of adhering to the Solent deal came under discussiono 1 
It was a difficult matter to deal with, the 
Australian representatives apparently favouring 
the dropping of the Solent deal as they were not 
entirely in favour of the continued use of flying-
boats on the Tasman serviceo On the other hand, the 
New Zealand point-of-view, besides maintaining that 
it was a matter of honour to accept an order already 
placed, was that there was no alternative British 
aircraft offering with better performance. !!Our 
f th in the British aircraft industry and our belief 
in British enterprise naturally lead us to prefer 
British aircraft o We hold that, while a thoroughly 
ficient and competitive British aircraft 
particularly suited to the transtasman route is 
available, there is little justification for spending 
dollars on the purchase of American aircraft!!, said 
TEAL's assistant-general manager.2 The New Ze and 
outlook prevailed and the Solent order was not 
withdrawn. But it was a hard victory, made the more 
1. NZH, 18 May 19480 
2. , 18 Oct 1948. 
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difficult by the support given the Australian 
viewpoint in the decision of Qantas Empire Airways 
and British Overseas Airways Corporation to partially 
re-equip with American Constellation aircraft.. So 
it was that for a further period flying-boats 
performed the major portion of the company's 
operations .. Although the factors outlined above 
no doubt supported the wisdom of the decision at the 
time, its wisdom may be questioned retrospectively 
since a review of their operational history reveals 
that in three of the six years in which Solents 
formed all or part of TEAL's fleet, the company 
1 
operated at a loss .. 
The delivery of the new aircraft was delayed 
by difficulties encountered in the testing programme 
in England but finally, in the last quarter of 1949, 
the four Short Solents ordered by the company arrived 
at Auckland .. As was now the custom each was given 
an individual name, "Aotearoa II", IIArarangi", 
"Awatere ll , and IIAranui", the IIAotearoa II" having 
1.. Figures supporting this point were shown the 
author in the course of an interview with the 
company secretary, A .. A. Watson, 8 May 1968. 
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been christened by H.R.H. Princess Elizabeth in 
a ceremony at Belfast on 26 May 1949. A fifth 
aircraft, a Solent Mark III delivered to TEAL in 
September 1951, was given the name lIAparimau .. 1 
The Solent, like its predecessor the Sandringham, 
was a conversion from a military aircraft, in this 
case the Short Seaford, which in turn was developed 
from the Sunderland Mark III. B.O.A.C .. , having 
used a Seaford for evaluation purposes, decided 
that it was a better proposition for development 
for civil use than the Sandringham and secured the 
help of Short Bros. in producing the Solent, which 
was intended as a high performance flying-boat 
specially suitable for operations on long-range 
overseas routes. 
TEAL's aircraft, the only Solent Mark IV's 
produced, were a long-range version of the basic 
design .. Fitted with more powerful Bristol Hercules 
733 engines, and able to carry forty-five passengers 
on two decks, the Solent's ability to cross the 
Tasman in less than seven hours meant that it was 
1. The Mark IV aircraft had the serial numbers 
SH 1556-59 and bore the registrations 
ZK-AML "Aotearoa II", ZK-AMM "Ararangil!, 
ZK-AMN "Awatere" and ZK-AMO "Aranui".. The 
Mark III Solent. "Aparima" had the serial 
number NJ 204.S 1296 and bore the registration 
ZK-AMQ .. 
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now possible to fly to Australia and back in one 
day .. The Solents, with their two decks, small 
efficient kitchen fitted with utility ovens, and 
comfortable and spacious seating, ushered in an 
era of great passenger comfort. Like most aircraft 
the Solent of course had its faults. The high noise 
of the stol Hercules engines, the comparatively 
slow speed, although the Tasman was crossed in less 
than seven hours, and the unpressurised cabin which 
made it necessary to fly through weather avoided by 
today's high-flying jets - all were points against 
the Solent when compared with modern aircraft. 
However they were able to provide a twofold extension 
of the Tasman service in th a daily service could 
now be operated and their passenger carrying capacity 
of forty-five was a considerable increase on that 
of the Sandringhams which in the latter period of 
operation were restricte'd to carrying only nineteen 
or twenty passengers. 
with the acquisition of the Solents to replace 
the interim Sandringham fleet TEAL was in a better 
position to reorganise its services. Solent 
operations began on 14 November 1949 when the 
aircraft were introduced on the company's only service, 
Auckland-Sydney. Operation of the Sydney-Auckland 
81. 
service by Solent, which occurred the following 
day, began on rather a comical note when the 
aircraft was recalled as it taxied out to its 
take-off position in order that three passengers 
who had been left behind in the passenger launch 
might be put aboard. 1 The last Sandringham 
service was flown by "New Zealand" from Sydney to 
Auckland on 19 December 1949 and a most troublesome 
period in the company's history was brought to an 
end .. Subsequently, "New Zealand" and "Auckland" 
were sold to Ansett Airways for use on that line's 
Sydney-Lord Howe Island service, whilst "Tasman" 
and "Australia" joined the fleet of Qantas Empire 
Airways and served the Sydney-Noume ji service .. 
With the Solents now in full operation, eight return 
flights a week were scheduled whilst on 11 January 
1950 "Aotearoa II" inaugurated a regular night 
crossing from Sydney to-Auckiando This was a 
particularly useful service as its arrival in 
Auckland about breakfast time enabled travellers 
bound for other_New Zealand centres to connect with 
internal air services without having to spend a 
night in Auckland. Appropriately the same aircraft, 
1. SMH, 16 Nov 1949. 
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"Aotearoa II", flew the tenth Anniversary flight 
on 30 April 1950 under the command of 
Captain C. Griffiths who had been first officer 
on the delivery flight of "Awarua", TEAL's second 
flying-boat, in April 1940. Questioned regarding 
the number of times he had flown the Tasman, 
1 Captain Griffiths confessed that he had lost count .. 
As well as increasing the frequency of its 
services, TEAL was now able to introduce other 
centres into its netw6rk. After concentrating 
solely on the Tasman crossing for ten years, route 
expansion began in June 1950 when the company took 
over the Auckland-Suva route previously operated by 
N.A.C., the 1,330 miles on the trip being flown 
2 between midnight and breakfast .. The change of 
operator on this route took place because TEAL had 
better faci ties to run this service economically 
and, as well as allowing TEAL to effect a greater 
fleet utilisation, relieved NoAoC. of the obligation 
to maintain and operate an orphan Sunderland flying-
boat. An extension of this new Pacific Island 
service was opened by TEAL between Suva and Lambassa 
1. ~,1 May 1950. 
2. TEAL, [untitled outline history], ch.5, p.l. 
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and return but this was discontinued in December 
1951. Two other services were opened in 1950; 
in October Wellington-Sydney services commenced and 
in December a service from Auckland to the Chatham 
Islands via Wellington was established. Christchurch 
was also incorporated into the company's network in 
June 1951 but as this service was operated with 
chartered landplanes it is dealt with elsewhereo 1 
The Wellington service, contemplated in 1948 
and originally intended to commence in April 1950, 
was delayed by a hold-up in the provision of 
facilities at EVans Bay, the site chosen in Wellington 
for a flying-boat base. The Commissioner of Works 
blamed the delay upon the company's tardiness in 
submitting firm proposals regarding base requirements 
but TEAL's chairman denied this, stating that the 
company was anxious to operate the service when 
necessary facilities were available. Lighting, 
buildings, anchoring buoys and service launches were 
some of the items which the company deemed necessary. 
There were three factors involved in operating 
commercial air services, said TEAL's chairman, safety 
of the passengers and aircraft, economics of operation 
i. See below, ch. 3. 
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and amenities to which the travelling public were 
entitled. Any attempt to operate a regular service 
between Wellington and Sydney without passenger, 
technical, and operational facilities at Evans 
was, he predicted, foredoomed to failure. 1 The 
service finally began on 3 October 1950 when the 
flying-boat "Ararangi", with twenty-eight passengers 
aboard, left Evans Bay for Sydney, this flight 
inaugurating a twice-weekly return service. The 
"Ararangi" carried only twenty-eight passengers due 
to the weight of a 'first flight' mail issue which 
the aircraft was carrying, but the next three flights 
to Australia were fully booked with waiting lists 
whilst all flights from Sydney to Wellington were 
booked out till 17 October. 2 Indeed the prediction 
by a Wellington newspaper that the day might not be 
far off when patronage of the Wellington service 
would outstrip the Auckland-Sydney service seemed 
possible, moreso when the frequency of Wellington 
operations was increased to four return flights a 
. 3 
week at the enQ of October. 
1. ~,25 May; 26 May 1950. 
2. Dominion 3 Oct 1950u 
3. Dominion, 3 Oct 1950; AJHR, 1951, H 37, p.33 .. 
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The introduction of the Wellington-Sydney 
service gave rise to a debate on whether or not 
TEAL flying-boats should operate an internal service 
between Auckland and Wellington, and it was reported 
that such a proposal was the subject of preliminary 
investigations by the airlineo 1 Most of the drive 
for this idea was derived from the fact that 
flying-boats for the Wellington-Sydney service were, 
in the early days of that service, flown empty 
between Auckland andWellingtono This occurred 
for only one month, after which the aircraft flew 
an Auckland-Sydney-Wellington and return service, 
never flying directly between the two New Zealand 
cities. There were a number of factors against the 
establishment of such a service; TEAL's Solents 
were long-range aircraft and to operate them on the 
Auckland-Wellington service would hardly have been 
economic .. Further the passenger capacity of the 
Solents (45 seats) would have demanded higher fares 
if the service was to pay .. In fact the only points 
supporting such. a 'service were the desirability of 
utilising the aircraft rather than having them 
10 NZH, 3 Oct 1950. 
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standing idle and the possibility of chartering 
the aircraft to N.A.C. for the trip at a figure 
which covered only the direct operational costs, 
a highly improbable situation. With the change 
of route to Auckland-Sydney-Wellington proposals 
for a TEAL-operated internal service were abandoned" 
The Wellington service provided a number of 
incidents .. The first occurred just two weeks 
after the opening of the service when on 17 October 
1950 the "Ararangi" was struck by a four foot wave 
on Evans Bay and one float and wing damaged. 
Fortunately none of the passengers aboard suffered 
injury .. One year and a day later the same machine 
was caught by a sudden fifty-five knot gust of wind 
while landing at Evans Bay. The starboard float 
of the machine was ripped off and three starboard 
windows at the after end of the lower deck were 
smashed in; again none of the forty passengers 
were injured. 1 Despite these mishaps the Wellington 
service continued to be operated by flying-boats 
until 25 June 1954 when the last Solent service out 
of Wellington was flown. As TEAL was re-equipping 
with landplanes and Wellington possessed no 
1. CS, 17 Oct 1950; 18 Oct 1951. 
international airport, the New 
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and capital 
relinquished its place on the company's international 
services and was not reinstated until 26 July 1960. 
The third extension of services undertaken by 
the company during this period was the operation of 
a service from Auckland to the Chatham Islands via 
Wellington. Undertaken at the request of the 
Government, who provided a subsidy for this service, 
this route was operated on a frequency of four return 
trips a year, the single fare being £11. The first 
f ght over this route took place on 15 December 1950 
when "Ararangi" took forty-eight passengers to the 
island and returned with seventeen passengers. In 
1952 TEAL applied for, and was granted, a five year 
licence for a non-scheduled passenger and goods 
service to the Chatham Islands. However this was 
not fully utilised for this service, like that to 
Wellington, came to an end when the company changed 
to landplanes and the last TEAL flight to the 
Chathams was flown by "Ararangi" on 7 April 1954 .. 
The TEAL service was extremely popular with the 
i anders as it provided a fast link with New Zealand, 
and it was reported that nearly one-third of the 
island's inhabi s were present Te Whanga 
lagoon to greet "Ararangi" on its inaugural flight .. 1 
It took only three hours to compl the journey 
from Wellington to the Chatham Islands and this meant 
that perishable goods could be transported to the 
islands. Indeed the aircraft must have resembled 
flying grocery shops as they carried, amongst other 
things, oranges, tomatoes, sausages and ice-cream 
on nearly every trip .. Aboard the So lent on the 
last flight of the service, for example, there were 
610 Ibs of sausages, a large quantity of ice-cream 
2 
and twenty-one cases of tomatoes.. One of the 
Chatham flights, that flown on 28 January 1953, was 
full of interest as the hull of the aircraft was 
holed by the service launch and on the return journey 
an engine f I 
lightning .. 3 
and the aircraft was struck by 
In May 1951 the company announced that it 
would extend the Auckland-Suva route to British 
Samoa, the Cook Islands Group and Tahiti, and would 
at the same time procure another Solent.,4 This, 
the fifth Solent in TEAL's fl 
1 .. Dominion, 16 Dec 1950 .. 
Ibid .. , 8 Apr 1954. 
TEAL, 
4.. Press, 17 May 1951. 
, arrived on 
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15 September 1951 and differed from the others in 
that it was an earlier version, a Mark III. It 
was in fact last So lent operated by BoO.AoCo 
and had only flown one trip to South Africa before 
being beached .. Taken over by TEAL, the craft's 
original name, "City of Belfast" was replaced by 
"Aparima" and the machine flown to New Zealand by 
way of America, this route being flown because of 
a petrol shortage in the Middle East. Early in 
November 1951 "Aparima" conducted a proving flight 
along the proposed Pacific route and on 28 December 
the first scheduled service to Tahiti via Suva and 
Aitutaki was flown. 
The Coral Route, as this route became known, 
was originally operated on a monthly basis but in 
May 1952 the schedule was increas to a fortnightly 
trip. The Pacific Islands area was an appropriate 
one in which to extend TEAL operations as in October 
1946 the company had adopted the Maroro, a Polynesian 
flying-fish, as the TEAL insignia. The new Coral 
Route promised to be an economic venture for the 
large number of American tourists wishing to visit 
Tahiti could fly only as far as Fiji on the major 
airline networks. From Fiji it was necessary to 
travel by the New Zealand flying-boat and so TEAL, 
90. 
in operating the service, gained for New Zealand a 
share of the dollars spent by tourists in the 
Pacific. The economic potentiality of the route, 
however, was not as great as appeared and losses 
occurred in the operation of the serviceo These 
were accentuated after 1954 when the route was 
maintained by one Solent retained by the company 
solely for this purpose and in 1956 the Minister in 
Charge of Civil Aviation, T.P. Shand, stated that 
from a commercial point of view the service was bad 
business and expressed doubts whether the cost was 
justified by the value of the service to the island 
1 people. 
In October 1952 Apia was included as a stopover 
between Fiji and Cook Islands en route to Tahiti and 
in August 1953 the frequency of the whole Coral 
Route service was revised. In future the Auckland-
Suva service was to be flown five times in four 
weeks, the Suva-Apia service three times each month, 
and the Suva-Papeete service once every month. A 
service to Tonga was so commenced as an extension 
of the normal Auckland-Suva flights on a frequency 
of once a month. This service began on 12 August 
1. PD, cccx, 22590 
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1953 and was actually flown on a frequency of twelve 
return flights per year, two return flights being 
made within about a fortnight of each other every 
two months .. 1 The Coral Route, operating it as 
did at a time when other airlines were withdrawing 
flying-boats, had a character of its own with 
lagoons, palm trees and tropical sunshine .. In the 
latter years of Solent operation on this service 
TEAL was one of the last major airlines to 
carrying passengers in this type of aircraft, a 
fact which lent added glamour to the service" The 
Coral Route was also the scene of the company's first 
Royal Flights when, in December 1953, HoM. Queen 
Elizabeth II and HoR.H. Duke of Edinburgh were flown 
between Suva and Lautoka and return, and between 
Suva and Nukualofa in "Aotearoa 11"" 
During the whole period when this route 
expansion was occurring Tasman operations continued, 
and by November 1952 the flying-boats were operating 
nine return services a week over the Tasman. In 
this period the"value of TEAL was proven by its 
service during the New Zealand waterfront strike of 
1.. TEAL, [untitled outline history], ch.5, p,,2 .. 
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19510 To cope with the situation the entire 
Solent fleet was called upon, along with a number 
of chartered aircraft, and from the start of March 
till the end of June, 485 Tasman flights were made, 
including forty-four special Solent flights and 
seventy-nine chartered operationso 1 The amount of 
freight, passengers and mail carried during the 
strike showed a great increase over both preceding 
and succeeding years as figures provided in 
Appendix B reveal. 2 Particularly noteworthy is 
the 1951 figure for freight carried in the month of 
July, showing as it does an almost five-fold increase 
over the July figures of both 1950 and 19520 The 
company again proved its value when in 1952 it 
undertook an airlift across the Tasman of some 
1,800 replacement troops for New Zealand's K-Forceo 
Alternative means of transport had been considered 
but as there was no shipping company operating a 
suitable or regular service between New Zealand and 
the Far East a ship would have had to have been 
chartered if the troops were to travel by sea. As this 
would have cost'more and taken longer, a contract 
was let to TEAL to fly the troops to Australia and 
P ,18 Jul 19510 
See Appendix B, po2220 
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arrange for other airlines to complete the air t 
to Japan. It was good exercise for the company 
since, in times of emergency conditions, any nation's 
overseas airline is of strategic importance in 
that it provides a fast transport fleet which is 
ly converted to military needs. 
In spite of the improved service the Solents 
were able to offer and the amount of work they were 
able to perform, the days of flying-boat operation 
were necessarily drawing to a close. By 1953 
the landplane was rmly established on most major 
commercial services throughout the world, and as 
TEAL had announced that the Solents would be withdrawn 
from the high density Tasman routes within five 
years, it was clearly necessary to choose a 
1 
replacement. Apart from the relative merits of 
landplanes and flying-boats, there were a number of 
factors which seemed to favour a switch to landplaneso 
In Sydney, the re dents of Rose Bay were requesting 
the removal of the flying-boat base from their suburb o 
The long-range plan was to remove the base to 
Botany Bay but residents of this area became vocal in 
1. Press, 24 Oct 1952. 
94 .. 
opposition .. The hope of the D artment of Civil 
Aviation, as revealed by the Minister, HoL. Anthony, 
was that the problem would solve itself by flying~ 
boats becoming outmoded so that no base would be 
neededo 1 Secondly, there was a scarcity of 
flying-boats being constructed, the only one worthy 
of consideration being the Saunders-Roe Princess 
originally designed for 100 passengers and obviously 
too large for TEAL's requirements 0 The only 
alternative was for the company to order a flying-boat 
constructed to its own specifications but the ~ost 
of such an action would have been prohibitive. 
"Unless the development of a flying-boat was financed 
by the New and Government, the company could not 
see any possibility of replacing the Solents with 
another aircraft of that type. That meant, therefore, 
th the company must convert to landplanes, in which 
field there would be plenty of choice", said TEAL's 
manager, G.N. Roberts. 2 
An interesting comment on the future commercial 
use of flying-boats was made in June 1951 by the 
10 SMH, 20 Jan 1954. 
2. NZH, 3 May 1951 .. 
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Chief of the New Ze and Air Staff, Air Vice-Marshal 
D.V. Carnegie: 
I foresee the landplanes still 
carrying the passengers who must get 
from A to B as quickly as possible, 
but the tourist, freight, and normal 
passenger trade will undoubtedly be 
carried by the future flying-boat •• 0 0 
The flying-boat may appear to be on the 
way out. If there is no increase in 
the size and weight of commercial 
aircraft, and if governments are prepared 
to meet the cost of the upkeep of runways, 
then commercially the days of the flying-
boat may be numbered. But if large 
craft do corne .00 bringing ••• the need 
for longer and stronger runways - then 
we shall once more see the flying-boat 
corning into its own. 000 New Zealand 
may be witnessing the passing of a phase 
in the history of aviation •••• To-day 
the civil and military types in use are 
10 years old, and ••• there are, as far 
as I am aware, no flying-boats of 
commerci design under construction in 
any country.1 
Carnegie went on to say that the landplane, 
compared with a flying-boat of similar ze, had a 
higher speed and greater payload and was the logical 
choice if an airfield was available. However, he 
predicted that the cost of aerodromes and the airport 
congestion that might develop from extensive use of 
landplanes would bring flying-boats to the fore as 
the main air carrier of the future. Two years 
1. Pre s, 29 Jun 1951. 
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later, in 1953, the pioneer aviator Captain 
P.G. Taylor endors this point of view: 
A few years ago the flying-boat 
appeared to be finished as a transport 
aircraft in competition with the more 
economical and efficient land-based 
type. The introduction of jet 
propulsion has, however, completely 
changed this picture. We now see 
the flying-boat coming up over the 
horizon again, not only as a practical 
airline transport for transocean 
services, but as a possible threat to 
the existence of the land aircraft 
where there is water available for a 
marine air-base. The propellor 
clearance problem, which dictated the 
rather inefficient shape of flying-
boats in the past, has now been 
eliminated by the jet. 1 
Despite the opinion of these two experts it 
did seem likely that landplanes would supplant the 
Solents when the time came for their retirement and 
there were pointers in this directiono In 1948 
when Sandringham services were suspended, the Tasman 
service was operated almost entirely by land aircraft; 
in 1951 the Christchurch-Melbourne service was begun 
using chartered landplanes and in December 1951, 
TEAL's chairman, Sir L. Isitt, stated that 
-
consideration was being given to the eventual 
replacement of the Solents with Bristol Britannia 
2 landplaneso However it was not Britannias but an 
1. SMH, 26 Mar 1953. 
2. , 18 Dec 1951. 
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American landplane, the Douglas DC-6 , which 
replaced TEAL's Solents in 19540 On 17 March 1954 
the decision was announced to discontinue the 
Chatham Islands, Wellington and Auckland-Suva services: 
the latter service was replaced by a DC-6 operating 
from Auckland to Nandi, the first service of this 
Hibiscus Service being flown on 15 May 19540 The 
last Solent flight across the Tasman occurred on 
27 June 1954 and by the end of that month all the 
Solents, with one exception, had been withdrawn. 
The one exception was "Aranui" which was retained for 
use on the Fiji-Tahiti section of the Coral Route. 
Disposal of the other machines was not an easy task 
since the use of flying-boats for passenger carrying 
was generally being discontinued but "Aotearoa II" 
and "Awatere" were eventually sold to Aquila Airways 
of the United Kingdom, whilst "Ararangi" and 
"Aparima" were scrapped 'at Mechanics 'Bay_ The 
"Aranui" continued its Coral Route service until it 
returned to Auckland in September 1960 at the end 
of a farewell flight over the whole Coral Route. 
Today the machine is on display at the Museum of 
Transport and Technology in Auckland, a reminder of 
the twenty-one year flying-boat era in TEAL's history. 
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CHAPTER 3 FROM KEELS TO WHEELS 
In March 1954, when New Zealand's Minister in 
Charge of Civil Aviation, T.H. Macdonald, announced 
that, as a result of changes to be made in the Pacific 
air services, TEAL would be re-equipped with 
Douglas DC-6 landplanes, The P commented, "the 
reorganisation ••• contains no surprises, except 
that the plan has taken five months to comple ,,1 , a 
remark occasioned by the fact that tentative agreement 
on the matter had been reached the previous November. 
However, the idea of TEAL operating landplanes on 
all or some of its services was actually a good deal 
older than five months. It is possible in fact, 
to trace it back almost to the time of the company's 
inception, for in January 1941 the Board of Directors 
of Union Airways, TEAL's managing agents, had 
received a report on a propos€:d TEAL-operated 
Palmers ton North-Sydney service from their General 
Manager, Maurice Clarke. In his report Clarke 
wrote "it can be assumed that the Tasman would 
ultimately be flown by landplanes" and he recommended 
1. Press, 18 Mar 1954. 
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"that Tasman Empire Airways investigates the 
possibility of securing a DC-4 or a Boeing 
Stratoliner for the Tasman service to augment the 
service already being run by the boatso,,1 By 
"boats" Clarke meant of course, the TEAL flying-
boats "Aotearoa" and "Awarua" whilst both the 
aircraft referred to in his recommendation were land 
machines. Any proposal to expand TEAL's fleet or 
route network was curtailed, however, by the wartime 
conditions which overshadowed the first five years 
of the company's historyo 
The question of a landplane service across the 
Tasman was revived, in somewhat different form, in 
January 1945 when Australian National Airways (A.N.A.) 
lodged an application to operate a number of 
overseas services with the Australian Department of 
Civil Aviationo Included in A.NoA.'s proposals 
were landplane operated services between Australia 
and New Zealand and Australia and the United States 
by way of New Zealand but the withholding of official 
" 
approval of the companyts application resulted in the 
1. Me Clarke, Tasman Empire Airways Ltd; 
Palmerston North-Sydney Service, pp.1-2. 
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postponement of landplane operations across the 
Tasman .. A.N.A. did prove, however, that the 
commercial operation of landplanes across the Tasman 
was possible when, on a special flight in March 1946, 
one of its Skymaster aircraft carried forty-one 
passengers and 5,000 lbs of freight between Australia 
and New Zealand. 
Further indication that landplanes might take 
their place on the Tasman service was given by 
TEAL's Vice-Chairman, CoG. White, when he announced 
that the company intended to change over to Avro 
Tudor lIs as soon as these machines became available. 1 
Unfortunately this re-equipment with British landplanes 
did not take place and in November 1946 the use of 
landplanes across the Tasman was estimated to be at 
least three years away, the delay being attributed 
to the fact that TEAL was approaching the question 
of land machines with some caution since post-war 
2 types had not yet been thoroughly tested. 
Subsequently, the decision to order a number of 
Short Solent flying-boats, justified by TEAL's 
1. CS, 6 Mar 1946. 
2. Press, 9 Nov 1946. 
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assistant-general manager on the grounds of safety 
and economics, postponed the introduction of 
landplanes indefinitely .. l "Land planes may 
eventually replace the Solent, but that plane 
should do us for another five or six years, or 
longer .. We would ~ have to consider whether 
land planes should be used", said New Zealand's 
A "t" M"" t 2 v~a ~on ~n~s ere 
The landplane continued to make incursions 
upon this domain so strenuously preserved for the 
flying-boat; in February 1947, for example, a 
number of charter flights were made by Skymaster 
aircraft of Trans-Australia Airlines in order that 
TEAL might cope with the increased Tasman traffic 
which followed the accident to the steamer IfWanganella". 
The landplane strengthened its case for inclusion in 
the operation of the Tasman airways during the period 
February-June 1948 when DC-4 Skymasters of 
Trans-Australia Airlines and A .. N.A .. maintained the 
Tasman service whilst TEAL's Sandringham fleet was 
grounded .. Additional support for the operation of 
landplanes across the Tasman carne in the reports of 
two Government appointed bodies. The Royal 
1.. CS, 18 Oct 1948. 
2. ~,cclxxxi, 1084 [emphasis added] .. 
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Commission established to inquire into the 
Sandringham incident of 3 December 1947 recommended 
that pressurised aircraft be used on the Tasman 
service as soon as possible which, in view of the 
difficulties that existed in pressurising the hulls 
of flying-boats, was virtually a mandate for a 
change to landplaneso Secondly, the Tymms Mission 
of 1948 recommended that "Government should consider 
the establishment of both landplane and seaplane 
services across the Tasman .. " 1 Flying-boats 
nevertheless continued to operate the service for a 
fUrther six years .. 
On 29 June 1951 TEAL itself took a major step 
toward the full-scale use of landplanes when the 
company inaugurated a Christchurch-Melbourne service 
using a chartered DC-4 aircraft. The opening of 
this service was the outcome of long agitation for 
such a link. In the course of this agitation the 
question of TEAL's monopoly on the Tasman and the 
continued use of flying-boats had come under discussion 
-for the matter concerned not only the establishment 
of an air service into the South Island but the offer 
of a private company, A.N.A., to operate such a 
1. Press, 30 Apr 1948; AJHR, 1948, H 37A, p.35. 
service. In February 1946 the Mayor of 
Christchurch had received advice from Melbourne 
that subject to official approval, A.NoAa were 
prepared to operate a Tasman service with 
Christchurch as the New Zealand terminal: thus 
began a five year struggle to have Christchurch 
incorporated into New Zealand's external air network. 
The required governmental approval of AoN.A.'s 
proposed service was withheld, hardly a surprising 
decision for not only were both the Australian and 
New Zealand Governments pledged to nationalisation 
of airways but their sanctioning of such a proposal 
would have meant, in effect, authorising a service 
to compete on the Tasman with the services offered 
by TEAL in which company both governments had a 
financial interest. On the other hand there was 
little doubt that a direct air service to the South 
Island would have to be provided, if only because 
South Islanders wishing to travel on TEAL's Tasman 
services were required to travel to Auckland and 
-
await the departure of their trans-Tasman aircraft, 
a period of anything up to twenty-four hours. The 
basic question was of course, whether or not an 
operator other than TEAL was going to provide this 
additional service for companies other than TEAL and 
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A.N.A. were interested in the route. Indeed 
N.A.C., Trans-Australia Airlines, Qantas Empire 
Airways and British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines -
all government-owned concerns - as well as the 
privately owned Ansett Airways all expressed interest 
in the service at some time prior to its inauguration. 
Furthermore the likelihood of foreign airlines 
demanding the right to use New Zealand as a stopping 
place on through routes could not be overlooked; 
Pan American Airways' services to the United States 
from both Australia and New Zealand were one example. 
"The position of the Dominion on the map of the 
Pacific is so strategical from the point of view of 
••• airline operation that serious consideration 
will have to be given to the claims of other airlines 
wanting to use the Tasman route" wrote the editor of 
one aviation journal. 1 Six years later 
The New Zealand Herald warned that continuation of 
TEAL's monopoly across the Tasman might CUlminate in 
New Zealand being bypassed by some of the Pacific 
trunk services ~ith the result that it would be at 
the end of a branch line to Fiji instead of being on 
the international routes. 2 As far as the 
1. Whites Aviation, Jul 1947, p.l. 
20 NZH, 24 Jan 1953. 
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New Zealand Government was concerned, however, 
there was no question of another airline operating 
across the Tasman; lithe Government's policy was 
that air services between Australia and New Zealand 
should be operated by Tasman Empire Airways", said 
the Minister in charge of the Air Department, 
F. Jones, adding that the provision of a direct air 
service by TEAL between the South Island and 
Australia was not immediately practicable as TEAL's 
equipment consisted solely of flying-boats. 1 
Prospects for a landplane service to the South 
Island brightened late in 1949 when a change of 
government occurred on both sides of the Tasman. 
In May 1949, whilst still Leader of the Opposition, 
the new Prime Minister, SoG. Holland, had stated, 
"if I had the authority I would start the preparations 
for a South Island-Australia air service from 
Harewood tomorrow ..... Modern planes for the 
service were available now, and some healthy 
competition in air services would be all to the gOOd .. ,,2 
. 
On the Australian side of the Tasman, the decision of 
the new Government to designate Essendon airfield, 
10 Press, 2 Jul 1949. 
2.. Ibid., 5 May 1949. 
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Melbourne, an international airport brought the 
Christchurch-Melbourne service a step closer 
especially as the distance separating the two cities, 
some 1,500 miles, was comfortably within the range 
of Douglas DC-6 and Lockheed Constellation aircraft 
currently in use by British, American and Australian 
airlines on overseas services. In May 1950 
New Zealand's Minister in Charge of Civil Aviation, 
W. Goosman, announced that a Christchurch-Melbourne 
service would begin in December, although he gave no 
indication as to which of the many interested 
companies would operate the service. The end of 
this rather protracted prologue to the new service 
carne in July 1950 when Goosman announced that TEAL, 
using chartered landplanes, would operate the route, 
although no decision had as yet been made regarding 
the inaugural date or type of aircraft to be used. 1 
A government which had supported the application 
of the privately-owned A.N"A. whilst in opposition 
had now reversed its stand and adopted the very course 
of action it had criticised before assuming office. 
!lAlthough the Government is naturally predisposed in 
favour of private enterprise" said Goosman, "it has 
1. NZH, 4 May 1950; CS, 14 Jul 1950. 
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concluded after a full examination that it is 
bound to observe the terms of the agreement entered 
into by the British, Australian, and New Zealand 
Governments in 1940, and renewed on September 15 
1949, conferring on Tasman Empire Airways the 
exclusive right to operate the regular civil air 
transport services required for the carriage of 
1 passengers, mail, and freight across the Tasman Sea,,1l 
It was a righteous sounding statement but it fell far 
short of explaining the change in attitude to the 
service on the part of the Government before and 
after its election to office. Goosman's added 
comment that the operation of a South Island service 
by a private operator might subject TEAL to an 
operating loss and jeopardize the capi investment 
of the three governments concerned was probably a 
better reason with which to explain the Government's 
change of outlook .. 
The Australian aviation journal 
criticised the decision to grant TEAL the operating 
rights on the new service, contending that New Zealand 
was developing a "Mare Nostrum" (our sea) attitude 
2 toward commercial air services across the Tasman. 
1 .. ~p~~, 14 Jul 1950. 
2 .. IlAircraft", Aug 1950, quoted in , 11 Aug 1950 .. 
108. 
There were, however, a number of factors which 
supported the decision to employ TEAL on the 
Christchurch-Melbourne service. By awarding 
another company the charter for the route but 
retaining control in the hands of TEAL, in which 
the Government held fifty per cent. of the shares, 
ultimate control of the Tasman air routes remained 
in the hands of the New Zealand Government. There 
was also the possibility that had the New Zealand 
Government granted a private company the right to 
compete with TEAL, one or both of the other two 
partners might have demanded that New Zealand buy 
them out. Furthermore the decision meant that 
New Zealand would in time of war or emergency have 
the major voice in deciding the future of the air 
services whereas if a private company ran the service 
the aircraft might, under similar circumstances, be 
switched to other routes. 
For Christchurch, a taste of things to come was 
provided in December 1950 when a DC-6 and Constellation 
landed at Harewood having flown from Melbourne and 
Sydney respectively. Questioned at Christchurch, 
TEAL's chairman, Isitt, stated that the company 
expected to commence operation of a weekly return 
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service by June 1951, the aircraft to be chartered 
from Australian sources. 1 This date was somewhat 
premature and it was not until 29 June 1951 that 
the Christchurch service was inaugurated with the 
arrival from Australia of the DC-4 "Philippine 
Trader" under charter from Qantas. The service 
was operated in this manner until June 1954 when 
TEAL's own landplanes were introduced upon the route. 
In this rather indirect way TEAL began the transition 
from flying-boats to landplaneso 
The full-scale changeover to landplanes did not 
take place until 1954 following the reorganisation 
of the Pacific air services operated by the British, 
Australian and New Zealand Governments when TEAL 
acquired three DC-6 landplanes. TEAL had, in fact, 
been considering re-equipment plans in 1951 and 
indications at that time were that the flying-boats 
would be abandoned in favour of landplanes, since 
TEAL's Solents were due for replacement by 1957 and 
there was no suitable flying-boat currently in 
production. The only alternative, TEAL acquiring a 
number of flying-boats built to its own 
specifications, having been dismissed as too costly, 
10 Press, 20 Dec 1950. 
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conversion to landplanes appeared the only choice, 
a conclusion confirmed by one of TEAL's directors, 
ToAo Barrow, who stated that when the time carne for 
re-equipment TEAL would have the choice of three 
British and two American landplanes with the Duchess 
flying-boat a sixth possibility.1 Consequently 
it was rather surprising to find the company chairman, 
Isitt, stating less than two months later, that 
TEAL would continue to operate flying-boats if suitable 
replacements could be found. In support of this 
contention Isitt noted that sea- ighting areas on 
TEAL routes were more adjacent to the terminal ci s 
than the international airports currently in use, and 
also the cost of preparing a lane base was much 
less than the cost of aerodrome construction. 2 
Although this statement was in complete 
contradiction to the prevailing trend toward landplanes 
there was something in Isitt's case for flying-boats 
when the question of alighting areas was taken into 
consideration, since the close proximity of the 
flying-boat bases to the terminal cities made for 
economy and convenience for both the airline and the 
1. Press, 18 Oct 1951. 
2. Ibid., 11 Dec 1951. 
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passengers. In addition the comparative cost of 
sea-alighting areas and land aerodromes undoubtedly 
made Isitt's case attractive to the New Zealand 
Government, faced as it was with the costly possibility 
of having to provide New Zealand with one or two 
international airfields. A further attraction to 
New Zealand's politicians in the continued use of 
flying-boats was the fact that a change to landplanes 
would undoubtedly deprive Wellington of a direct link 
wi th Australia. On the other hand there were a 
number of reasons to suggest a re-equipment with 
landplanes. TEAL was by 1951 one of the last 
international airlines of any consequence making 
extensive use of flying-boats in the operation of its 
services. Future flying-boats would, if constructed 
solely for TEAL, be expensive machines. There was 
also the possibility that they might be inferior 
machines since the current advantages of the landplane 
would almost assuredly increase as a result of the 
greater attention being given to the development and 
improvement of that type of machine. Furthermore, 
TEAL could hardly overlook the ,disadvantages of 
operating a m~xed fleet of aircraft, yet it was bound 
eventually to have some landplanes of its own, if 
only to operate the Christchurch-Melbourne service, 
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thus ending the reliance on existing charter 
arrangements. The odds seemed to favour the 
landplane and seven days after the press release 
of his first statement, Isitt appeared in print for 
a second time with an announcement that "serious 
consideration" was being given to the replacing of 
the Solent flying-boats with Britannia landplanes, 
although "in view of its commitments to the new 
extended Pacific service" it was unlikely that TEAL 
would entirely abandon flying-boats. 1 By March 
1952 TEAL was no further advanced toward re-equipment, 
the company's vice-chairman stating that no decision 
on the Britannia could be made until after that 
machine had concluded its testing flights in June. 2 
It did seem, however, as though the Britannia 
would be the next aircraft to serve in the company's 
fleet and consequently it was surprising when the 
company suddenly proposed the use of Handley Page 
Hermes IV landplanes as an interim measure. The 
planes were to come from B.O.AoC. and it was intended 
that they fill the gap until TEAL took delivery of 
the Britannia, the decision to use an interim machine 
i. CS, 18 Dec 1951. 
2. NZH, 19 Mar 1952. 
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being made because the Solent was rapidly becoming 
. 1 1 uneconom~ca .. The decision came under some harsh 
criticism, Sir Keith Park for example, contending 
that it was a "scandalous waste of public money 
and sterling funds" to replace TEAL's Solents with 
"obsolete Hermes landplanes discarded by an overseas 
airline", a erence to the fact that BoOoA.C. had 
replaced its Hermes with de Havilland Cometso 2 
On 21 May 1953, just three months after the announcement 
of the interim plan, the Hermes scheme was abandoned, 
investigations having revealed the machine to be 
unsatisfactory for TEAL's operating conditions .. 
Instead TEAL was to continue operating its Solents, 
the passenger capacity of which would be increased 
to fiftY-four .. 3 
The solution of the company's re-equipment 
problems, the acquisition of three DC-6 machines, 
resulted from discussions regarding the reorganisation 
of the two tri-party government-owned airline 
companies, TEAL and British Commonwealth Pacific 
Airlines (B.C.P.A.). These discussions began in 
1.. NZH, 16 Feb 1953. 
2.. Ibid .. , 4 Apr 19530 
3.. Press, 21 May 1953 .. 
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Canberra in August 1952 and were continued at 
irregular intervals until tentative agreement was 
reached at a conference held in Christchurch in 
October 1953. However, a final announcement was 
withheld until the following March because of the 
need to obtain governmental approval of the 
provisions contained in the agreement, the prolonged 
negotiations and official reticence on the matter 
providing an interesting parallel with the years 
preceding TEAL's establishment. 
There were a number of factors which necessitated 
some reorganisation of the two airlines' serviceso 
There was, for instance, the question of introducing 
"tourist" fares early in 1954, a matter to which 
both companies were bound by international agreement, 
and one which would require the greatest operational 
efficiency at the lowest cost. Finance was of 
course another factor deserving consideration. TEAL 
was faced with the heavy expense of· are-equipment 
programme and both companies were in nancial 
-difficulties, TEAL to a lesser extent than B.CoP.Ao 
Regular sums were voted to the companies by the 
New Zealand Parliament to meet operational deficits 
and in the year ended 31 March 1953 B.CoP.A. received 
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some £50,000 in this way, a kind of ten per cento 
dividend in reverse on an investment of approximately 
1 £542,000. 
The difficulties of both companies might have 
been overcome by a merger of the two organisations, 
a move which would have been of great benefit to 
TEAL since that company would have obtained the use 
or ownership of B.C.P.A. 's landplanes which could be 
adapted for the carriage of "tourist-class" passengers! 
whether the financial difficul s would have been 
overcome is a matter for conjecture. Any such 
merger would, however, have raised a number of problems 
relating to traffic rights and company control. 
B"CoP.A. 's aircraft operated between Australia, 
2 Vancouver and New Zealand , but were restricted from 
the trans-Tasman traffic which was reserved solely 
for TEAL .. If a merged TEAL-BoC.P.Ao was admitted 
to the Tasman a similar concession would have had to 
have been made to rlines such as Pan American 
Airways and Canadian Pacific Air Lines, otherwise 
landing rights in Canada and the United states could 
1. AJHR, 1953, B 7 [Pt I J, P .. 192. 
20 BoCoP.Ao's service operated through San Francisco 
but enjoyed only transit rights for that centre. 
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possibly have been withdrawnG The question of 
control of a merged company also presented problems .. 
Both organisations had similar share structures, 
fifty, thirty, twenty per cent .. , but the New Zealand 
Government was the major shareholder in TEAL and the 
Australian Government held the fifty per cent. in 
BQC.,P .. A. A compromise on control of a merged 
airline would clearly have been necessary, an unlikely 
probability since the British shares would have 
assumed the character of floating votes able to sway 
decisions either way .. In the light of such problems 
it was evident that any plan relating to 
reorganisation would have to overcome complex 
difficulties, a fact realised by New Zealand's 
Minister in Charge of Civil Aviation: 
Each different scheme has to be 
studied in the light of factors such 
as estimated profit or loss, suitability 
of aerodromes for various types of 
aircraft, the use or otherwise of 
flying-boats, the defence value in 
controlling an international airline, 
and the advantage to be gained in 
operating services to Pacific Islands 
and dependencies.,l 
The idea of merging the two airlines was, of 
course, only one of the many plans suggested during 
i. NZH, 16 Jul 1953. 
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the conferences and negotiations which took placeo 
In June 1953 The New Zealand Herald reported that 
the possibilities were believed to have been reduced 
to two; that BoC.P.A. absorb TEAL and operate an 
Australia-New Zealand-North America service, or that 
TEAL would continue to operate but Britain would 
withdraw, selling her shares to Australia and 
New Zealand. 1 The adoption of the first of these 
two schemes was unlikely since, for the reasons 
mentioned above, it would have been necessary to 
end the Tasman monopoly. The second suggestion had 
more sUbstance since the likelihood of Britain 
withdrawing from both companies seemed possible in 
light of two factors. Firstly, the post-war 
operations of B.OoAoCo had been anything but a financial 
success and the losses incurred through the company's 
interest in B.CoP.A. and TEAL no doubt contributed 
to the overall deficit. Consequently it was not 
surprising when B.O.A.Co's chairman noted in his 1953 
Report that BoO.AoC. would probably drop its nancial 
interest in TEAL .. 2· The second reason is one of 
conjecture rather than fact but at this time, 
10 NZH, 30 Jun 1953. 
2. Quoted in SMH, 23 Sep 1953. 
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i.e. 1952-53, BoO.AoC. was re-equipping with Comet 
jet airliners and the possibility of the company 
desiring to operate a round-the-world service with 
these machines cannot be overlooked. Withdrawal 
from TEAL and B.C.PoA., both of which operated in 
the Pacific region, would have 1 BoO.A.Co free to 
operate independently when it was ready with machines 
and organisation and would also have simplified any 
negotiations for landing rights that might have been 
necessary. 
Advancement toward a final settlement was made 
at a conference held in Christchurch in October 1953, 
a list of recommendations being drawn up and forwarded 
to the various governments for th consideration. 
The main recommendation was that CoP.A. disappear 
with Qantas operating its Pacific services with its 
own aircraft, B.C.P.A's aircraft being transferred to 
TEAL. New Zealand and Australia, who were to become 
joint-owners of TEAL, were each to buy one of the 
machines and share the cost of the thirds New Zealand 
would not lose its Pacific service as the Qantas 
service to North America would be linked with 
New Zealand by an Auckland-Fiji service operated with 
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TEAL's newly acquired DC-6s, which would also be 
used on the Tasman serviceo 1 
The conference was reported to have considered 
four proposals relating to the latter service; 
A.NoA. should run a service; Qantas or 
Trans-Australia Airlines should operate the route; 
New Zealand should accept full responsibility; or 
New Zealand and Australia should establish joint-
ownership of the service. New Zealand's delegate, 
T.H. Macdonald, rejected the first two proposals 
because they did not meet that country's requirements, 
namely, the existence of a New Zealand-based overseas 
airline, and the retention of TEAL's workshops and 
maintenance organisation in Auckland. The third 
proposal was rejected because of the difficulty 
anticipated in maintaining a monopoly of the service 
2 
under pressure from other operators. The fourth 
possibility, the only one acceptable to New Zealand, 
overcame this point since a service so operated was 
not a monopoly in the strict sense of the word since 
it served both Australia and New Zealand. Furthermore, 
New Zealand was not in the position, financially, to 
1. CS, 19 Oct 1953; NZH, 17 Nov 1953. 
2. ~,17 Nov 1953. 
accept full responsibility for the serviceo The 
last solution was also the only one acceptable to 
New Zealand on strategic grounds. Had the Tasman 
service become the responsibility of an Australian 
company, New Zealand could have done no more than 
plead for consideration if her interests failed to 
coincide with those of Australia, a disastrous 
situation in the event of an emergency. 
At the end of 1953 agreement appeared to be no 
closer and in February 1954 New Zealand's Prime 
Minister, S.G. Holland, stated that nothing could be 
firmly decided upon until further consultations 
with the other shareholding governments had taken 
1 place. The of cial announcement of the 
reorganisation plans came in a statement by the 
Minister in Charge of Civil Aviation on 17 March 1954 
which in effect, merely confirmed what had been 
predicted following the Christchurch conference five 
months before. Britain was to withdraw from TEAL 
leaving New Zealand and Austra a as joint-owners. 
Australia would~buy out BeC.P.A. and Qantas was to 
run a Pacific service. New Zealand would withdraw 
1. NZH, 12 Feb 19540 
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its thirty per cent. interest in B.C.P.A., receiving 
in return three DC-6 landplanes formerly used by 
that company, and TEAL would continue to enjoy a 
monopoly on the Tasman. 1 
An unsatisfactory aspect of the settlement from 
New Zealand's viewpoint was the new joint-ownership 
of TEAL, with the Australian and New Zealand 
2 Governments each holding 811,400 £1 shares, for 
although the board of directors was to have a 
New Zealand chairman whose casting vote gave 
New Zealand nominal control, the possibility of the 
chairman being forced to rule the board with his 
casting vote, and the delays which might result from 
such a situation, could not be overlooked. On the 
other hand TEAL had received a fleet of three DC-6 
landplanes which promised not only to improve the 
financial side of company operations, but allowed 
for the introduction of tourist fares if desired and 
provided greater passenger comfort inside their 
pressurised cabins. 
Re-equipment was not merely a matter of an 
overnight switch of aircraft and in changing from 
1. Press, 18 Mar 1954. 
2. AJHR, 1955, B 1 CPt II], po58. 
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Solents to DC-6s TEAL faced many temporary difficulties; 
in fact this changeover may fairly be regarded as the 
most trying of the company's five re-equipment 
programmes. During its completion there were many 
problems which had to be met and dealt with; s 
had to be retrained in the flying and servicing of 
land aircraft; new maintenance facilities had to be 
provided at Whenuap the company's new base of 
operations, twenty-two miles from Auckland; routes 
and timetables had to be rearranged and a retooling 
programme for the workshops undertaken. The 
changeover was made more difficult by the fact that 
a British aircraft was being replaced by an American 
machine, equipment for which was far from easy to 
obtain as the DC-6 was no longer being manufactured; 
valuable help in this respect was received, however, 
from Qantas and Trans-Australia Airlines. 1 
The many dif culties were all successfully 
overcome and on 14 May 1954 the company operated its 
first landplane service when one of its DC-6 aircraft 
flew from Sydney to Auckland under the command of 
two B.C.P.A. cap ns, this flight constituting both 
the delivery flight and first scheduled DC-6 operation. 
1. TEAL, [untitled outline story], ch o 6, p.3o 
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For the next six weeks the company operated both 
DC-6s and Solents until the latter were withdrawn, 
the Coral Route machine excepted, at the end of June, 
by which time TEAL had taken possession of all three 
DC-6so 1 These 265 mop.h o machines were capable of 
carrying fifty-six passengers across the Tasman in 
five-and-a-half hours~ 
The changeover to landplanes necessitated a 
reconstruction of the company's route structure since 
a number of the ports-of-call on the flying-boat 
routes possessed no international airporto This 
problem was not confined to the Pacific Islands since 
New Zealand itself was faced with the need to fulfill 
aerodrome requirements, having only Christchurch and 
Whenuapai, a joint civil-military ai ld, suitable 
for use by TEAL's machineso 2 It was not an exciting 
prospect which the New Zealand Government faced as 
its Australian counterpart had only recently expended 
some £10,000,000 on airport development Mascot and 
Adelaide alone. 3 The lack of suitable aerodromes 
1. As was the established custom each rcraft 
received an individual name: "Aotearoa III", 
"Arawhata", and "Arahia" (ZK-BGA, -BGB, -BGC 
~esp .. ) .. 
2. The military rfield at Ohakea was a third 
possibility but its distance from any major 
centre precluded it from serious consideration .. 
3.. SMH, 7 Jul 1954Q 
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on TEAL's routes made it necessary to discontinue 
the Chatham Islands service, the Wellington services 
and the Auckland-Suva service, whilst one Solent 
was retained to operate the Suva-Papeete section of 
the Coral Route .. The Auckland-Suva service was 
replaced by a DC-6 service between Auckland and 
Nandi but Wellington lost its place on the 
international air network until reinstated in July 
1960; the Chatham Islands were less fortunate and 
were left without a regular air service, a tuation 
little improved today .. 
Conversely, the DC-6s made it possible for TEAL 
to increase frequencies on established routes and 
inaugurate some new services .. The first of these 
new services was that between Auckland and Nandi, 
inaugurated on 15 May 1954, and it was soon followed 
by a Sydney-Christchurch service which supplemented 
the charter-operated Christchurch-Melbourne route .. 
TEAL's acquisition of landplanes meant that this 
charter arrangement could be dispensed with and the 
last of the Qantas-operated charter flights left 
Harewood on 25 June 1954. 1 Four days later 
"Aotearoa III" became the first aircraft in TEAL 
1. On 4 Oct 1961 Qantas services into Harewood 
recommenced, this time under Qantas' own 
operating rights. 
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livery to land at Christchurch when it inaugurated 
the new Sydney-Christchurch-Melbourne service, the 
Sydney-Christchurch service being flown twice weekly 
and the Christchurch-Melbourne service being 
operated on a once-a-week basis. This was not the 
end of charter operations over TEAL routes for in 
November 1955 TEAL took over the Norfolk Island route 
previously operated by NoAoC. and this service was 
operated with a DC-4 chartered from Qantaso This 
change of operator was of benefit to NoAoC. since 
the DC-3 aircraft which the company had operated on 
the route were subject to restrictions on operating 
weight and payload which combined with airport dues 
to make the route uneconomic from N.A.Co's point of 
. 1 
v~ew. The changeover, besides relieving N.AoC. of 
this encumbrance, also meant that the corporation 
became a solely domestic operator and TEAL became 
the only New Zealand operator of international 
services. 
Further route expansion was undertaken in 1957 
when in February-an Auckland-Melbourne service was 
begun on an experimental basis and incorporated into 
the regular network eight months later. In July 
1959 a service between Auckland and Brisbane was 
10 AJHR, 1955, H 35, p.8o 
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begun experimentally and operated over a three 
month period .. In June 1961 this service was 
extended to a duration of six months by the DC-6's 
successor, the Lockheed Electra and subsequently 
became a regular all year round serviceo The 
DC-6s were also introduced on to the Coral Route 
in September 1960 following the withdrawal of the 
So lent flying-boat "Aranui" .. The lack of suitable 
airstrips on some of the islands served by this 
route necessitated a change of terminals and the 
omission of some previously served centreso The 
DC-6s extended the Hibiscus Service from Nandi to 
Tahiti but were forced to terminate their Coral 
Route journey at Bora Bora until 22 October 1960 
when they commenced operations into Tahiti's new 
international aerodrome at Faaa. 
The DC-6s served TEAL efficiently until replaced 
in 1961, especially when the financial aspect of the 
company's history is considered. In the year ended 
31 March 1955, the first year in which the DC-6s 
had been used, initially alongside the Solent 
flying-boats, the company finances were lifted from 
a loss of £168,250 to a profit of £62,0730 1 In 
subsequent years the profits earned by the company 
1. Press, 20 Dec; 22 Dec 1955. 
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continued to increase, totalling £286,775 for the 
year ended 31 March 1958. It is with some 
justification, therefore, that the company secretary, 
A.A. Watson, can claim that the DC-6s "put TEAL on 
1 
the map"" 
There were of course a number of noteworthy 
events during this period of the company's history. 
Like their predecessors the Solents, the DC-6s 
were used on occasions under charter as troop carriers. 
On 7 July 1954 TEAL undertook to charter DC-6 aircraft 
over a route through Sydney-Darwin-Manila-Iwakuni-
Tokyo to support New Zealand forces in Korea. In all 
seventeen of these flights were carried out between 
July and October, seven being flown by "Arahia" and 
five each by "Aotearoa III" and "Arawhata"o2 Later, 
in August 1958, the DC-6 aircraft performed seven 
flights under charter to the United Kingdom Government. 
These flights involved the transporting of troops and 
mail between Honolulu and Christmas Island and were 
carried out prior to the British nuclear tests which 
3 took place in August and September 1958. 
1. Interview, 8 May 1968. 
2. TEAL, Operational History, entry for Jul 1945_ 
3. TEAL, [untitled outline history], ch.5, po7. 
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Another occasion worthy of note occurred on 
28 October 1955 when TEAL completed its 10,000th 
crossing of the Tasman. 1 This was a Sydney-
Christchurch crossing and was flown by "Arahia" 
under the command of Captain C. Griffiths who had 
made 1,240 crossings since joining the company in 
1940. In the course of these 10,000 crossings the 
company had used four different types of aircraft, 
had expanded its route network from 1,340 to just 
over 9,000 miles, and had carried over 300,000 
passengers, as well as more than 5.8 million pounds 
of freight and some 6.3 million pounds of mailo 2 
In 1956 the holding of the Olympic Games in 
Melbourne provided TEAL with an extremely busy period 
and the traffic carried during the games period 
boosted the total number of passengers carried in 
the year to just under 50,000; 49,389. In order 
to cope with the increased volume of traffic TEAL 
augmented its own DC-6 services with services operated 
by aircraft under charter from Qantas, Sabena and 
Trans-Australia Airlines. A total of forty-three 
return services were operated in the twelve days 
1. Press, 18 Oct 1955. 
20 See Appendix A, p.221. 
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preceding the games and fifty-five return services 
flown in the fifteen days after the games. In 
these twenty-seven days, 9,417 passengers were 
1 carried on the 196 trans-Tasman services operated. 
The re-equipment with DC-6 aircraft not only 
solved TEAL's financial problems but enabled the 
airline to continue the expansion of its network 
initiated during the period when Solents had been 
operated. There was, however, one difficulty 
which the DC-6 brought with it - age. The aircraft 
had a long operational history having been operated by 
Scandinavian Airlines System prior to their purchase 
by B.C.P.A., who operated them from 1949 until 1954 
when they were transferred to TEAL. During the 
winter of 1956 these aircraft were required to 
undergo wingskin modifications, a step recommended 
by the Douglas Air Company and ordered by both the 
American and Australian Civil Aviation Departments. 
Individually the modifications were minor but they 
involved removing wing-sheeting, fuel tanks, and 
other components for access: consequently, if the 
aircraft were not to be out of service for a long 
i. TEAL, Annual Report, 195 
H 37A, po22. 
7; AJHR, 1957, 
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period of time a large labour force was and 
a contract for the work was awarded to the Hong Kong 
Aircraft Engineering Company which was able to 
provide the required labour force as well as necessary 
aeronautic engineering and inspection lities .. 
The first of the three aircraft to undergo this 
treatment, "Arahia", left for Hong Kong on 24 May 
1956, followed by "Aotearoa III" on 10 August and 
"Arawhata" on 20 September. In each case the 
modifications, which gave an increase of approximately 
2,000 lbs in payload, were completed and the 
returned within about fifteen days.1 
rcraft 
Even with these modifications, however, it was 
clear that TEAL could not continue to operate the 
DC-6s ind ly without considering a replacement 
machine. The prevailing trend among the world's 
major international airline operators was toward 
pure-j or turbo-prop aircraft, and by the end of 
1956 all the airlines serving New Zealand, with the 
exception of TEAL, had ordered aircraft from one or 
both of these ca~egories; Qantas had Boeing 707s on 
order; Transports Aeriens Intercontinentaux had 
ordered DC-Bs; Canadian Pacific had placed orders 
1. TEAL, Operational History, entry for May 1956. 
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for both the de Havilland Comet and the Bristol 
Britannia, and Pan American Airways had both DC-as 
and Boeing 707s on order. The aviation correspondent 
of an Auckland newspaper commented; "At the rate 
the other international airlines are ordering new 
airliners, it appears that Tasman Airways will be 
the last in the line .. "l A year later the Director 
of Civil Aviation referred to TEAL's DC-6 and So lent 
aircraft in his Annual Report and commented, 
"Although these aircraft continued to give good 
service, and are capable of doing so for some time 
to come, it has become urgently necessary in view of 
the inevitable delay between ordering and delivery 
dates to consider the choice of replacement aircraft",,2 
In fact the Board of Directors of TEAL was 
already concerned with re-equipment and in May 1957 
had recommended that a change of aircraft take place 
in 1960 .. 3 The final decision on a replacement 
aircraft was not made until late in May 1958 when 
as a result of the so-called "TEAL Deal" the rline 
-
was re-equipped with Lockheed Electra turbo-prop 
aircraft .. In the period between the announcement of 
10 NZH, 28 Dec 1956. 
20 AJHR, 1958, H 37A, p .. 17. 
3 0 Press, 31 May 1957 .. 
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the decision to re-equip and the choice of the 
Electra a bitter struggle took place during which 
the claims of a number of aircraft were pressed as 
being the best-suited for TEAL's requirements. The 
search for a replacement had led to a pure-jet, the 
Convair 880, The New Zealand Herald informed its 
readers; six months later the same newspaper reported 
that the Boeing 720, a scaled down version of the 
Boeing 707, was now the centre of attraction; and at 
an even later date one of the paper's headlines 
announced "Comets recommended for TEALII"l 
The Auckland Star summed the matter up in a headline 
"Aircraft choice - complexity" and then proved its 
point by listing six aircraft, the Electra, Vanguard, 
Comet IV, Boeing 720, Convair 880, and Caravelle, 
possible contenders .. 2 as 
The choice of a replacement aircraft was further 
complicated by the fact that re-equipment was no 
longer a simple problem of choosing the aircraft 
best suited, economically and operationally, to the 
job in hand" Broader political and economic aspects 
now played a part; the question of the Tasman 
monopoly, the relative merits of purchasing American 
1. NZH, 29 Jul 1957; 16 Jan, 24 Mar 1958. 
2. Auckland Star, 29 Mar 19586 
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or British machines, the comparative value of 
turbo-props as against pure-jets, all had to be 
taken into account. Furthermore the choice of a 
replacement would be the first major decision taken 
since the Australian and New Zealand Governments 
had assumed joint control in 1954 so if the two 
parties disagreed on the matter a recurrence of the 
delays which had occurred during TEAL's founding and 
prior to the reorganisation of 1954 seemed probable. 
By March 1958 the likely contenders for the 
replacement choice were narrowed down to two aircraft, 
the de Havilland Comet Mark 4 and the Lockheed Electra, 
but this limitation did not eliminate the many side 
issues referred to above since the Comet was a 
British-constructed pure-jet aircraft whereas the 
Electra was built in the United states and was a 
turbo-prop machine. Late in March TEAL's Board of 
Directors announced that they would recommend the 
purchase of three Comets for TEAL, the total cost 
being estimated at about three million poundso 1 
This decision was not a unanimous one however, two 
of the Australian directors dissenting in favour of 
1. NZH, 24 Mar 1958. 
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the Electra, which the Australian airline Qantas 
was interested in purchasing for operation on its 
secondary routes. Consequently a clash of 
national interests seemed likely to occur when the 
Australian and New Zealand Ministers of Civil 
Aviation met to discuss re-equipment plans early in 
April 1958, as the Australian Minister, So Paltridge, 
would almost certainly advocate the purchase of 
Electras whilst the New Zealand Minister, J. Mathison, 
would in all probability, support the recommendation 
of TEAL's directors that Comets be purchased. 
In these negotiations between the two partner 
governments, it does appear that Australia held the 
upper-hand, and that New Zealand could do little but 
obtain concessions in return for its support of the 
Australian choice, the Electra. New Zealand for 
instance could not force the Australian's hand too 
hard since they would be providing half the cost of 
the new aircraft; on the other hand New Zealand 
was unable to bluff by threatening to purchase the 
Australian share in the company, since the country's 
economy precluded such an action. Furthermore, 
whereas the future of TEAL was of vital importance 
from New Zealand's point-of-view, it was of little 
135 .. 
consequence to the Australian Government, as it 
ready possessed in Qantas an international airline 
of world-class; the Australian's main preoccupation, 
in fact, was the acquisition of a machine suitable 
for use on Qantas' secondary routes. Australia's 
Prime Minister, Menzies, did acknowledge, howev~r, 
that his Government recognized the importance for 
New Zealand's defence policy of having long-range 
turbo-prop aircraft on New Zealand's register as 
well as having maintenance facilities and operating 
crews based in that country, commenting that such 
considerations were also of indirect strategic 
importance to Australia. 1 
Australia had in fact dealt generously with 
New Zealand in regard to TEAL before 1958. The 
company's headquarters and servicing facilities had 
been established and allowed to stay in Auckland and 
despite the equal Australia-New Zealand ownership, 
TEAL had, by and large, been permitted to function 
as New Zealand's international airline. In fact in 
1 major respects but one the airline op as a 
New Zealand business: the one important exception was 
that the partnership gave TEAL a monopoly of Tasman 
--
, vol. H of Ro16, 192 0 
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traffic rightso If the present, or some future, 
Australian Government demanded that Qantas share 
the Tasman traffic, TEAL could not afford to be 
equipped with aircraft less attractive to the public 
than the jets operated by Qantas. In this respect 
purchase of the Comet appeared desirable for not 
only would it have served TEAL for a long period of 
time but would have introduced standards of comfort 
and performance comparable to those of jets being 
introduced by other airlines. On the other hand if 
both Qantas and TEAL operated Electras the possibility 
of the former airline being allowed traffic rights on 
the Tasman could not be overlooked, provided that 
company was required to use Electras and not jets on 
the route, a matter which the absence of jet airfields 
in New Zealand would assure. 
On 11 April 1958 the New Zealand Prime Minister, 
W. Nash, announced that following governmental 
discussions agreement had been reached on re-equipment 
plans; the details however were not released until 
~ 
both the Australian and New Zealand Governments had 
ratified the proposals. Two days later reports 
indicated that TEAL would re-equip with Electras 
provided tests indicated the taxiways and runways at 
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Whenuapai could be strengthened to the increased 
1 Joad.. This report was confirmed a month later when 
on 22 May, a joint statement by the Australian and 
New Zealand Ministers of Civil Avi on announced 
that TEAL would purchase three Lockheed Electras0 2 
The decision was said to be subject to the solution 
of aerodrome problems in New Zealand and the conclusion 
of an agreement by which excess cap ty on TEAL's 
aircraft would be chartered by Qantas, who would 
also op a service through New Ze and under 
charter to TEAL. Commenting on the decision, New 
Zealand's Minister, J .. Mathison, said; 
1. 
20 
In choosing the Electra for 
New Ze and and Australia have 
an aircr which holds out high 
TEAL, 
ected 
hopes 
for cient operation and very 
satisfactory economic results. This 
aircraft has been chosen by a number of 
other rlines, among them QANTAS, •••• 
This will be an added advant t'o TEAL 
because will result in sUbstantial 
saving s through economies in technical 
cooperation and thr-ough the absorption 
bY'QANTAS of excess capacity which will 
be available from TEAL's f .3 
NZH, 12 APFi 14 Apr 1958. 
SMH, 23 May 1958; May 19580 
3. External Affairs Review, 1958, viii(5), p.24. 
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He added that the new agreement assured the 
continued exi stence and operation of TEAL and a'lso 
ensured that up-to-date civil aircraft would be on 
the New Zealand register .. 
The official announcement of the Electra purchase 
drew a deal of criticism: The New Zealand Herald 
expressed the opinion that the Government "had done 
the wrong thing", whilst in Christchurch The Press 
commented, "The New Zealand Government has made a 
. 1 
singularly bad bargain .. " The object of criticism 
varied from critic to critic .. The New Zealand 
Government was reprimanded for approving the spending 
of some £4,000,000 in America, when Comet aircraft 
could have been bought without depleting dollar 
reserves, at a time when New Zealand exporters were 
striving to obtain better treatment on the United 
Kingdom market .. Another point of criticism was that 
New Zealand had yielded to Australian interests which 
were primarily concerned with acquiring Electras for 
secondary routes .. Australia, it was stated, wanted 
TEAL in the deal in order to get a better trade-in 
concession from Lockheed on Qantas' old Super 
Constellations, thus reducing the total cost .. This 
10 NZH, 24 May 1958; Press, 26 May 19580 
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criticism was made in The New Zealand Herald 1 and 
is open to doubt: on the other hand the subsequent 
offer of Australia to pay half the loss on TEAL's 
Coral Route, to charter excess capacity on TEAL's 
machines, and to contribute toward the upgrading of 
Whenuapai aerodrome would suggest that there was 
some validity in the Herald's theoryo Criticism 
was also directed at the decision to re-equip with 
turbo-props rather than pure-jets since the latter 
undoubtedly enjoyed a greater public popularity. 
Furthermore it was suggested that the homogeneous 
nature of the TEAL and Qantas Electra fleets would 
lead to the transferring of TEAL's maintenance works 
to the Australian headquarters of Qantas and 
ultimately to the total absorption of TEAL by the 
larger Australian concern. Conversely there was 
the possibility that if TEAL was re-equipped with 
jets in the mid-1960s it 'would suffer little 
competitively in operating turbo-props for a few 
years while their advance in comfort and speed over 
the DC-6s was still a novelty and while the more 
attractive jet services of larger operators were 
being established. 
1. NZH, 26 Apr 19580 
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Negotiations on the final points of the 
agreement continued until August, concluding towards 
the end of that month. In announcing the final 
reement, New Zealand's Minister in Charge of Civil 
Aviation, stated that throughout the negotiations 
the government had been concerned with procuring the 
registration in New Zealand of modern aircraft, along 
with maintenance facilities and operating crews, at 
the least possible cost to the New Zealand taxpayer, 
at the same time achieving a maximum of co-operation 
with Australiao The main points in the agreement 
were as follows:- TEAL would re-equip with three 
Lockheed Electra aircraft; Qantas would operate a 
service from Melbourne to Nandi via Auckland under 
charter to TEAL; Qantas would charter from TEAL the 
excess capacity of the latter's Electras; the Coral 
Route was to be treated as an integral part of TEAL's 
operations; and TEAL was to set up completely 
self-contained maintenance and overhaul workshops for 
Electra rcraft. 1 
Analysed in its entirety the "TEAL Deal", as 
the arrangement was termed, appeared a highly 
satisfactory solution to the re-equipment problem. 
1. PD, cccxviii, 1484-85. 
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The decision to register, base and maintain three 
Lockheed Electra aircraft in New Zealand, and the 
other associated agreements, were generally to the 
benefit of New Zealand and the economic background 
of TEAL, though Australia also made some gains 
through Qantaso What had emerged was a compromise 
solution tted to the economy of New Zealand and 
the des s of Australia, but with room for the 
future development of New Zealand's overseas airline 
to a greater stature in the international airline 
field. Obviously the decision to purchase Electras 
must have been disappointing to those, including 
TEAL's directors, who had hoped jet equipment might 
be obtained. Such a project would for success have 
demanded heavy financial backing and a bold approach 
on the part of the government to the question of 
New Ze and's place in international aviation. In 
view of the prevailing e,conomic circumstances, 
particularly when allied with the considerable 
aerodrome development problem which New Zealand faced, 
the arguments i[l f'avour of a cautious policy prevailed 
and as a result TEAL was able to establish itself on 
a solid base before making the final step into the 
jet-age. 
142 .. 
New Zealand gains from the agreement were 
considerable; she had kept TEAL in existence when 
an Australian takeover seemed possible, Australia 
had agreed to negotiate the loan required for the 
new aircraft and would also contribute half the 
total cost .. Furthermore, Australia would meet 
half the cost of running the Coral Route, as well 
as contributing to airport maintenance and aircraft 
repair installations and assisting in the economic 
usage of TEAL's Electras through charter arrangements .. 
In return Australia had gained her wish for a 
standardization of fleets, and stopover privileges 
in New Zealand, as a result of which Qantas became 
the only one of four trans-Pacific airlines1 to offer 
through services with full passenger loading facilities 
to and from New Zealand and Australia. 
This was in fact a minor but important loosening 
of the hitherto rigid barrier which had until then 
kept the Tasman as solely TEAL's domain. TEAL itself 
was not afraid to face competition provided it had 
the right aircrafto The company "fully recognised 
that competition on the transtasman run was some day 
10 The other three operators were Canadian Pacific 
Air Lines, Pan American Airways, and Transports 
Aeriens Intercontinentauxo 
Plate V: Prelude to the jet ag e - t he jet-prop 
Lockheed Elec t ra. 
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inevi table", TEAL's general manager had said in 
1957, adding that the company f t that before the 
Tasman was opened to competition TEAL would need to 
be fully comp tive with those operators likely to 
be interested. 1 There was of course no question in 
1958 of TEAL's Electra turbo-props competing with 
Qantas Boeing 707 jets across the Tasman as the 
absence in New and of an airport up to large jet 
standards precluded the immediate operation of this 
type of machine on the Tasman route. Indeed the 
need to develop New Zealand rports to this standard 
could, and did, postpone the operation of large jets 
across the Tasman until TEAL itself was ready to step 
into the field of jet operations. 
TEAL's three Electras were delivered in the last 
two months of 1959 and although they did not have a 
much greater seating capacity than the DC-6s, 
seventy-one against fifty-six, their greater speed 
of 400 m.p.h. compared with the DC-6's 265 m.p.h., 
allowed TEAL to increase its frequency of service 
and also extend i route network. 2 The change from 
1. NZH, 19 Jul 1957. 
2.. The Electras were given the names "Aotearoa" , 
"Atarua" and "Akaroa" (ZK-TEA -TEB -TEC , , " 
resp.) .. 
144. 
piston-engined DC-6s to jet-prop Electras was not 
as difficult as the transition from flying-boats to 
landplanes which the company had undertaken in 1954; 
there were of course a number of problems which 
arose, a common occurrence during any re-equipment 
programme .. On this occasion, however, TEAL was able 
to be better prepared and before the aircraft had 
been delivered key personnel from TEAL's staff had 
undergone technical training in Lockheed's Burbank 
workshop. At the same time the company's technical 
training school in Auckland was expanded in order 
that the required numbers of technically proficient 
engineering and flight personnel would be available .. 1 
In a similar manner, though on a larger scale, 
preparations were made in 1965 prior to the conversion 
to DC-Ss. The Electra, in fact, provided a useful 
interim period before jet operations, for not only 
did profits continue but the utilisation of the Electra 
gave a larger breathing-space before the introduction 
of jets for it must be remembered that TEAL had only 
switched to landplanes in 1954 .. 
The first of the Electras was brought into use 
on 1 December 1959 when the machine was introduced on 
1.. TEAL, [untitled outline history], ch .. 6, p.4. 
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the Auckland-Sydney service; six days later Electras 
took over the Auckland-Melbourne service and on 
5 January 1960 Electras began operating between 
Auckland and Nandie Christchurch took its place 
on Electra schedules when these machines commenced 
operation of both the Christchurch-Melbourne and 
Christchurch-Sydney services on 23 January 1960. 
Further route extensions were made possible by the 
reversible pitch propellors the Electra possessed 
since these gave the aircraft the ability to operate 
from Wellington's new airport at Rongotai. 
Accordingly, on 26 July 1960 international services 
from Wellington were resumed after a six year break 
when an Electra made a Wellington-Sydney flight. 
Wellington's external services were further increased 
when Electra services between Wellington and Melbourne 
and Wellington and Brisbane were commenced in October 
and November 1963 respectively. In an era when the 
Electras were being introduced on the company's 
services, the now displaced DC-6s were used to 
operate the Co~alRoute, flying from Fiji to Bora Bora 
and later to FaaaD The DC-6s were recalled on to 
main line operations later in 1960 when, as a result 
of Electra crashes in the United States in September 
1959 and March 1960, the Electras were recalled to 
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the Lockheed factory to undergo a number of 
modifications, the rst Electra leaving on 
23 December 1960 and the last machine returning on 
6 March 1961. 
With the full Electra fleet back in operation 
TEAL was able to withdraw its DC-6s, the last DC-6 
Tasman flight being flown on 15 March 1961, and all 
DC-6s were withdrawn from operations on 21 March 
1961, after a final flight from Nandi to Auckland .. 
These machines which had contributed much in experience 
and economic well-being to the company were 
subsequently purchased by the Royal New Zealand Air 
Force and one remained in service as a VoI.P .. transport 
until 1968 when it was sold to the Australian Aircraft 
Sales Corporationo 1 Following the withdrawal of the 
DC-6s, Electras were used over the whole Coral Route, 
this service beginning on 24 March 1961 and operating 
direct from Nandi to Faaao At a later date, 
16 September 1961, the Electras included Tafuna, in 
American Samoa, as a point of calIon the Coral Route, 
thus providing the company's first service to Samoa 
since the withdrawal of the flying-boat the previous 
September .. 
i. Press, 17 Sep 1968. 
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Although faster and more numerous services were 
provided by TEAL af the introduction of its Electra 
aircraft, the overall character of the airline 
remained that of a regional operator, working across 
the Tasman and along the islands of the Coral Route. 
However during 1960-61 a set of circumstances arose 
which were quite different from those in which 
New Zealand had based its external aviation policy on 
half ownership with Australia of an airline limited 
to a small regional network and sustained by a 
monopoly of trans-Tasman traffic. Annual Report 
of the Department of External Affairs noted: 
During the year New Zealand's approach 
towards external civil aviation was 
completely re-examined. Since the war 
New Zealand had, in partnership with 
Australia, acted to preserve TEAL's 
monopoly of Tasman air serviceso A 
number of factors, however, have combined 
to make this policy progressively less 
tenable. The Government has accordingly 
explored the possibility of terminating 
the TEAL partnership and abandoning by 
stages the Tasman monopoly. It has 
also considered whether a wholly 
New Zealand owned TEAL should continue 
to be a regional operator or to expand 
into longer-range service. 1 
"- ~ 
Consequently, on the eve of its twenty-first 
anniversary, TEAL faced the prospect of operating over 
an extended network as well as becoming a wholly 
New Zealand owned concern. 
~~, 1961, A 1, p.52. 
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CHAPTER 4 ACQUISITION AND EXPANSION 
On 28 April 1961 New Zealand's Minister in 
Charge of Civil Aviation, J o McAlpine, announced 
that, as a result of inter-government negotiations, 
New Zealand would purchase Australia's shareholding 
in TEAL .. The company would become a wholly 
New Zealand-owned concern. 1 
The idea of New Zealand assuming sole-ownership 
of the airline was not new, however, and had been 
suggested on a number of occasions during the 
company's history. An early indication that 
New Zealand might operate its own external airline 
had been given in 1948 when The Sydney Morning Herald 
suggested that TEAL was about to be dissolved in 
order that both the Australian and New Zealand 
Governments could operate separate trans-Tasman 
services, although it was predicted that the 
New Zealand Government would retain the name "Tasman 
·2 Airways" for the company under its management .. 
At the time a pTecedent for the operation of a 
parallel air service by the two governments concerned 
1. Press, 28 Apr 1961. 
2. SMH, 1 Dec 19480 
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existed in the Qantas and B.O.A.C. services over 
the Australia-United Kingdom route, but New Zealand's 
Minister in Charge of Civil Aviation denied that any 
such scheme was proposed for the Tasman and the 
suggestion lapsed. 1 
The idea was revived on two further occasions. 
First, in 1951 a New Zealand aviation journal 
suggested that TEAL become an all-New Zealand company 
ready to operate alongside other airlines both over 
the Tasman and in other parts of the world. 2 
Secondly, during the discussions which preceded the 
1954 reorganisation of Pacific air services it was 
suggested that the Australian Government, through 
their international airline Qantas, take over B.C.PoA. 
and the New Zealand Government assume full control of 
TEAL. On each occasion, however, New Zealand's 
financial position and the advantages gained from 
joint ownership excluded any ambitions which 
New Zealand might have had toward such an end. In 
1958 the decision to re-equip TEAL with Lockheed 
Electra aircraft was made in the context of a 
continuing Australian-New Zealand partnership. 
1. NZH, 2 Dec 1948D 
2. Whites Aviation, Sep 1951, p.lo 
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Commenting on this arrangement the New and 
Minister in Charge of Civil Aviation stated that 
New Zealand ownership of TEAL was "beyond the reach 
of our resources in the foreseeable futureo,,1 
Yet within two years of the Minister's statement 
the government was reported not only to have 
re-examined New Zealand's approach towards external 
commercial aviation but also to have inve gated 
the possibility of terminating the TEAL partnership 
and abandoning the Tasman monopolYo2 A later, 
at a cost of £NZ811,400, TEAL became a wholly 
New Zealand-owned international airline. 
This sudden change cannot be explained by simply 
referring to the change from a Labour to a National 
Government which occurred in 1960 0 The long-term 
planning and cost forecasting which international 
aviation demands precludes party politics to a very 
large extent. Consequently the planned course of 
development for any country's international rline 
is usually con~inued irrespective of ch s in 
government which might occur. In the case of 
1. PD, cccxviii, 14840 
2. AJHR, 1961, A 1, p.52. 
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New Zealand ownership of TEAL the matter had been 
investigated by the Labour party whilst it was in 
office and communication on the matter had passed 
between Australia and New Zealand. Furthermore a 
cabinet committee established by the Labour Government 
to inquire into the matter reported: 
In order to strengthen New Zealand's 
negotiating position it will be necessary 
to secure for New Zealand sUbstantial 
ownership in and effective control of 
TEAL through an increase in New Zealand's 
shareholding and voting power, and that 
if Australia did not agree New Zealand 
should take over the Australian share 
and assume responsibility for TEAL's 
finances. 1 
It was thi's policy which was taken over and 
brought to a successful conclusion by the National 
Government, a point borne out by the National 
Government's Aviation Minister, J .. McAlpine, when he 
said, "I believe that what the Labour Government set 
out to do but failed to achieve ••• was the right 
'2 
and proper thing to do,," It is not possible, 
therefore, to explain the sudden New Zealand desire 
to acquire TEAL solely in terms of that country's 
change of government in 1960. On the other hand 
the National Party's Manifesto contained a number of 
1. PD, cccxxvii, 1661. 
2" Ibid", p .. 1507 .. 
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items which suggested a more vigorous outlook with 
regard to international aviation. 
Referring to TEAL the Manifesto stated that, 
in conjunction with Australia, TEAL's position would 
be protected until "in co-operation with Commonwealth 
colleagues or otherwise, we are in a position to 
compete satisfactorily on the world's air routes or 
a part of themo"l The difficulty of joint-ownership 
in the negotiation of traffic rights, discussed in 
greater detail later in this chapter, and the proviso 
that a National Government would, like the previous 
Government, expedite the construction of Mangere 
aerodrome, Auckland, to jet aircraft standards, seemed 
to foreshadow a New Zealand takeover of TEAL. 
Another policy factor worthy of note was the 
setting of a goal of £10,000,000 in overseas exchange 
for earnings derived from tourists visiting New 
Zealand. The size of this goal was such that it 
would have placed tourism next after the big three of 
wool, meat andflairy produce in New Zealand's export 
marketing, and it could only have been achieved by 
an accelerated drive for tourists in the world's 
1. Press, 2 Nov 1960. 
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tourist market. The promotional work of TEAL 
overseas, as well as the possession of an 
international carrier identified with New Zealand, 
were important features in this respect. 
Reference must also be made to the National 
Party's promise to pursue a vigorous policy of 
development in New Zealand's overseas trade. The 
need to expand overseas trade was then, and has 
remained, a major economic issue from New Ze and's 
point-of-view. In 1961 this need for a diversification 
of marketing areas was emphasised by Britain's 
contemplation of entry into the European Economic 
Community and New Zealand exporters were f with 
the need to find markets in other parts of the world. 
Here again, it was possible that TEAL, as a fully 
New Zealand organisation, could be used fully and 
effectively as an instrument in the national cause. 
If New Zealand produce was to be made available on 
markets in North America, the Orient and other parts 
of the world there was undoubtedly a need for 
New Zealand-owned rcraft with which to display the 
New Zealand colours in these areas. 
It must not be supposed however that the move 
toward New Zealand ownership of TEAL came solely from 
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within the realms of New Zealand party politics. 
By 1961 a number of other factors existed which 
seemed likely to lead to the dissolution of the 
Australian-New Zealand partnership in TEAL, and of 
these the most important was undoubtedly the problem 
of traffic rights. At this point it must be 
explained that all international airlines operate 
into another country under a system of reciprocal 
rights; for example, if New Zealand wants to operate 
an airline to Canada, then a Canadian airline must be 
given permission to operate into New Zealand. 
Because a country's air rights are as much a part of 
i national assets as its mineral and other resources, 
these air-traffic rights are negotiable and involve 
the bargaining of concessions between the Governments, 
not the airlines, concernedo The possibilities 
open to any state in seeking tr ic rights for its 
airline depend primarily-upon the value of traffic 
to and through the state, and hence upon the value 
of the concession it can offer when negotiations are 
conducted with qther countrieso Consequently it is 
clear that the situation created in 1954 in which the 
Tasman was kept as the monopoly of a jointly-owned 
Australian-New Zealand airline was not out of keeping 
with prevailing circumstances, for although American 
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and Canadian airline operators would have liked to 
operate across the Tasman, New Zealand was in no 
po tion to make use of any reciprocal rights which 
those countries could have offered. The subsequent 
development of commercial aviation in the Pacific 
region, however, and the discussions on rights which 
arose from this development, came to pose a constant 
threat to the continued existence of the Tasman 
monopoly. 
This development of commercial aviation in the 
Pacific brought with it an additional problem; the 
introduction of jet airliners upon the routes of 
most of the major companies operating in the area. 
In 1954 the same negotiations which had established 
the joint-ownership in TEAL, gave to Qantas, by that 
time completely Australian-owned, the rights to 
operate across the Pacific which had previously been 
exercised by British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines. 
By 1960 Qantas had developed into one of the major 
round-the-world airlines and was using modern j 
-
aircraft on most of its overseas services, the Pacific 
included. Transport Aeriens Intercontinentaux,l 
1. On 1 October 1963 T.A.Io merged with the other 
major independent airline of France, Union 
Aeromaritime de Transport (U.A.To) to form 
Union de Transports Aeriens (U.T.A.) and this 
company took over ToA.Io's New Zealand service. 
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the French international airline, had by 1960 
developed a series of routes in the Pacific through 
Noumea and Tahi J and in September of that year 
began a round-the-world service through Sydney using 
DC-B jets. In addition the pos lity that 
BoOoAoCo, having established itse on the African, 
Asian and Atlantic routes, would wish to operate 
in the Pacific region could not be overlookedo 
Operators from North American continent were also 
introducing jets into the Pacif Pan American 
Airways, re-equipped with Boeing 707s and 
Douglas DC-Bs, used these machines on a United States-
Australia service, and served New Zealand on a spur 
service from Fiji, this being operated with piston-
engined aircraft9 A similar type of service was 
provided by Canadian Pacific Air Lines who extended 
r jet service to Honolulu on to New Zealand by 
using DC-6 aircraft, thi~ being necessary since 
Auckland's international airport at Whenuapai was 
unable to accommodate heavy jets. 
The decision to press ahead with the construction 
of a jet airport at Mangere and the construction of 
international airports in American Samoa and Tahiti 
appeared to foreshadow services between Austral and 
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the United States via New Zealand which could be 
flown with the jet airliners currently being 
introduced into the area by the airlines referred to 
above" The immediate inauguration of such a service, 
which would have placed New Zealand upon the je 
operated trunk routes of the Pacific, was clearly out 
of the question because of New Zealand's lack of a 
jet-standard international aerodrome, a shortcoming 
which would not be remedied until the opening of 
Mangere, which was expected to occur in the st 
quarter of 1965. 1 In addition it was equally clear 
that international airlines would not be p ared to 
operate a j service on a spur-line into Mangere 
once that airport had opened, for such a service, 
terminating as it would in a market with such a 
relatively small potential as New Zealand's, would 
not have been an economic proposition. This factor, 
in association wi th the .increasing work cap ty and 
cost of commercial aircraft, made it almost certain 
that such operators would expect "through" rights in 
order that their aircraft could carry New Zealand and 
Australian c across the Tasman in comp tion 
with TEAL .. 
10 AJHR, 1963, H 37A, po3. 
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If this need to abandon the Tasman monopoly 
arose, it was essential that TEAL broaden its 
narrow base of operations beyond the existing 
regional pattern in order that an adequate fleet 
utilisation and profitable operations might be 
continued. Any such expansion would, however, 
bring TEAL into competition with Qantas, thus giving 
rise to an anomalous situation in which the Australian 
Government would find self part-owner of an 
airline based in another country and competing with 
Qantas, the Australian Government's chosen instrumento 
Any proposed expansion of TEAL's network was, of 
course, subject to the granting of rights into the 
areas which it was desired TEAL serve. In the past 
each party in TEAL, Australia and New Zealand, had 
experienced difficulty in negotiating traffic rights 
for an airline of which it only owned half since 
these rights were the result of bilateral negotiations 
and neither party would necessarily be regarded by 
other countries as solely responsible for TEAL or for 
the exchange of rights on its behalf. 
An example of the difficulties experienced in 
this respect occurred during 1960 when the future of 
TEAL's Coral Route hung on the outcome of negotiations 
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between New Zealand, France, Australia and the 
United States. The New Zealand-France negotiations 
took place on a basis of Transports Aeriens 
Intercontinentaux into Auckland, a New Zealand 
airline (i.eo TEAL) into Tahiti, with the acquisition 
of landing rights in Tahiti being particularly 
important to New Zealand in view of Tahiti's position 
as a stop-over point on any service which might be 
established between New Zealand and the west coast 
of the United States~ A settlement of these 
negotiations was threatened however by a breakdown 
of Australian-French negotiations which resulted in 
the cessation of Qantas' Sydney-Noumea and ToAGI. 's 
Noumea-Brisbane services .. In view of the fact 
that Australia held half of the shares of TEAL the 
possibility that the French might exclude TEAL from 
Tahiti could not overlooked. The difficulties 
encountered in negotiating with the United States 
were a little less complex; Pan American Airways 
operated to and from Pago Pago, American Samoa, an 
aerodrome which_the New Zealand Government desired 
to incorporate as an Electra base on the Coral Route .. 
Without the granting of reciprocal rights which the 
American Government was sure to demand to enable 
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Pan American Airways to operate across the Tasman, 
it was possible that the American authorities would 
deny TEAL the right to operate through American 
1 Samoa. The problems encountered in the negotiation 
of bilateral rights for a jointly-owned TEAL were 
therefore a major factor behind the ultimate 
dissolution of the TEAL partnership. 
A further reason for the New Zealand take-over 
of TEAL can be found in the rapid growth of Tasman 
air traffic .. In the first year of operations TEAL 
had carried 1,507 passengers and less than 0.2 million 
pounds of freight across the Tasman: in the year 
ended 31 March 1960 the airline carried 83,435 
passengers and 1.5 million pounds of freight over the 
company's rou network. 2 Moreover there was in the 
late 1950's a steady trend towards r travel amongst 
those arriving and departing from New Zealand.. The 
year ended 31 March 1960 was significant in this 
respect for it was the first year in which both 
arrivals and departures by air were greater than those 
by sea, fifty-four per cent. of arrivals and 
fifty-six per cent. of departures travelling by 3 r. 
1. NZH, 25 Feb; 14 Mar 1960. 
2. See Appendix A, p.221. 
3. YB, 1964, p.1059. 
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By 1960 it seemed economically possible to consider 
sharing the Tasman traffic with Qantas since this 
would be necessary if the Australian Government 
granted rights in Australia to a wholly New Zealand-
owned TEAL .. 
With both nations wishing to plan their own 
international airline policies, and with the above 
factors taken into consideration, it was clear by 
the end of 1960 that the advantages to be gained from 
the continued joint-ownership of TEAL were considerably 
outnumbered by the disadvantages which such a 
continuance would bring. What was needed in fact, 
was a future in which New Zealand would be able to 
exchange traffic rights more freely and in which a 
New Zealand-owned airline would be free to expand its 
routes in competition with overseas airlineso 
In an effort to create such a situation 
negotiations regarding the future of TEAL took place 
in Melbourne in February and March, 1960. However 
no final agreems=nt on the matter was reached although 
a set of proposals was sent forward to the joint-
owners for their consideration.. A newspaper report 
that Australia had offered to accept the return of her 
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capital invested in TEAL in return for the transfer 
of the Australian shares to New Zealand was denied 
by the New Zealand Minister in Charge of Civil 
Aviation who added that the matter was of sufficient 
gravity to justify the postponement of a final 
decision until the Prime Minister returned from an 
overseas tour at the end of March. 1 
Settlement of the matter was complicated when, 
in the middle of March, Ansett Transport Industries 
Ltd of Australia, presuming that Australia was about 
to sell its shares in TEAL, offered to buy that 
company from the New Zealand Government for a price 
2 
of £2,000,000. Despite the reassurances of 
RoM. Ansett, the company's managing director, that 
the offer was accepted TEAL would, operationally, 
remain New Zealand's international airline, the 
Australian firm's offer was little more than an attempt 
on its part to expand from a national to international 
airline. In order to achieve this status and obtain 
the rights needed for the operation of an overseas 
airline it was necessary for Ansett to buyout a 
New Zealand-owned TEAL since the Australian Government 
1. NZH, 8 Mar; 9 Mar 1961. 
20 Press, 21 Mar 19610 
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had its own international airline Qantas, and would 
no doubt have been embarrassed if its other property, 
Trans-Australia Airlines, applied for extensions 
equal to any sought by its rival, Ansett-AoNoA. 
The main obstacle to Ansett's plans was of course, 
the attitude of the New Zealand Government and in 
view of the latter's determination to possess an 
international airline it was hardly likely that TEAL 
would be sold to outside interests. Consequently 
it was little surprise when on 19 April 1961 the 
New Zealand Government decided to reject the Ansett 
offer and go ahead with plans to take over the 
Australian share of TEAL.1 
Two days before TEAL celebrated its twenty-first 
birthday it was officially announced that New Zealand 
had purchased Australia's half-share in the airline 
at a cost of £811,400, the par value of the Australian 
investment. The sale was to be retrospective from 
1 April 1961 but Australia agreed to take progressive 
payment over a period of four years up to 31 March 
1965, and this obligation was met in the year ended 
31 March 1964 by the full payment of £811,400 from the 
1. Press, 19 Apr 1961. 
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National Development Loans Account. 1 
Following the announcement in April 1961 there 
remained the need to conclude a formal air service 
agreement between Australia and New Ze and under 
which both TEAL and Qantas would receive Tasman 
traffic rights, and an arrangement by which TEAL 
would be entitled to carry more than h the Tasman 
traffic of the two airlines had also to negotiated. 
Settlement of these two matters took a further three 
months but on 13 July it was announced that TEAL 
would surrender thirty per cent. of its Tasman 
monopoly to Qantas in October 1961, this portion to 
be increa to forty per cent. the following April. 
The arrangement also closed the Tasman to 1 other 
airlines until 1964, the two Governments ng 
that until Mangere was brought into operation, the 
Tasman c would only support the operations of 
2 . TEAL and Qantas. The second matter, that of traffic 
rights, was finalised on 25 July 1961 with the 
conclusion of a formal air agreement in which Qantas 
received traffic rights to and through Auckland, 
~p~~, 28 Apr 1961; AJHR, 1964, B 1 [pt IIJ, p.27. 
2. p 29 Apr; 13 Jul 19610 
Wellington and Christchurch, and TEAL received 
rights to and through Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane 
and Norfolk Island;l on the same day New Zealand 
became sole owner of TEAL following the signing of 
a formal agreement transferring Australia's half-
share to the New Zealand Government. Commenting on 
the purchase and associated agreements the 
New Zealand Prime Minister, K. Holyoake, said, 
"This is the end of 21 years of close partnership 
with Australia through the joint ownership of TEAL, 
but it is also the beginning of a new kind of 
cooperation between our two countrieso I am grateful 
to Australia for helping us in this long period of 
joint ownership to find our f , 't' ,,2 ln aVla lono 
Overall the terms on which New Zealand acquired 
ownership were s sfactoryo The price was reasonable 
and the terms on which Australia was to be paid were 
not at all onerouso That the p at which 
New Zealand acquired Australia's share in TEAL was a 
reasonable one is borne out by the fact that a 
replacement Lockheed Electra aircraft, purchased in 
10 AJHR, 1961, A 17, po8o 
20 External Affairs Review, 1961, xi(7), po36o 
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1965, cost slightly more than £710,000 or 
approximately eighty-seven per cent. of the amount 
New Zealand was to pay Australia for her shares in 
TEAL .. 1 As well as the economic points of the TEAL 
purchase, New Zealand acquired a freedom which it 
had not enjoyed whilst only a partner-government and 
the possession of this freedom gave New Zealand the 
opportunity to intensify its interest in international 
aviation and the power to bid for rights to establish 
services further afield. In addition the retention 
for TEAL of more than half of the Tasman traffic 
after Qantas began operating on its own behalf on 
3 October 1961, a condition which was to remain in 
existence until 1964 when TEAL's Electras would be 
paid off, ensured th TEAL would possess a firm 
base from which to continue profitable operations 
and undertake future development. The establishment 
of this Qantas-TEAL shared monopoly on the Tasman, 
though criticised as likely to impair New Zealand's 
position in negotiations for additional traffic 
2 
rights in othe~ parts of the world, was in effect 
a well-founded'measure since it retained a degree of 
10 Air New Zealand, Annual Report, 1964-65, p.14. 
2. _P~~, 29 Apr 1961. 
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protection for TEAL until 1964, when it was 
anticipated the airline would be capable of operating 
jet aircraft. Without these aircraft TEAL would 
have been ill-equipped to deal with open competition 
from other airlines which operated in the Pacific and 
were anxious to procure trans-Tasman traffic rightso 
It was appropriate that the ownership of TEAL 
should pass to New Zealand in the companyts twenty-
first year of operations, a coincidence which caused 
The Dominion to comment, "Any key presented to Teal 
to mark its 21st birthday this weekend will be an 
appropri symbol. The intergovernment decision 
to grant the airline single-nation ownership provides 
a physical key to its mature developmento,,1 
The actual date of TEALts twenty-first anniversary 
was 30 April and to commemorate the occasion cakes 
were cut aboard all seven of the company flights which 
took place on the day. In those twenty-one years 
TEAL had operated five different rcraft, had 
expanded its route network tenfold and seen passenger 
traffic rise from some 1,500 to more than 103,000 
people per yearo The frequency of company services 
~~-=~, 29 Apr 19610 
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had also increased, 130 Tasman crossings being 
flown in the first year of operations compared 
with 1,666 in the year ended 31 March 19610 1 With 
this record of achievement providing a solid base 
TEAL, as New Zealand's international flag carrier, 
could begin to plan for the next step in its history -
the operation of jet airliners over a greatly 
extended route network. 
However, planning for the future could not be 
allowed to obstruct the normal operations of the 
company and these were maintained throughout the 
period 1961-65. During this period the company 
operated alongside other operators on the Tasman for 
the first time, Qantas commencing services in October 
1961 and B.O.A.C. in April 1963, the latter being 
lowed to inaugurate New Zealand's first jet service 
with once-weekly Comet flights across the Tasman. 
The guaranteed position of TEAL with regard to the 
proportion of Tasman traffic carri allowed the 
airline to cope with this competition in a satisfactory 
way. 
The same period, i.e. 1961-65, saw little in 
the way of route expansion or increased frequencies, 
1. Press, 27 Apr 1961. 
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but it must be remembered that these usually take 
place when a new aircraft is introduced and as this 
had occurred when the Electra was brought on to 
TEAL's network there was little that a change of 
ownership could accomplish in this respect. 
Nevertheless Tafuna in American Samoa was incorporated 
into the Coral Route and new routes were added to the 
trans-Tasman network with the establishment of 
Wellington-Melbourne and Wellington-Brisbane services 
in October and November 1963. Unfortunately 
operations to Tahiti were halted following the 
withdrawal of New Zealand's air rights to French 
Oceania but in lieu of this TEAL began to oper a 
weekly service between Auckland and Noumea, this 
service being maintained by B.OoA.C. Comets under 
charter .. The most notable increase in frequency 
occurred on the Hibiscus service between New Zealand 
and Fiji which was increased to a daily frequency in 
February 1964 and was 1 r stepped up to eight 
return services a week. Six of these services were 
operated by TE~ Electras and the other two by Qantas 
Electras under charter. The years 1961-65 were not 
therefore static from the point-of-view of company 
activi es, in fact in the last year of the period 
under consideration the Electra fleet utilisation 
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rose to 12,232 hours, a 19.5 per cent. improvement 
on the previous year, and the total passenger traffic 
on all company routes increased by almo 
twenty-seven per cent .. on the 196 64 figure. 1 
Unfortunately this period of pre-jet-age 
consolidation was marred by two incidents relating 
to the company's Electra aircraft .. In July 1964 
it was necessary to ground these machines in order 
that they could be examined for suspected cracks in 
the wing structure, a fault which had appeared in 
Electras in use in other parts of the world. TEAL's 
aircraft were all cleared and scheduled operations 
were quickly resumed. TEAL was less fortunate on 
the second occasion for on 27 March 1965 the Electra 
ItAkaroa ll crashed and burned at Whenuap after a 
heavy landing had been made in the course of a 
training flight: fortunately none of the six-man 
crew were injured. The loss of the Electra, although 
a blow to the company's twenty-five year accident-
free record, was only a temporary setback for 
'. 
ItAkaroa lt was replaced within three weeks by an 
Electra purchased from Qantas. The new Electra was 
brought into service immediately in order to cope with 
1.. Air New Ze and, Annual Report, 1964-65, pp.1 & 7. 
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the heavy traffic of the Easter vacation and for a 
short time operated in Qantas colours with a New 
Zealand registration, ZK-CLX. Subsequently the 
machine was repainted in Air New Zealand livery and 
the Qantas name "Pacific Endeavour" was replaced by 
"Akaroa" .. 
Whilst the Electras kept TEAL's banner flying 
the preparation for the company's entry into the 
jet-age was continued, and in 1965 the airline 
emerged from a large-scale expansion programme as a 
fully-fledged jet-operator .. This programme, which 
brought new aircraft, new routes, a new name and the 
opening of a new maintenance base, was compressed 
into nine months but the planning which had made it 
possible dated back to 1961 when New Zealand acquired 
total ownership of the airline .. 
In view of the fact that a number of the reasons 
behind New Zealand's acquisition of the airline were 
concerned with TEAL's future development it was a 
logical step to~extend these factors to determine the 
pattern of TEAL's future growth, this pattern being 
evolved against a background of the threatened 
British entry into the European Economic Community, 
the need for New Zealand to find new markets for her 
traditional exports, and the opportunities which could 
ill 
172. 
be won for New Zealand in the growing flow of 
tourists to the Pacific area. Consequently it was 
necessary that the newly acquired New Zealand-owned 
TEAL be used as fully and as effectively as possible 
in the advancement of the national interests in 
transport, foreign exchange earnings, trade, and 
tourist promotion abroad. The airline's initial 
task therefore was to branch out from regional 
operations by inaugurating services to both North 
America and South-East Asia, since both areas were 
becoming increasingly important to New Zealand's 
trade, defence, and tourism. The establishment of 
New Zealand-owned and controlled r-links with these 
areas would strengthen the country's national and 
economic identity in these potentially important new 
markets as well as providing the transport arteries 
needed to sustain a higher level of trading. 
The airline's new role determined the type of 
equipment it would need in future. Traditionally, 
the airline had a network of South Pacific and trans-
Tasman routes ranging from 821 miles to double this 
distance, but the proposed expansion of services to 
North America and the Orient would include sectors 
nearly 4,000 miles long. Hence versatility was the 
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key when TEAL began seeking a pure jet aircraft for 
that machine would have to operate economically 
over the proposed long-range routes in addition to 
the short trans-Tasman sectors .. Consequently the 
choice of a new aircraft was a difficult one, made 
even more so by the fact that for the rst time an 
airliner was being chosen which would have to compete 
on world routes with those operated by major 
international airlines. 
In addition, as had happened in 1958 prior to 
the Electra purchase, the choice of a jet aircraft 
was complicated by side issues, with the question of 
buying from Britain or the United states assuming 
great importance in view of the former's stated 
intention to seek entry into the European Economic 
Community .. The British had available the Vickers 
VC 10, a new and relatively untested machine: the 
United States on the other hand were able to offer 
two tried and tested aircraft, the Boeing 707 and the 
Douglas DC-8. The choice was further complicated 
-by the fact that a choice of the Boeing 707 or 
Vickers VC 10 could lead to a closer alignment of 
TEAL with ther Qantas or BoO.AoC .. Since Qantas 
operated Boeing 707s it was possible that TEAL and 
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Qantas could pool maintenance facilities if TEAL 
purchased similar aircraft, whilst Qantas would not 
have to fear competition from a more appealing 
aircraft. On the other hand if the VC 10 was 
ordered TEAL could possibly align itself with BoOGAGCo 
who had a number of those jets on order, a move which 
would have allowed TEAL to share in the British 
company's maintenance organisation at Singapore, as 
well as co-ordinating BoOoA.C. services with TEAL's 
t P 'f' . 1 rans- aCl lC serVlces. It was also suggested 
that the VC 10 might be offered to TEAL on lease from 
B.OoAoC., and as any re-equipment with jets would 
involve TEAL in an expenditure of some £10,000,000, 
the possibility that this proposition may have been 
too attractive for TEAL and the Government to dismiss 
without earnest consideration could not be overlooked. 2 
However, in spite of last minute efforts by Vickers-
Armstrong who cut the pr~ce and claimed new performance 
figures for the VC 10, the New Zealand Minister of 
Civil Aviation announced that the Government would 
approve the reco~mendation of TEAL's experts that 
three DC-8 Series 52 jets be purchased for the airline. 3 
1. At this time BoO.AGCo did not operate a service 
across the South Pacific, their Pacific service 
passing between Tokyo and San Francisco. 
2. NZH, 4 May 1963. 
3. Ibid., 3 Aug 1963. 
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In his announcement the New Zealand Minister 
stated that, of the three types considered, the DC-S 
was the most suitable since neither the Boeing 707 
nor the Vickers VC 10 would have offered such good 
economic prospects for TEAL's route pattern; the 
DC-8 not only possessed the ability to operate most 
economically over the Tasman and Pacific Island 
routes but, unlike the VC 10, also had the ability 
to operate over long hops, e.g. Tahiti-U.S.Ao, with 
a full load of passengers and freight and adequate 
fuel reserves. "Not only was this aircraft proven in 
airline operations, which was a most important 
consideration to a small company like TEAL", said the 
Minister, "but it had passenger appeal, high 
performance, a large freight capacity and excellent 
operating economics - essential requirements if the 
company's operations were to be successfully conducted 
on a commercial basisa"l TEAL's chairman later 
disclosed that the company had waited for more than 
twelve months in an effort to see a suitable British 
aircraft develoRed before the decision to purchase 
American DC-Ss was taken; however, as 
i. External Affairs Review, 1963, xiii(S), po26. 
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pointed out, "regrets that the airline is not 
'buying British' ••• must be tempered by satisfaction 
that, in spreading its wings, T"E"A.Lo is equipped 
with the best aircraft for the job"I1 1 
In September 1963 a contract for the purchase of 
three Douglas DC-8 Series 52 jet rliners was 
signed and the aircraft were delivered in the latter 
part of 1965, the first of the three arriving on 
20 July after a direct flight from the United States. 
It is interesting to note that the time taken for 
the Los Angeles-Auckland journey, approximately 
thirteen-and-a-h f hours, was almost one hour less 
than that taken by Kingsford Smith on his pioneering 
Tasman crossing in 19280 The second and third of 
the new machines arrived at Auckland in August and 
September to complete the new jet-fleeto In a break 
with tradition it was decided that the DC-8s would 
not be given an individual name and so each became 
known by the last three letters of its registration 
number; ZK-NZA, -NZB and -NZC. It was, however, 
decided that the new aircraft would be known as 
'Five Star Jets' and the supporting theme - liThe Five 
Star Jetline" - was added to the company's name for 
i. NZH, 30 Jan 1964; Press, 7 Aug 1963. 
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promotion purposes, the inspiration for this being 
drawn from the stellar cons lation of the Southern 
Cross which is incorporated in the New Zealand flag 
and which had, for five years, been featured on the 
tail of the company's Electras. 1 
With the choice of aircr t concluded the next 
need was to acquire the right to operate services to 
new areas about the Pacific. In 1961, when TEAL 
became New Zealand-owned, expansion of the airline's 
route network could have taken place in two different 
directions; firstly through Australia to South-East 
Asia, and secondly, through the Pacific Islands to 
the west coast of the United States~ Since both of 
these areas constituted potential markets for New 
Zealand produce, the negotiation of bilateral agreements 
with the governments of the countries concerned was 
undertaken in an effort to gain TEAL the rights to 
operate into these new areas. As a result of 
negotiations with the United Kingdom traffic rights 
enabling TEAL to operate into Hong Kong and Singapore 
were obtained. In return B.OaA.C. were allowed to 
operate a Comet service across the Tasman as a 
1. Air New Zealand, Annual Report, 1964-65, p.3. 
. 1 continuation of that company's London-Sydney serv~ce. 
This Comet service, in addition to being New Zealand's 
rst scheduled jet service, also marked the entry 
into Tasman operations of the last of the three 
original TEAL partnerso 
Negotiations with the French Government were 
rather more difficult and were further complicated in 
1964 when France, having failed in its effort to 
secure trans-Tasman rights from the Australian 
Government, suspended TEAL's traffic rights into 
Tahiti. After the opening of Auckland International 
Airport negotiations with the French were resumed and 
in the resultant agreement New Zealand secured rights 
from France to a round-the-world route via Tahiti 
and the United States. France, in return, was 
granted the right to operate a round-the-world service 
2 through Auckland. The French airline Union de 
Transports Aeriens commenced operating over this 
route in 1966; Air New Zealand did not resume 
operations into Tahiti until November 1967, that 
route having been excluded from the major route 
expansion which had occurred when TEAL introduced its 
DC-8 jets. 
1. AJHR, 1963, H 37A, p.13. 
2. Ibid., 1967, A 10, po10. 
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Traffic rights to United States territory in 
the Pacific area were held by New Zealand under an 
interim agreement of 1961 which allowed TEAL to 
operate into Pago Pago, American Samoao However, in 
order to take full advantage of the potential of the 
DC-8s improved rights of access extending on to the 
United States were desired, and these were obtained 
in an Air Transport Agreement between New Zealand and 
the United States which was concluded in 1964. Under 
the schedule of this Agreement a New Zealand airline 
was granted the right to fly to Los Angeles via 
Honolulu or via American Samoa, the agreement also 
allowing for services through Tahiti should a new 
agreement with the French Government be reached. In 
return an American airline was granted rights through 
Auckland and Christchurch, provided both points were 
not included on the same flight, and the airline was 
also to be allowed to operat~ across the Tasman. 1 
With jet services imminent the upgrading to 
long-haul jet standard of Christchurch International 
-
Airport, and the completion of the construction of 
Mangere, Auckland, was undertaken by the New Zealand 
Government. It would be incorrect of course to 
i. AJHR, 1964, A 17, p.l0. 
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suggest that such action was the result of TEAL's 
development since these airports were needed if New 
Zealand was to maintain its proper place on Pacific 
air routes. As an increasing number of main trunk 
routes elsewhere were being converted to jet operation, 
New Zealand's position was becoming progressively 
more anachronous, and New Zealand was faced with the 
choice of constructing jet airports or being relegated 
to spur-line operation, a situation which would have 
become an increasing liability. Consequently 
New Zealand came to own two high standard jet airports 
and the trend toward transportation isolation was 
arrested and reversed. 
In association with the construction of a new 
airport at Mangere TEAL began the construction of a 
jet maintenance base which would not only service 
TEAL's aircraft but provide in addition, service 
facilities for the aircraft of other international 
airlines operating through New Zealand. This base, 
planned to serve the demands of the jet age, and 
covering 330,000 sq. ft, possessed a number of 
interesting features. One of these was the extremely 
large hangar, 510 ft wide, and covering 102,000 sq. ft, 
the doors of which weighed fifteen tons each. Within 
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this vast hangar area fire protection was served by 
a deluge system capable of pumping the equivalent of 
ghteen inches of rain an hour into the area from 
1 
some 1,400 sprinkler heads o The whole jet 
ntenance complex, erected at a cost of £2,000,000, 
was occupied during June and July 1965 and was 
lared open on 20 July 1965 at a function held to 
mark the arrival of the first DC-8 rliner from 
A further step in TEAL's transition from a 
regional to an international operator was taken in 
1965 when the Minister of Civil Aviation announced 
that the Government had acceded to the request of 
the TEAL board of directors that the name of the 
company be changed to Air New and from 1 April 
19650 In the course of the announcement of this 
decision the Minister said: 
This change has been brought about 
by the very practical need to identify 
the airline more closely with New Zealand 
in the wider international aviation 
scene •••• Air New Zealand will get our 
country's and our airline's message to 
the world in the most direct and compelling 
way. It says what it means and it means 
what it says. It is a name which well 
suits the country's chosen instrument of 
international aviation. 2 
Air New and, Annual Report, 1964-65, p.22. 
2. Press, 21 Jan 1965. 
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Speaking on the change of name TEAL's man er, 
Fo Reeves, said that the sheer size and speed of the 
airline's expansion in the next twelve to eighteen 
months was such that new markets would be introduced 
to New Zealand's airline service for the first time 
and consequently it was important that the airline 
enter this period with the most appropriate name, 
a condition satisfied by Air New Zealand. 1 The 
company ch rman, A .. McKee, gave a similar 
interpretation to the causes of the name change 
adding that the airline's name would become a "flying 
advertisement for New Zealand's tourist industry and 
sales promotion efforts abroad. 1I2 If the passing 
of the name TEAL was regretted there was no escaping 
the fact that outside a limited region the name TEAL 
meant nothing to potenti 
name gave New Zealand's fl 
with its country of orig~no 
air travellers .. The new 
carrier full identification 
There were numerous precedents for the choice 
of a new name similar to Air New Zealand - Air Algerie, 
Air India, Air Mali, Alitalia, Swissair - and on this 
pattern the new title, Air New Zealand, seemed a 
logical choice .. On the other hand opponents of the 
10 Press, 21 Jan 19650 
2 .. ~ .. 
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change could point to international airlines such 
as Australia's Qantas and the Dutch K.LoMo, contending 
that there was little to identify these names with 
the airline'S country of origin. There was little 
basis for such an argument however, since both Qantas 
and KaLoM. were known world-wide long before the 
concept of nationally named airlines was adopted and 
neither was currently engaged in a programme of route 
expansion. Furthermore, at the time of the 
TEAL - Air New Zealand changeover, Qantas aircraft 
carried the words "Australia's international airline, 
QANTAS" along the side of the fuselage and K.LoMo's 
aircraft bore the inscription "KLM - Royal Dutch 
Airlines" 0 
The change of name carne into effect at midnight, 
31 March 1965, when one of TEAL's Electras, "Atarua", 
was nearing the end of an Auckland-Nandi serVice, so 
that a flight which had begun with a TEAL take-off 
was concluded with an Air New Zealand touchdown. 
The honour of making the first complete flight under 
the new banner went to the Electra "Aotearoa" which 
left Sydney shortly after midnight on a trip to 
Auckland. Each aircraft was given the new company 
title as soon as possible but in order to avoid any 
Plate VII: TEAL or Air New Z and? 
The tail of a DC-8 du the 
company's change of nameo 
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confusion which might have arisen from a sudden 
change, the name TEAL was retained in a sUbsidiary 
role for a transition period of about twelve months 
and throughout this period the company's aircraft 
bore the new and old names. 
The cUlmination of this multi-phase build-up 
programme came on 3 October 1965 when Air New Zealand 
jet operations began with the flight of DC-8 ZK-NZB 
between Christchurch and Sydney. This inaugural 
journey was accomplished in 170 minutes but the 
return journey to Christchurch, made on the same day, 
took only 141 minutes: 1 both times however reveal 
the great changes which had taken place in the 
thirty-seven years since Kingsford-Smith's fourteen 
hour crossing. The new Auckland International 
Airport was opened for commercial services on 24 
November and the first departure was that of an Air 
New Zealand DC-8 on a service to Sydney. The 
company's new aircraft were introduced on the 
Auckland-Nandi service on 28 November and the aircraft 
flew on to Pago Pago the following day. With the 
introduction of the DC-8s to most of the company's 
1. Press, 4 Oct 1965. 
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existing short-haul routes, attention was switched 
to the inauguration of the three new long-range 
services, to Los Angeles, Singapore and Hong Kong, 
which would almost treble the route network of the 
company. Services to Los Angeles were commenced on 
14 December, although a pre-serv,ice flight over the 
route had been made in the preceding week.. The 
second of the new services, Auckland-Hong Kong, was 
begun on 3 March 1966, the aircraft flying via Sydney 
and Darwin on the outward journey and returning via 
Manila and Sydney: direct Sydney-Hong Kong services 
were not commenced for another year, being introduced 
in August 1967. The last of the new routes, 
Auckland-Singapore, was inaugurated on 6 April 1966 
thus bringing the expansion programme to a successful 
conclusion.. The lack of traffic rights into Tahiti 
excluded the incorporation of that point in Air New 
Zealand's initial jet se.rvices but rights were 
restored in 1966 and a service between Auckland and 
Los Angeles via Tahiti was opened in November 19670 
The introduction of jet airliners meant that 
improved f lities for meal service had to be provided. 
This need for a streamlining of cabin services can be 
appreciated when it is revealed that the replacement 
of Electras with DC-8s on short-haul routes meant a 
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lowering of flight times by up to a third whilst the 
passenger list was increased from seventy-six to 
129. Obviously the technique used on board the 
company's DC-6s and Electras, whereby in-flight 
cooking of partly cooked food was required before a 
meal could be served, would no longer suffice .. 
Consequently meals were prepared in Air New Zealand's 
flight kitchen which forms part of the jet base 
constructed at Auckland International Airport. J..'IIhen 
put aboard the aircraft these meals require only 
seven minutes cooking to make them ready to serve and 
in the year ended 31 March 1967 nearly 230,000 of 
these flight meals were prepared, of which some 90,000 
were supplied to other airlines .. 1 Quanti ty has. 
not, however, been allowed to overrun quality and 
today company menus feature such dishes as roast 
pheasant, crayfish, tohearoa soup, and New Zealand 
lambo 2 In addition Ai+, New. Zealand points with pride 
to the fact that it has been able to avoid entering 
the "plastic age of catering", and aboard all company 
aircraft china ~ishes, with a specially designed 
motif, are used in the serving of meals. 3 
1. Air New Zealand, Annual Report, 1966-67, po9. 
2. TEAL, luntitled outline history], ch.7, po3 .. 
3. Ibid., ch.7, p.4. 
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The high passenger capacity of the DC-8s also 
accentuated the importance of flight stewards and 
hostesses and in 1965, when the new jets were 
introduced, Air New Zealand was served by 133 flight 
stewards and sixty-one hostesses. The uniform of 
the company hostesses was not changed during 
Air New Zealand's expansion: in fact the only change 
of hostess uniform took place during the period of 
Electra introduction when the fawn summer and black 
winter uniforms worn by TEAL's hostesses were replaced 
with a turquoise jack and skirt with white cuffs 
and cravat. This outfit, designed by the House of 
Dior, was continued into the jet-age and a new hat 
style was the only modification made. 
Unlike previous re-equipment programmes, when 
one type of machine was replaced with another, the 
change to DC-8s did not bring an end to the operation 
of turbo-prop Electras over some of the company's 
routes. This was due to the lack of international 
j aerodromes at the terminal points of Wellington, 
Melbourne and Brisbane, and Electras were retained in 
order to continue services to these ci eso In 
April 1966 the upgrading of Brisbane to the required 
standards resulted in DC-8s being introduced on to 
the service and a similar changeover occurred in 
December 1967 when Electra services to New Caledonia 
were replaced by faster DC-8 jet servicesq 
Having completed its conversion to jets and 
extension of rou s, Air New Zealand adopted a programme 
of consolidation, a programme which included 
strengthening new market areas to feed the expanded 
route pattern, setting standards of performance on the 
new routes, and maintaining the continued growth of 
traditional routes and markets again increasing 
competitiono The success of this programme was 
revealed when in the year ended 31 March 1967 the 
company ag n earned a profit, this being the 
twenty-third profitable year in the company's 
twenty-seven year existence. 
Unfortunately, the success of this expansion and 
consolidation was marred when, on 4 July 1966, one of 
the DC-8 aircraft, ZK-NZB, crashed and burned at 
Auckland International Airport. Although a subsequent 
inquiry absolved the company and flight crew from any 
responsibility for the accident, the mishap caused 
the death of two crew members, the first fatalities 
in the airline's twenty-six year operational historyo1 
1. AJHR, 1967, H 37, po32o 
189 0 
World-wide inquiries failed to find another DC-8 
suitable for use under charter and as the delivery 
date, late 1967, of a fourth DC-8 on order to Air 
New Zealand could not be advanced, a reorganisation 
of services was necessaryo As a result the Singapore 
service was suspended, the introduction of a jet 
service to Tahiti postponed and Electras replaced 
DC-8s on a number of flights, especially on the 
Auckland-Nandi service o A replacement aircraft 
was, of course, ordered but difficulties that were 
being experienced by the manufacturer delayed the 
delivery of both this machine and the DC-8 already 
on order so that neither was delivered by the end of 
In order to cope with the heavy Christmas 
traffic Air New Zealand chartered a DC-8 from an 
American firm, United Air Lines. For the period of 
the charter this machine remained in United's red, 
blue and white colours and was used on shorter routes, 
e.g. trans-Tasman and Auckland-Fiji, in order that 
Air New Ze and could keep its own aircraft on the 
services to Hong Kong and Los Angeles where, because 
of competitioni the airline most needed to identify 
1. The two DC-8s in question were delivered early 
in 1968. 
Pl ate VIII: Far away placeso Nine of 
the fi f teen points se rved by th e 
airline a r e indi c ated on th i s s i g n a t 
Christchurch International Airport. 
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itself. Despite the inconvenience caused by the 
delayed delivery of the two additional DC-8s Air 
New Zealand had by December 1967 clearly established 
itself in the field of international aviation; over 
a period of twenty-seven years the company which had 
commenced services by operating two flying-boats 
over a 1,300-odd mile route had developed into a jet 
equipped airline whose route network of more than 
42,000 miles served three continents and fifteen 
destinations. 
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION 
One consistent and inexorable factor in the 
history of air transport has been its dynamic 
growth. At the end of the First World War there 
was not a single scheduled passenger service. 1 By 
1960 there were almost 300 airlines in existence, 
ranging from giants like Aeroflot (U.S.S.R.), 
United Air Lines (U.S.A.) and Pan American Airways 
(U.S.A.), which carry tens of thousands of passengers 
in jet aircraft which accommodate more than 100 
passengers each trip, to companies operating small 
and often veteran aircraft in remote corners of the 
world .. This forty years of development was 
highlighted in 1960 when, for the first time, more 
than 100 million passengers were carried by the world 
2 
airlines in one year. 
The enormous capacity required to carry more 
than 100 million passengers per year required a 
corresponding increase in the size of aircraft and 
1. The first scheduled passenger service was flown 
by Deutsche Luft Reederei on 5 Feb 1919. 
2. International Civil Aviation Organisation, 
"Digest of Statistics No. 85", quoted in 
International Air Transport ~ssociation, 
World Air Transport Statistics, 1960, po5. 
192. 
the 150 ton DC-8s of the 1960s are a far cry from 
the machines which introduced the air transport age. 
In an examination of this point Davies has combined 
the data of aircraft speed, size, and hours flown 
per year in order to obtain a figure of "airliner 
work output" and this not only reveals a great increase 
over the years but emphasises the tremendous advance 
which the big jets madeo 1 If Davies' figures are 
applied to aircraft operated by Air New Zealand it 
is possible to formulate the equation 1 DC-B = 4 DC-6s. 
One of the most important developments in air 
transport during recent years has been the trend 
towards closer links between airlines of different 
nations. Equipment is so expensive, the acquisition 
of traffic rights so involved and competition so 
intense that an independent airline is faced with a 
bitter struggle for survival. International 
airlines have responded to this situation by 
co-operation and co-ordination, usually through 
pooling agreements between several airlines. 
Qantas and Air India operate the England-Australia 
route on a pool basis, Lufthansa, Air France and 
1. R.E.G. Davies,·A History of the World's Airlines, 
pp.49B-503. 
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Alitalia operate international services under a 
pooling agreement, and Air New Zealand operates on 
a pool basis with Qantas and B.O.A.C. 
Such arrangements involve the establishment of 
agreed timetables and the equitable sharing of 
available traffic. A more far-reaching kind of 
alliance was that reached in October 1958 by 
Scandinavian Airlines System and Swissair. Not only 
were timetables and fleets integrated but a system 
of cross-leasing of aircraft was begun. Another 
significant development has been the establishment 
by four European international airlines, Lufthansa, 
Air France, Alitalia, and Sabena, of a partnership 
scheme under which each member takes an agreed share 
of the total traffic. Although Air Union (as the 
partnership is called) has achieved some of its aims, 
namely close integration of timetables and the 
avoidance of crippling competition, it remains in 
the experimental stage. 
The format~on of these inter-line groupings, 
and the fact that in 1961 forty airlines carried 
ninety-one per cent. of the total world air-traffic,1 
10 R.E.G. Davies, A History of the World's Airlines, 
p.500. 
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are indicative of the prevailing trend in international 
civil avi on; it is becoming a game for giantso 
Yet, in an apparent contradiction of the contemporary 
trend, New Zealand acquired an international airline, 
re-equipped it with jet airliners, gave it a new name 
and transformed it profitably from a regional to an 
international operator by sending it over newly 
negotiated routes to the Orient and North America. 
The j were purchased for £10 million, the 
construction of an international jet rport at 
Auckland required the expenditure of a further 
£10 million and the purchase of Australia's share in 
TEAL cost £0.8 million, a total of almost £21 million 
for these three items aloneo Clearly the advantages 
of New Zealand ownership had to be great in order to 
counter the almost inevitable suggestion that 
New Zealand avoid the financial gamble of entering 
the field of jet-age international r transport by 
asking one or more of the major overseas operators 
to provide New Zealand's external air services. 
There were, in fact, a number of reasons which 
favoured New Zealand owning its own international 
airline. Many of these became apparent when 
examined from the point-of-view of the country as a 
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whole rather than in the context of a purely 
commercial undertaking which must show a profit in 
its annual accounts. Airlines, particularly 
international carriers, have not always been 
money-makers., The initial cost of aircraft and 
their operational costs are high and according to 
figures published by ICAO in 1962, covering thirty 
leading airlines (which account for about seventy-five 
per cent. of all international transport operations), 
the operating profit on £700 million revenue earned 
in 1960 was less than £20 million. 1 Air New Zealand 
has done well in this respect when compared with the 
overall pattern .. In twenty-seven years of 
operations (i.e. to 31 March 1967) the company made 
operating profits in twenty-three of those years 
totalling £2.6 million, against operating losses in 
four years of £0.5 million, a favourable financial 
credit of £2.1 million •. The airline therefore has 
not been an expense which the New Zealand taxpayer 
has had to bear; in fact its domicile in New Zealand 
has been financially beneficial for the government 
has benefited substantially from the payment of direct 
taxation and annual dividends. In the last four 
1. RoE.G. Davies, A History of the World's Airlines, 
pp .. 531-32 .. 
1960 
financial years, 1964-67, dividends p d to the 
New Zealand government by Air New Zealand were in 
excess of £350,0000 1 
There was of course an almost world-wide 
precedent for New Zealand owning an international 
airline; almost every state in the world has found 
it worthwhile in its national interest to maintain 
its own international airlineo There is virtually 
no nation, even among the newest or the smallest, 
which has not professed to operate an international 
airline of its own. Garuda of Indonesia, Ghana 
Airways and Air Mali are examples of new nations 
operating international airlines; Swissair of 
Switzerland and KoLoMa of the Netherlands exemplify 
small nation ownership. It would be surprising 
therefore if New Ze and did not maintain an 
international airline, particularly in view of the 
country's exceptional dependence on transporto 
The domiciling of Air New Zealand in New Zealand 
has meant that the company's first loyalty is to 
New Zealand .. .. No other international rline would 
10 Dividends paid in each of these ars can be 
found in AJHR B 1 [pt IJ , under heading 
"Details ts from Trading Undertakings". 
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owe first allegiance to New Zealand, nor could it 
identify itself with New Zealandts national image 
abroad. Aviation services operated into New Zealand 
by an overseas airline run, not in the interest of 
New Zealand, but in the interest of the operator and 
his country of origin. Without an international 
airline of its own New Zealand would have been forced 
to rely upon such services. There would, however, 
have been no guarantee that these services, which are 
essential to New Zealand, would have continued to 
operate in all circumstances or under favourable terms. 
It was, therefore, desirable to have a measure of 
control over New Zealandts communication with the 
outside world and, as the organisation of shipping 
had become entrenched, aviation provided the only 
method of overseas transport over which an effective 
governmental influence could be exerted in the 
national interest. 
In addition, reliance on an overseas airline to 
do the job done for New Zealand by Air New Zealand 
would have resulted in the loss to the New Zealand 
economy of a substantial amount of overseas exchange. 
In the year ended 31 March 1966 some 207,000 persons 
travelled from New Zealand; of this number slightly 
more than eighty per cent. travelled by 
198 .. 
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every case where the traveller's fare was paid to 
an overseas airline this was a straight out-going 
of overseas exchange; if the fares were paid to a 
New Zealand owned international airline the money so 
spent stayed in New Zealand. The pooling arrangement 
which Air New Zealand has with Qantas and B.O.AGe. 
does, of course, provide a modification of the above 
generalisation but it is generally true that the 
higher the proportion of departures who flew by the 
New Zealand carrier, the higher the proportion of air 
fares, and consequently overseas exchange saved • 
. 
Air New Zealand also earned overseas exchange since 
the fare of every visitor brought to this country by 
the airline represented a direct gain in overseas 
exchange by the New Zealand economy. Air New Zealand 
thus earned and saved overseas exchange for New Zealand 
and in this sense has be.en a most significant earner 
of vital income for the nation. The importance of an 
international airline in this respect is shown by the 
fact that in th~ year ended 31 March 1967 Air New 
Zealand saved £5.6 million in overseas exchange, and 
1. YB, 1967, pp.73 & 1002. 
in so-doing, became second to the Tasman Pulp and 
Paper Company as New Zealand's biggest single 
earner of foreign exchange. 1 
Associated with the earning of overseas funds 
obtained in flying visitors to New Zealand, Air New 
Zealand also played an important part in the tourist 
industry of New Zealand since it was possible for 
the airline to help direct the flow of tourist 
traffic towards New Zealand, a flow which might have 
been turned by other carriers to countries elsewhere. 
Furthermore it has been possible to use Air New 
Zealand as a spearhead in the promotion of New Zealand's 
tourist industry, not only through advertising and 
publicity, but also through the introduction of low 
fares (e.g. Airconomy fares and package tours) which 
encouraged tourists to visit New Zealand. Air New 
Zealand's role of course has been to bring the 
tourists to New Ze and: economically it was extremely 
important that such tourists were not diverted 
elsewhere for tourist spending in this country 
totalled £11.6 million in the year ended 31 March 19660 2 
1. Air New Zealand, Annual Report, 1966-67, p.9; 
Press, 1S Apr 1967. 
2. AJHR, 1966, H 2, p.3. 
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The value of an international airline to New 
Zealand, however, extended beyond the ability of 
that airline to earn and save overseas funds for its 
parent country .. Throughout its history New Zealand 
has been dependent on overseas trade for its 
development and progress and has traditionally 
supplied a narrow range of primary products, wool, 
meat and d ry produce, to a limited number of markets, 
principally the United Kingdom. In-the early 1960s 
the threat of the United Kingdom's possible entry 
into the European Economic Community awoke New 
Zealanders to the dangers which existed in the 
continued dependence on this narrow export market 
and the finding of new markets in other p s of the 
world became one of New Zealand's most pressing needs 
as a trading nation. The possession by New Zealand 
of an international airline allowed Air New Zealand 
to be used in the pioneering of new mark s, not 
only showing the flag but by taking New Zealand's 
image to lands where New Zealand was relatively unknown. 
In addition it has been possible to use Air New 
Zealand's jets -to transport samples of New and 
produce to new markets.. Surface transport is not 
flexible enough to be effective in this way; its 
role has been a follow-up one involving bulk delivery. 
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This of course has not stopped the aircraft 
being used as a cargo carrier .. In the early days of 
commercial aviation the carriage of freight was a 
minor activity; in fact the potential of air cargo 
was not fully realised until the jet-age. With this 
awareness of the potential of airfreighting, airlines 
devoted solely to cargo-carrying were formed, e .. g. 
the Flying Tiger Line (U.S.A .. ) and freighter versions 
of standard jet airliners constructed, e.g .. the 
Douglas DC-SF .. TEAL was associated with the carriage 
of cargo from the time of its inception, because of 
the wartime lack of Tasman shipping. The amount of 
cargo carried annually by the airline has increased 
steadily. 1 However the re impetus to the airline's 
cargo-carrying came with the introduction of the 
DC-Ss in 1965 since each of the new aircraft was 
capable of carrying seven tons of cargo, almost as 
much as TEAL had carried, in its first year of operation .. 
A wide variety of goods has left New Zealand in the 
holds of Air New Zealand's aircraft; these have 
included perish?bles such as chilled fish, crayfish, 
and strawberries, and a wide variety of products from 
, 
New Zealand's secondary industries, notably electrical 
appliances, washing machines and radios. The 
1. See Appendix A, p.221. 
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introduction of the DC-8 also meant that broadloom 
carpet was added to the list of commodities 
airfreighted overseas; previous aircraft operated 
by the company had been unable to accommodate the 
twelve foot width of this commodity. 
In the year ended 31 March 1967 airborne exports 
from New Zealand exceeded airborne imports for the 
first time in Air New Zealand's history,1 emphasising 
the future importance of this means of cargo-carrying 
in New Zealand's external trade pattern. Furthermore, 
recent technological developments seem likely to lead 
to what may become known as the age of the long range 
airfreightero An international airline would appear 
to be a necessary pre-condition of a locally tuned 
airfreight company, and this requirement has been 
fulfilled through New Zealand's ownership of Air New 
Zealand. As a trading nation it is imperative that 
New Zealand have control of some vehicles of tradeo 
Shipping has been allowed to slip, as far as practical 
control is concerned, completely from New Zealand 
-
handso The magnitude of this issue can be judged 
when it is revealed that shipping freight costs on 
10 Air New Zealand, Annual Report, 1966-67, p.22. 
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exports exceed £45 million and those on imports, 
£35 million .. 1 It is therefore important that any 
idea of hiring or chartering airfreighters from a 
carrier based in another country be strenuously 
resisted; it is in New Zealand's interest to own and 
control at least one means of communication and trade 
with the outside world .. 
There is also a strategic role in a country's 
ownership of an international airline .. Air New 
Zealand's very existence has retained in New Zealand 
a force of trained flight- and ground-crew which 
would be extremely valuable in a time of emergency. 
Furthermore, New Zealand ownership of Air New Zealand 
ensured that a number of modern aircraft were owned 
and based in the country and these machines could 
quickly assume a supporting role as troop transports 
in wartime .. The use of civil airliners for the 
transport of service personnel became increasingly 
common during the 1960's; United States' airlines, 
for example, flew Operation Deep Freeze2 personnel 
from the United States to Christchurch, New Zealand, 
and transported replacement personnel from the 
1.. YB, 1967, po301. 
2. Operation Deep Freeze is the code name of an 
American scientific programme concerned with 
the study of the Antarctic continent. 
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United States to Vietnam. In August 1967 the 
Minister of Defence, D. Thomson, announced that 
approval had been given the Ministry of Defence to 
enter into negotiations with Air New Zealand for an 
air-trooping arrangement. 1 An agreement of this 
type would relieve pressure on the RoN .. Z .. AoF. 
Transport Wing, particularly in the movement of 
servicemen's families who would be able to travel in 
greater comfort than can be provided in Service 
aircraft, and would also free Service aircraft for 
operational tasks. However agreement on the matter 
had not been reached by the end of 1967. 2 
Furthermore, the existence of a New Zealand 
based operator necessitated the locating in this 
country of the associated engineering and technical 
facili ties .. TEAL's engineering resources in 
machines, manpower and technical know-how became 
valuable national assets .. No other international 
airline would base its operations in New Zealand and 
so station here this valuable nucleus of skilled 
technicians who have also fulfilled a nationally 
important support role in the servicing of military 
1.. PD, ccclii, 2728 .. 
20 AJHR, 1968, H 4, p.6. 
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and agricultural aircraft. An important project 
of the company's workshops in this field has been 
the redesigning of the Fletcher FU-24 topdressing 
aircraft to take a turbo-prop engine, the first of 
these machines flying in July 1967. 1 However, 
the activities of the company's workshop have not 
been confined solely to aviation matters and an 
important contribution to safety at sea has been 
made with the servicing and repair of life-rafts for 
the Navy, commercial fishermen and a number of 
shipping companies. 
The final, but no less important, reason for 
New Zealand possessing an international airline is 
the simple <matter of geography. New Zealand is 
relatively isolated geographically and consequently 
is dependent more than most countries on transport and 
communication for trade and contact with the outside 
world. Aviation has changed the meaning of distance 
and made the world grow smaller. In an Air New 
Zealand DC-8 it is possible to travel the 1,300-odd 
miles between Christchurch and Sydney in about 
two-and-a-half hours, only slightly longer than the 
time taken to travel by car from Christchurch to 
1. AJHR, 1968, H 37, p.21. 
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Timaru, a distance of 100 miles. 
As far as New Zealand is concerned the Second 
World War put the label 'essential' on air travel .. 
Fortunately New Zealand never had to face up to the 
situation which would have applied had there been 
no TEAL flying-boats, but it requires little 
imagination to picture the almost total isolation 
in which the country would have been placed. As one 
of the more isolated communities of the world, New 
Ze and is vitally interested in retaining some 
degree of control over at least a nucleus of the 
aircraft which maintain its contact with the outside 
world; this it has achieved through its ownership 
of Air New Zealand. 
New Zealand undoubtedly benefits by owning an 
international airline but the question arises as to 
whether these advantages would be any greater if 
Air New Zealand was merged with the country's domes c 
operator, N.AoCo The suggestion th the two 
rlines be merged was made as early as 1952, and 
was revived again late in 1955. 1 However, as New 
Zealand ownership of the international rline was a 
1.. CS, 9 Sep 1952; 1iVhi tes Avi ation, Sep 1955, p" 1; 
SMH, 1 Nov 1955. 
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necessary prerequisite of any such merger, little 
could be done toward that end prior to New Zealand's 
purchase of Australia's shares in TEAL in 19610 
Strong support for the suggested merger of the 
two airlines was given by a Special Committee which 
had been established by the Air League of New Zealand 
in October 1962 to examine the way in which civil 
aviation was developing in New Zealando In its 
report, published in 1964, the Special Committee 
made the following recommendations: 
1 .. TEAL and NAC should be merged 
by the formation of a holding 
company, with common directors 
and management, and a fully-
integrated joint organisation. 
.0" 
2. The finances of the two airlines 
should also be merged .. 1 
Basically, the reasons behind the Committee's 
recommendation were economics, size of enterprise 
2 
and precedento In the course of its inquiry the 
Committee had found that both airlines faced 
sUbstantial capital development programmes costing 
millions of pounds, both had made reduced profits or 
losses in previous years (1960-63), and both were 
faced with increased competition and rising costs in 
1. Air League of New Zealand (Inc.), Civil 
Aviation Blueprint, p.l0 .. 
2.. Details of the Committee's examination are given 
in the report of that body, Ibid .. , pp.42-48 .. 
208 .. 
the future .. Consequently the Committee held that, 
although both airlines had an almost common board of 
directors, closer co-ordination was necessary since 
this would lead to administrative and other economies 
in addition to giving the advantages associated with 
a large-scale enterprise" 
The. Committee held that the distinction between 
domestic and international airlines was one of 
convenience - "nothing more than that each currently 
concentrates on a separate sector of the same 
industry"l and pointed out that a number of airlines 
combined domestic and overseas operations, eogo 
Irish Air Lines, Trans-Canada Airlines and South 
African Airways. In fact the Committee held that 
Irish Air Lines could provide a useful model for 
New Zealand of a state-owned organisation providing 
for the unified operation of two legally separate 
airlines, one short-haul to the United Kingdom and 
Europe (Aer Lingus), the other operating long-haul 
services across the Atlantic (Aerlinte) .. These two 
airlines were separate companies, their finances 
were separate and they presented separate accounts, 
but they had common management and joint organisation 
10 Air League of New Zealand (Inc,,), Civil 
Aviation Blueprint, p o47o 
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and operationally were fully integrated under the 
name Aer Lingus - Irish International Airlines. 
The Committee emphasised the terms common management, 
joint organisation and fully integrated, and on the 
reasoning that, if the Irish could derive benefits 
from a merger of their international and domestic 
airlines, New Zealand could do likewise, made the 
recommendations for amalgamation referred to above. 
Naturally in a matter of this kind there were 
points for and against the merger. The Committee 
had, however, presented a strong case for 
amalgamation, although for every airline cited as 
successfully combining international and domestic 
operations a country could be found which operated 
both an international and domestic airline; 
Australia's Qantas and T.A.A. and Britain's B.OoA.C. 
and B.E.A. provided two examples. In 1961, after 
, , 
the purchase of TEAL, the New Zealand Government had 
appointed a joint board of directors for TEAL and 
N.A.C. and had agreed that the board commission a 
firm of consultants to investigate whether further 
co-ordination or amalgamation was desirable. On 
1 September 1965 after almost a year of investigations, 
the consultants released their report. 
of amalgamation was rejected. 1 
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The idea 
The Committee of the Air League had stated 
that differentiation between overseas and domestic 
operators was one of convenience; the consultants, 
Barr, Burgess and stewart, thought otherwise -
We are of the opinion that the 
possibility of amalgamation and the 
provision of common services have 
been given undue significance in 
relation to the differences in the 
roles and2characteristics of the airlines. ' 
In arriving at their conclusion the consultants 
stated that the operating figures of both airlines 
compared favourably with larger overseas companies, 
the two airlines had no common routes, and there was 
no evidence of any significant savings which could 
arise from the amalgamation of the two airlineso 
Furthermore N.AoCo, as a short-haul operator, and 
Air New Zealand, as an international long-haul operator, 
had quite different functions in domestic and 
international operations. "It is the primary function 
of N.A"Co to pr()vide air services within New Zealand", 
the consultants wrotE:!, "and of A"N .. Zo to provide air 
services overseas, to promote tourism and trade and 
1. Press, 2 Sep 1965 .. 
2. Ibid .. 
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.18. • assist in earning and saving overseas exchange 
Policy on factors affecting the development of 
N.A.Co and A.N.Z. is dependent on quite different 
political and economic considerationso" 1 
In regard to administration and management the 
consultants found that, because of the specialised 
activities of the two airlines, an amalgamated 
company would still require two distinct management 
groups. It was therefore recommended that the one 
joint board be replaced by a board for each company 
since this would provide a direct link between the 
Government and the organisation responsible for a 
particular policy, and would also maintain the 
existing specialisation. 
The consultants in making their investigation 
had had the advantage of reporting closer to the 
jet age; and had the Air League reported in similar 
circumstances it is possible that the two reports 
might both have rejected amalgamation. Throughout 
the 1960s the field of activity of the two airlines 
drew them further apart .. Air New Zealand began to 
operate in the competitive world of long-haul 
1. Press, 2 Sep 19650 
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international aviation; NoA.C. on the other hand 
had to wait until October 1968 before it introduced 
Boeing 737 short-haul jets to its protected domestic 
routes. Almost certainly future developments in 
long- and short-haul commercial aviation will 
accentuate the differences in the activities of the 
two companies. 
Perhaps the most pressing problem of the 
immediate future, as far as Air New Zealand is 
concerned, is that associated with the continued use 
of turbo-prop Electras, involving, as this does, the 
operation of a mixed fleet. Essentially this is a 
New Zealand and not just an Air New Zealand problem 
for Melbourne is expected to open a new jet airport 
at Tullamarine early in 1969 and this will leave 
Wellington as the only point on Air New Zealand's 
network which does not possess an airport able to 
accommodate long-range jets. The question of the 
construction of an international airport at Wellington 
is a complex one, for not only is it doubtful whether 
New Zealand needs three international airports -
Mangere at present handles sixty-four per cent. of 
international traffic and Christchurch and Wellington 
1 
eighteen per cent. each - but a decision has to be 
10 Department of Statistics, Statistics of 
Transport, 1967, p.54o 
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made on whether to develop Rongotai to international 
jet standards or construct a new international 
airport at Paraparaumuo Either of these alternatives 
is expensive and the New Zealand Government would no 
doubt prefer, on economic grounds, to extend Rongotai 
to small-international jet standards, such as the 
Boeing 727, and a study of the performance of various 
twin- and three-engined jets for use on the Tasman 
has been undertaken. 1 
This would of course necessitate the continuance 
of a mixed Air New Zealand fleet, a tuation which 
the company no doubt wishes to end with the withdrawal 
of the Electras o On the other hand the development 
of Paraparaumu, whilst likely to be of greater value 
for future extensions, would put Wellington's 
airport some three-quarters of an hour by road from 
the city; NoAoCo's new Boeing 737 j s are expected 
to bring Rongotai within forty minutes of the two 
existing international airports at Christchurch and 
Auckland. If a close linking of services between 
N.AoC. and trans-Tasman operators were arranged it is 
possible that Wellington could be withdrawn from the 
international network. Clearly, therefore, the 
1. AJHR, 1968, H 37, p.22. 
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phasing-out of Air New Zealand's Electras is but 
-
one segment of a complex problem and the airline's 
solution must necessarily await a governmental 
decision on the future po tion of Wellington in 
New Zealand's international air network. 
The future route expansion of Air New Zealand is 
also a matter for conjecture. In 1966 the company's 
General Manager, Fo Reeves, declined to be specific 
on future expansion although he stated that the 
close association of communication and trade could 
possibly result in Japan and Central America becoming 
destinations of future Air New Zealand serviceso 1 
More recently plans and estimates have been prepared 
for the construction of a new runway, terminal and 
associated facilities able to accommodate DC-8s, on 
Rarotonga in the Cook Islands, and this could provide 
an alternative route to Los Angeles and other points 
in North and South America .. A more novel possibility 
under consideration is the question of Air New Z~~land 
operating tourist services to Antarctica and it is 
possible that these might be inaugurated in the 
1969-70 Antarctic summer seasono 2 
1.. Press, 12 Apr 1966 .. 
2Q CS, 10 Sep 1968 .. 
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Discussion of Air New Zealand and the future 
mu~t include a reference to developments in the 
aircraft industry; in the international and long-
haul sector of commercial aviation aircraft are 
becoming larger and faster and the terms "jumbo jets" 
and "supersonic transports" (SSTs) are ready in 
common usage. Developments in speed are typified 
by such projects as the Anglo-French Concorde which 
will carry 130 passengers at 1400 m.p.h. and the 
Boeing SST which is expected to carry some 250 
passengers at speeds up to 2000 m.p.h. An Air 
New Zealand DC-8 has already crossed the Tasman in 
2 hours 2 mins, during which journey a speed of 
725 m.p.h. was reached .. 1 The supersonic aircraft 
of the future, with a speed almost double and triple 
this figure, will further reduce the distance barrier 
which separates New Zealand from the rest of the 
world .. This virtual imination of flight time is 
particularly important to tourists and businessmen 
with limited time to spare, and promises to have a 
stimulating eff~ct on the tourist economy of remote 
areas of the Pacifico 
Of greater significance, from New Ze and's 
viewpoint as a trading nation, is the increase in 
1 .. _P~~, 30 Aug 1968. 
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aircraft size .. The first of these bigger aircraft, 
a "stretched" version of the DC-8 S es 52, as 
flown by Air New Zealand, has already been put into 
service .. This aircraft, the DC-8 Series 60, is 
available in three versions, the 1 st of which is 
capable of carrying 250 passengers .. Other versions 
of these jumbo jets - the Douglas DC-l0, Boeing 747, 
and Lockheed L500 - are expected to carry up to 
400 pass at speeds of about 600 mop.h .. 
The c potentiality of these rcraft is 
enormous .. Air New Zealand's General Manager has 
stated that a Boeing 747 could fly to Los Angeles 
and return in forty hours, and, by operating 
twenty-four days in every twenty-eight, could carry 
16,000 tons a year over this route alone .. 1 Although 
the machines are expensive, their cargo-carrying 
capacity is expected to produce a cost reduction in 
airfreight charges, the extent of this being 
determined by the nature of the cargo and the 
airline's lity to carry maximum payloads in either 
direction .. 
10 P .. Reeves, "Aviation - the New Colussus in 
International Commerce", p .. 11o This was an 
address Reeves gave to the Royal Aeronautical 
Society in Christchurch, 25 Jul 1966 .. 
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There are, of course, a number of problems 
which must be solved before New Zealand, through its 
international airline, enters the jumbo jet age" 
The ability of these aircraft to move hundreds of 
tons of produce at one time will demand great 
efficiency from New Zealand's producer industries" 
It will also be necessary for New Zealand to develop 
a large two-way trade in order to get economic 
back loading of its airfreighters for without such 
backloads the items being exported must carry extra 
costs in order to make the operation economic. 
Furthermore, the high capital cost of the jumbo j 
will demand intensive utilisation of the t 
if its operations are to be successful nancially; 
there can be no such thing as "flying in ballast" .. 
In this respect the performance with sea freight 
hardly provides grounds for confidence, for, 66, 
203 of the 915 vessels Which entered. New and's 
ports came in ballast in order to carry New Zealand 
produce abroad" 
No doubt bulk airfreighting will increase in 
importance year by year and ultimately involve 
New Zealand and its international 1 , Air New 
Zealand .. At the end of 1967, however, in the words 
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of the Minister of Civil Aviation, J. Gordon, 
"bulk airfreighting of New Zealand's present basic 
products ...... is still a vision .. 111 What is certain 
is that New Zealand as a trading nation cannot afford 
to be held to ransom by overseas airfreight interests. 
The country can best protect itself against this by 
having its own New Zealand owned, controlled, and 
operated airline which will be capable of operating a 
fleet of airfreighters at the appropriate time. 
These, the problems of routes and planes, are 
the problems which Air New Zealand must face in the 
future. . In a way, however, these problems are not 
just Air New Ze and's .. They concern the New Zealand 
Government and the New Zealand people for in the 
final analysis international airlines are instruments 
of nation policy and their fundamental significance 
to their country of origin can never be disregarded. 
The hard facts which have faced New Zealand's 
economy in the 1960s have placed new emphasis on the 
value of New Zealand owning an internation airline .. 
They have also 'raised the whole question of the 
relationship of New Zealanders and their international 
airline .. 
1. Statements by Ministers of the Crown, 1967, 
18/67, p .. 329 .. 
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For the Government's part this means that 
Air New Zealand will need the support of, and 
encouragement of, a strong and positive aviation 
policy through the years ahead.. For the people's 
part it will call for a greater willingness to 
express support for, and a loyalty towards, an 
important national enterprise. There has been in 
the past a tendency for New Zealanders to regard a 
thing of foreign origin as preferable to the equivalent 
local product. In international commercial aviation 
this has manifested itself in a certain glamour and 
prestige attached to flying foreign, i.eo using 
overseas-based airlines.. There is no doubt of the 
solid backing the Australian Government and people 
give Qantas; Swissair is the pride of that small 
country, and the Dutch are solidly behind KoL"M .. 
Air New Zealand has proved itself to be an operator 
of the highest standard .and has achieved a record for 
safety and reliability of which every New Zealander 
can be proud .. 
In the course of their growth and development 
TEAL, and latterly Air New Zealand, have been 
confronted by, and successfully surmounted, a great 
many problems .. Success, both as the regional 
operator TEAL and the international operator Air New 
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Zealand, has attended the airline's history. Listed 
among the international airlines of the world the 
New Zealand company has appeared small, perhaps even 
insignificant. However the success and value of an 
international airline are measured not by size, but 
rather by the economic results which the airline 
achieved and the advantages which it brought to its 
country of origin. From both the company's and the 
country's point-of-view, TEAL and Air New Zealand 
have been profitable ventures.. Of even greater 
importance is the fact that the two have fulfilled 
admirably their triple role of servicing the country's 
commerce, enhancing its image abroad and maintaining 
communications with neighbouring countries. In 
so doing they have justified New Zealand's 
participation in the field of international commercial 
aviation .. 
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APPENDIX A: OPERATIONAL FIGURES 
Year Ended Passengers Freight ;$ Mail 
31 March (lbs) (lbs) 
1941 1,507 18,800 78,179 
1942 1,959 32,230 167,275 
1943 2,256 35,195 101,741 
1944 2,924 40,024 94,106 
1945 5,803 84,189 142,812 
1946 6,100 99,584 214,792 
1947 11,648 176,687 278,789 
1948 18,792 223,229 331,926 
1949 24,597 377,178 345,715 
1950 22,579 361,623 405,587 
1951 31,233 561,779 461,792 
1952 42,301 1,675,447 665,206 
1953 36,898 620,252 728,485 
1954 35,910 719,959 778,073 
1955 43,575 868,983 809,599 
1956 49,389 1,016,342 796,520 
1957 62,168 1,131,174 842,906 
1958 61,908 1,184,277 922,192 
1959 69,721 1,036,291 908,634 
1960 84,130 1,537,000 1,054,000 
1961 115,109 2,389,000 1,301,000 
1962 114,29,5 2,122,000 1,243,000 
1963 108,891 1,983,000 926,000 
1964 123,489 2,399,795 950,180 
1965 156,780 3,162,981 1,008,774 
1966 188,003 3,950,586 1,376,848 
1967 231,709 4,943,859 1,658,199 
* Includes excess baggage. 
Source: (i) 1941-63: New Zealand Official Yearbook, 
1951-52; 1956; 1960; 1964. 
(ii) 1964-67: Air New Zealand Annual Report, 
1966-67. 
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APPENDIX B: TEAL OPERATION DURING WATERFRONT 
STRIKE, 1951 
Month Passengers Freight Mail 
('OOO) (tOOO lbs) <tOoo lbs} 
1950 April 3 .. 4 63 .. 3 37.8 
May 3 .. 2 77,,1 43 .. 2 
June 2 .. 3 69 .. 0 42.1 
July 2 .. 3 74 .. 2 40.5 
August 2.8 69 .. 7 44 .. 7 
1951 April 4.9 199 .. 6 45.3 
May 5.5 327.6 60.,9 
June 4.6 347.5 63 .. 6 
July 4.2 358 .. 4 65 .. 5 
August 3.8 217 .. 0 58 .. 2 
1952 April 4.1 66 .. 1 53.3 
May 3 .. 9 80 .. 0 57.6 
June 3 .. 0 68.5 50.3 
July 3 .. 4 67 .. 4 63 .. 9 
August 3 .. 9 74 .. 7 51.1 
Source: Monthly Abstract of Statistics, 
Jun 1951; Aug 1952; Jun1953. 
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